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ABSTRACT 
Information technology (IT) security, which is concerned with protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information technology assets, inherently 
possesses a significant amount of known and unknown risks. The need to manage IT 
security risk is regarded as an important aspect in the daily operations within 
organisations. IT security risk management has gained considerable attention over the 
past decade due to the collapse of some large organisations in the world.  
 
Previous investigative research in the field of IT security has indicated that despite the 
efforts that organisations use to reduce IT security risks, the trend of IT security attacks 
is still increasing. One of the contributing factors to poor management of IT security risk 
is attributed to the fact that IT security risk management is often left to the technical 
security technologists who do not necessarily employ formal risk management tools and 
reasoning. For this reason, organisations find themselves in a position where they do 
not have the correct approach to identify, assess and treat IT security risks.  
 
The IT security discipline is complex in nature and requires specialised skills. 
Organisations generally struggle to find a combination of IT security and risk 
management skills in corporate markets. The scarcity of skills leaves organisations with 
either IT security technologists who do not apply risk management principles to manage 
IT security risk or risk management specialists who do not understand IT security in 
order to manage IT security risk.  
 
Furthermore, IT is dynamic in nature and introduces new threats and vulnerabilities as it 
evolves. Taking a look at the development of personal computers over the past 20 
years is indicative of how change has been constant in this field, from big desktop 
computers to small mobile computing devices found today. The requirement to protect 
IT against threats associated with desktops was far less than the requirement 
associated with protecting mobile devices. There is pressure for organisations to ensure 
that they stay abreast with the current technology and associated risks. 
 
Failure to understand and manage IT security risk is often cited as a major cause of 
concern within most organisations’ IT environments because comprehensive 
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approaches to identify, assess and treat IT security risk are not consistently applied. 
This is due to the fact that the trend of IT security attacks across the globe is on the 
increase, resulting in gaps when managing IT security risk. 
 
Employing a formal risk based approach in managing IT security risk ensures that risks 
of importance to an organisation are accounted for and receive the correct level of 
attention. Defining an approach of how IT security risk is managed should be seen as a 
fundamental task and is the basis of this research.  
 
This study aims to contribute to the field of IT security by developing an approach that 
assists organisations in treating IT security risk more effectively. This is achieved 
through the use of a combination of existing best practice IT security frameworks and 
standards principles, basic risk management principles, as well as existing threat 
modelling processes. 
 
The approach developed in this study serves to encourage formal IT security risk 
management practices within organisations to ensure that IT security risk is accounted 
for by senior leadership. Furthermore, the approach is anticipated to be more proactive 
and iterative in nature to ensure that external factors that influence the increasing trend 
of IT security threats within the IT environment are acknowledged by organisations as 
technology evolves.  
 
Keywords: IT, IT security, risk, risk management, IT security threat modelling, IT 
security risk management, OCTAVE, COBIT, ITIL, ISO 27001/2, ISF Standard of Good 
Practice 
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
This table provides definitions of the significant terms, abbreviations and acronyms 
used in this document.  
Table A – Definition of Terms 
# KEY TERM/ACRONYM DESCRIPTION 
1 IT  
Information Technology (IT) is a set of people, processes 
and technology that allows information to be input, 
processed, output and stored throughout the information life 
cycle (Stoneburner, Goguen & Feringa, 2002) 
2 IT asset 
A resource that has high value, such as information or a file 
system (Swiderski & Snyder, 2004).  
3 Risk  
A probability or threat of damage, injury, liability, loss, or any 
other negative occurrence that is caused by external or 
internal vulnerabilities and that may be avoided through pre-
emptive action (ISO/IEC31001, 2009). 
4 Risk management 
The identification, analysis, assessment, control, avoidance, 
minimisation, or elimination of risk (ISO/IEC31001, 2009). 
5 
Risk management 
framework  
A risk management framework is a structure used to identify 
initiating events and the event sequences that might 
contribute significantly to risk. It provides realistic 
quantitative measures of the likelihood and the impact 
should the risk materialise, thereafter providing guidance on 
how that risk should be treated (ISO/IEC31001, 2009).  
6 IT security 
The process of safeguarding an organisation’s data and 
systems from unauthorised access or modification to ensure 
its availability, confidentiality and integrity (Ajibuwa, 2008). 
7 IT security threat 
A potential danger that might exploit a vulnerability and 
cause harm to an IT asset (Myagmar, Lee & Yurcik, 2005). 
8 IT security attack 
An IT security attack is any attempt to destroy, expose, 
alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised access to or make 
unauthorised use of an IT asset (Jouini, Rabai & Aissa, 
2014). 
9 IT security vulnerability 
Vulnerability is a weakness within an IT asset which allows 
an attacker to compromise the IT asset (Jouini, et al., 2014). 
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1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of society’s dependence on Information Technology (IT) has 
precipitated increasing dedication to IT security (Bhasker & Kapoor, 2009). 
Organisations and individuals always find themselves under pressure to stay abreast 
with the current technology in order to run their businesses or their lives, whereby 
their IT systems are open to the Internet (Krichene, 2008). There is a tremendous 
amount of innovation involved with technology, which introduces a great deal of 
complexity within the IT environment, thus resulting in a significant number of IT 
security risks (Ketel, 2008). IT security is a complex topic and evolves almost as fast 
as technology does (Kolias, Stavrou, Voas, Bojanova & Kuhn, 2016). 
 
While research in IT security has begun to draw attention to the importance of IT 
security risk management, the focus is still on the development of procedural 
guidelines and a few semi-automated methods (Chorppath & Alpcan, 2012 ). Several 
issues remain unsolved including the need for sophisticated formalisation in risk 
management reasoning (Krichene, 2008), which forms the basis of this study. With 
the foregoing in mind, the main objective of this study is to investigate if existing IT 
security frameworks and standards and risk management principles within the best 
practice body of knowledge can be extended to increasingly enhance management 
of IT security risk. 
 
1.2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
A risk management process is required to identify, describe and analyse possible 
vulnerabilities that could affect organisations’ assets (Ajibuwa, 2008). Risk 
management is an iterative process that should lead to continuous improvement in 
an organisation’s risk posture (Kolias, et al., 2016).  
 
For organisations to mitigate IT security risk, there should be measures that are 
implemented to minimise the likelihood and impact of risk, namely, controls (Burns, 
2005). Since the elimination of all risk is usually impractical or close to impossible, it 
is the responsibility of senior management to use the least-cost approach to 
implement prioritised controls (Alberts, et al., 2003). The implementation of 
prioritised controls assists to decrease risk to an acceptable level, with minimal 
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adverse impact on the organisation’s resources and mission (Ketel, 2008; Krichene, 
2008). 
 
Klemen and Biffl (2004) state that over time, a number of specific risk management 
approaches have been developed, including IT security risk management. IT security 
risk management is described as the process for the detection, reaction, and 
reflection procedures for IT security incidents (Amoroso, 1994; Klemen & Biffl, 2004). 
IT security risk management should be practised within organisations in order to 
achieve the goal of protecting IT and managing the associated risk (Chorppath & 
Alpcan, 2012 ). Having discussed the background to IT security risk management, 
the motivating factors that prompted this study are presented in the following 
sections. 
 
7.4.1. Increasing trend of IT security attacks 
Previous investigative research within the field of IT security in recent years have 
indicated that despite the efforts that organisations employ to reduce IT security 
risks, the trend of IT security attacks is still increasing (Netland, 2008; Straub, 2011). 
The window of time between the disclosure of a new vulnerability as well as the 
emergence of unique threats that operate against these new vulnerabilities continues 
to increase (Roos, 2008; Foley, 2009; Walser, et al., 2009). The volume of unknown 
IT security attacks is increasing, and as a consequence, the potential impact also 
increases (Roos, 2008).  
 
IT security attacks are still being launched against known vulnerabilities which 
organisations tend to ignore until they are exploited by hackers, resulting in less 
focus on unknown threats and vulnerabilities (Nakrem, 2007). Ogut (2006) attests 
that the scale and scope of hacker and virus attacks on computer systems are on the 
rise because recurring security breaches have increased. 
 
The fact that information systems are open to the Internet and the scale of hackers 
and viruses on information systems is increasing indicates that there is still a gap in 
managing IT security risk (Kolias, et al., 2016). Extending the risk management 
processes to provide insight to known and unknown threats as well as provide a real-
time holistic threat management solution is an area that requires attention (Krichene, 
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2008).The subsistence of this problem insinuates that reactive methods for 
addressing IT security attacks are still being employed within organisations. This 
statement prompts the motivating factor that follows. 
 
7.4.2. Poor risk management practices 
Failure to understand, identify and manage risk is often cited as a major cause of IT 
problems (Obrand, et al., 2012). Business executives often do not understand the 
environment in which the IT security function operates and what questions they 
should be asking their IT security personnel, resulting in a barrier to effective 
communication (Reid & Gilbert, 2007). Incomplete knowledge about the IT security 
domain in general and the current IT security status of the organisation is one of the 
main problems in IT security risk management (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). 
 
Van der Leeden (2010)  conducted a study that indicate that despite the application 
of various risk management frameworks and standards into mitigating IT security 
risks, there is still a gap in dealing with both known and unknown IT security attacks. 
The unfortunate fact is that most risk management methodologies available in the 
marketplace are reactive in nature and as a consequence end up neglecting to cater 
for unknown threats (Chorppath & Alpcan, 2012 ). Both known and unknown threats 
still remain a great IT security challenge for organisations (Van der Leeden, 2010; 
Kolias, et al., 2016).  
 
Ogut (2006) states that organisations use financial instruments such as insurance to 
hedge losses resulting from IT security breaches. Even though these financial and 
technological instruments reduce security vulnerabilities and losses from IT security 
breaches, it is not clear how organisations should manage their IT security risk 
(Ogut, 2006).  
 
The major reason behind the use of financial instruments to hedge IT security losses 
is that organisations seldom trust their IT security practitioners (Ponenti, 2008).. 
Organisations seldom trust their IT security practitioners because they are not 
objective about the process of implementing IT security controls; instead, they often 
rely on their intuition (Krichene, 2008). Unfortunately, this is the case because even 
the best practice IT security risk management frameworks and standards do not 
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provide adequate information for effective risk management (Kolias, et al., 2016). 
More specifically, most traditional IT security risk management processes ultimately 
boil down to only vulnerability identification for identifying a list of system 
vulnerabilities (Poolsappasit, 2010). Given the complexity of today’s IT infrastructure, 
it is not enough to consider the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in isolation 
(Poolsappasit, 2010).  
 
No single risk management framework is perfect or perfectly applicable to IT security 
(Ponenti, 2008). Non-existence of an IT security risk management framework leaves 
the decision-makers (i.e. IT security practitioners) with a series of challenges, the 
most pressing of which is to manage IT security risk in the ever-evolving arena of IT 
(Chorppath & Alpcan, 2012 ). It is therefore worth acknowledging that there is still 
ambiguity in the application of risk management within the field of IT security. This 
problem leads to the next motivating factor of this study. 
 
7.4.3. The incomplete mitigation of IT security risk 
Organisations employ security technologies such as firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems (IDS), encryption, biometric systems and other authentication systems to 
protect themselves against IT security attacks (Ogut, 2006). However, complete 
prevention of IT security breaches is technologically impossible and prohibitively 
expensive (Klemen & Biffl, 2004; Reid & Gilbert, 2007).  
 
Despite the increasing interest of many researchers in developing IT security 
networks technologies and strengthening the existing approaches, IT security 
mechanisms are seldom applied with efficiency to the real world (Krichene, 2008). 
Computer systems and networks have become too complex to be addressed using 
formal proofs of computability and they make up the environment in which IT security 
mechanisms are deployed and adversaries attack (Schechter, 2004). The discipline 
of IT security risk management is still unable to answer satisfactorily the question of 
how much is enough as well as how much value is derived versus benefit realised 
(Soo Hoo, 2000; Arora, Hall, Piato, Ramsey & Telang, 2004)). Ogut (2006) raises a 
valuable point by stating that even though the financial and technological controls 
reduce security vulnerabilities to a certain level, it is still not clear how organisations 
should proactively manage IT security risk. 
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1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Various authors (Ogut, 2006; Krichene, 2008; Ajibuwa, 2008) illustrate in their 
studies that IT security risk management has proven to be a challenging task 
because to date, organisations still suffer from IT security attacks on both known and 
unknown vulnerabilities. The trend of IT security threats is on the increase, as IT 
security specialists are still reactive in counteracting against the community of 
malicious hackers and do not place high focus on becoming more proactive (Straub, 
2011). The proliferation of IT has made the world seem much smaller, as computer-
related innovations, such as the Internet, allow individuals on opposite sides of the 
world to interact in ways that were unimaginable a few decades ago (Krichene, 
2008). Straub (2011) highlights that the deliberate and opportunistic paths of IT 
security compromise emanate from the Internet and attract hackers in that manner. 
 
On the other hand, formalisation in the risk management reasoning within the field of 
IT security is poor (Krichene, 2008). Fenz and Ekelhart (2009) express that 
incomplete knowledge about IT security and the IT security status of the organisation 
is one of the main problems in IT security risk management. The risk management 
frameworks and standards available in the body of knowledge do not support the 
complete process of risk management within the IT security environment (Krichene, 
2008; Straub, 2011). In fact, unknown IT security attacks are quickly becoming the 
next great IT security challenge for today’s organisations (Kolias, et al., 2016).  
 
1.4. RESEARCH VALUE 
This study is conducted through an exploratory exercise which analyses industry 
best practice IT security risk management frameworks and standards to assess if 
they can be extended to proactively manage IT security risk more effectively. By 
following the formal research methodologies, the target audience will have the 
opportunity to observe how they can use the proposed approach in their 
organisations to reduce the response rate to both known and unknown IT security 
attacks and the resulting risks. The research will be of value to any organisation’s IT 
security environment, especially senior specialists within this field. 
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1.5. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether strong characteristics of 
the existing IT security frameworks and standards, the basic risk management 
principles, as well as the IT security threat modelling processes within the best 
practice body of knowledge can be extended to develop a formal and proactive 
approach to managing IT security risk.  
 
The main research question of this study is: “Can a formal, dynamic and proactive 
approach for managing IT security risk be developed through the use of existing IT 
security frameworks and standards, basic risk management principles and IT 
security threat modelling processes?” The main objective is explored by investigating 
the sub-objectives and research questions that follow. 
 
1.5.1. Research sub-objective 1 
Research sub-objective 1: Investigate the best practice IT security frameworks and 
standards which are most commonly used within financial institutions in South Africa 
by identifying their common characteristics and limitations. This research sub-
objective will be explored in Chapter 3. This sub-objective is explored by asking 
research question 1. 
 
Research question 1: Do the selected best practice IT security frameworks and 
standards most commonly used within the financial institutions in South Africa assist 
in managing IT security risk? 
 
1.5.2. Research sub-objective 2 
Research sub-objective 2: Investigate basic risk management principles and IT 
security threat modelling processes to assess their benefits for IT security risk 
management. This research sub-objective will be explored in Chapters 3 and 4. This 
sub-objective is explored by asking research question 2. 
 
Research question 2: Can best practice risk management principles and IT security 
threat modelling processes be adopted for IT security risk management? 
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1.5.3. Research sub-objective 3 
Research sub-objective 3: Consolidate the strong characteristics of the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards, basic risk management 
principles, as well as IT security threat modelling processes to develop 
characteristics and attributes of a dynamic IT security risk management approach. 
This research objective will be explored in Chapters 5 and 6. Furthermore, the sub-
objective is explored by asking research question 3. 
 
Research question 3: Do the characteristics and attributes deduced from the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards, risk management principles, and 
IT security threat modelling processes provide a good base for a proactive and 
dynamic IT security risk management approach? 
 
1.6. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The objective of this study is achieved through the development of a holistic 
approach from the existing body of knowledge to assist professionals in the field of 
IT security to proactively manage IT security risk more effectively. The target 
audience for this study is limited to IT security professionals within the field of IT 
security. 
 
The research sample in this study is limited to financial institutions within South 
Africa. This is due to the fact that financial institutions are particularly dynamic in 
nature because they enhance process efficiency and expand their business areas on 
a more regular basis (Maphakela, 2008). In addition to this, the repercussions of not 
dealing with IT security risk within financial institutions are much greater (Ajibuwa, 
2008). 
 
Common threat sources as explained by Stoneburner, et al. (2002) are natural 
threats, human threats and environmental threats. The intention of natural threats 
and environmental threats is not malicious; on that account, more attention is given 
to human threats, as the majority of malicious intentions in IT security emanate from 
them (Alhabeeb, et al., 2010). For the purpose of this study, only human threats are 
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focused on. Human threats are events that are either enabled by or caused by 
human beings (Stoneburner, et al., 2002). Examples include unintentional acts such 
as advertent data entry or deliberate actions such as network-based attacks, 
malicious software upload and unauthorised access to confidential information 
(Stoneburner, et al., 2002). 
 
1.7. DISSERTATION LAYOUT 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, with each chapter discussing 
differing aspects pertaining to this study. The dissertation layout is depicted in Figure 
1.1. 
 
Chapter 1: This chapter provides the introduction to the study. The background 
information, statement of the problem, research value, research objectives, scope 
and limitations of this study are discussed. 
 
Literature Review Chapters 
 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are categorised under literature review chapters as their content 
is based on theoretical literature found in the body of knowledge. 
 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents the research methodology used to conduct this 
study by exploring existing literature. Additionally, the research strategy (i.e. survey) 
which is carried out for this study is presented, including the survey’s development 
process. 
 
Chapter 3: This chapter provides the literature review of the basic risk management 
principles as well as the existing IT security frameworks and standards, with the 
objective of deducing strong characteristics which can be used for managing IT 
security risk. The result of this chapter forms the theoretical basis of this study.  
 
Chapter 4: This chapter focuses on the pragmatic processes of modelling IT security 
threats with the objective of demonstrating how threats can be treated before they 
manifest in materialised risks.  
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Chapter 5: This chapter presents the proposed IT Security Risk Based (ITSRB) 
approach which utilises the basic principles of risk management, IT security 
frameworks and standards, and the threat modelling processes using Chapters 3 
and 4 as a theoretical foundation. 
 
End of Literature Review Chapters 
 
Chapter 6: The data collected from the survey (i.e. Chapter 6) is presented, and 
thereafter, the findings of the survey are analysed against the principles used to 
define the ITSRB approach.  
 
Chapter 7: This chapter concludes this study by providing the summary of the 
findings as well as assess if the stated research objectives in Chapter 1 are met. 
This chapter concludes by outlining the significance of the contribution to the field of 
IT security. Recommendations for future research are also discussed in this chapter. 
 
1.8. CONCLUSION 
The field of IT security requires a formal approach to proactively manage risk within 
the IT environment. This chapter highlighted the need for conducting this study in 
order to assist organisations to manage IT security risk better through the use of 
basic risk management principles, IT security frameworks and standards, as well as 
threat modelling processes found in the existing body of knowledge. The background 
and motivation, research objective, research value, the scope and limitations of this 
study were presented to provide the context for the research. 
 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology that is carried out by 
presenting the research strategy, methods and data collection tools used in this 
study.  
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding chapter provided an introduction and background to this study. The 
objective of this chapter is to present the research methodology that is used in this 
study. The background theory for the research methodology, with emphasis on the 
purpose of why this study is conducted, is presented. The selection of the research 
strategy is presented to provide the background for data requirements, the data 
generation method and the data analysis technique used to make conclusions. 
 
The selected research strategy chosen, the process of gathering and analysing the 
data and the process of formulating the theory for this study are discussed in section 
2.2. In addition to that, the reason for selecting quantitative measurement for data 
analysis is discussed in the same section (i.e. section 2.2). Section 2.3 includes the 
data collection process which is executed as part of the research methodology. This 
chapter is concluded in section 2.4. 
 
2.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In common terms, research refers to a creation of new knowledge through the use of 
a robust process that aims to satisfy the people who will use the discovered results 
(Sivasubramaniyan,  2012). Research can also be defined as a scientific and 
systematic search of information on a specific subject (Rajasekar, Philominathan & 
Chinnathambi, 2013). The process of research consists of identifying a problem; 
formulating a theory; collecting, organising and evaluating data; and making 
deductions, suggesting solutions and reaching conclusions (Dawson, 2002; Oates, 
2006; Sivasubramaniyan, 2012; Rajasekar, et al., 2013). To reach conclusions, the 
results must be carefully tested in order to determine whether or not they fit the 
formulating theory (Dawson, 2002). 
 
A research methodology is a mode of systematically solving a research problem 
(Dawson, 2002; Krauss, 2005; Oates, 2006; Rajasekar, et al., 2013). A research 
methodology is concerned with the explanation of why a particular study is 
undertaken; how the research problem was formulated; which strategy is employed 
to carry out the research; what types of data is collected; and why a specific 
technique of data analysis is used (Krauss, 2005).  
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The two main classes of research are basic research and applied research 
(Rajasekar, et al., 2013). Basic research investigates the elementary principles and 
reasons for the occurrence of a particular event or phenomenon, whereas applied 
research solves certain problems using well known and accepted theories and 
principles (Oates, 2006). This study employs the principles of applied research 
because it uses foundational theories derived from existing IT security, risk 
management, and threat modelling frameworks and standards. 
 
2.2.1. Six Ps of research 
 
To describe the research methodology undertaken for this study, the 6Ps of research 
suggested by Oates (2006) were considered, namely, purpose, products, process, 
participants, paradigm and presentation. 
 
2.2.1.1. Purpose: reason for conducting this research 
This study is undertaken because literature revealed that there were gaps in the 
application of formal risk management in the field of IT security. This gap was also 
suggested as an area for future research (Krichene, 2008). This study therefore aims 
to propose the ITSRB approach that intends to address the identified gaps. 
 
2.2.1.2. Product: outcomes of the research 
To bridge gaps that exist in managing IT security risk, this study develops an 
approach through the use of strong characteristics extracted out of existing best 
practice frameworks and standards. The development process of the ITSRB 
approach is presented in the form of a framework. 
 
2.2.1.3. Process: sequence of activities 
To formulate the research problem, existing literature within the body of knowledge 
was investigated. The outcome of the investigation indicated that there is still a gap 
in how IT security risk is managed within organisations. The research objective was 
formulated based on the research problem, and the background and motivation. 
Thereafter, the research paradigm, the research strategy, the data generation 
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method, as well as the data analysis techniques were chosen based on the type of 
research problem. 
 
2.2.1.4. Participants: people who were directly and indirectly involved 
In conducting the research, the academic supervisors of this study were significantly 
involved in providing guidance on the research process. Furthermore, a number of IT 
security professionals within South Africa were involved as the research population 
for data collection.  
 
2.2.1.5. Paradigm: shared way of thinking 
Myers (2004) and Oates (2006) highlight three research paradigms to be considered 
when conducting research in information systems, namely, positivism, interpretivism, 
and critical research. The positivism paradigm assumes that reality is objectively 
given and can be described by measurable and scientific properties which are 
independent of the observer (researcher) and his or her instruments (Oates, 2006). 
Interpretivism is concerned with understanding the social context influences with the 
assumption that access to reality is only through social constructions such as 
language, consciousness and shared meanings (Myers, 2004).  
 
Critical research is concerned with power relations, conflicts and contradictions with 
the assumption that social reality is historically constituted and that it is produced 
and reproduced by people (Myers, 2004). Table 2.1 presents the characteristics of 
the three research paradigms. 
 
Table 2.1 The Research Paradigms 
Positivism Interpretivism Critical research 
Validity Trustworthiness Emancipation 
Objectivity Confirmability Critique of tradition 
Reliability Dependability Non-performative intent 
Internal validity Credibility 
Critique of technological 
determinism 
External validity Transferability Reflexibility 
Source: Oates (2006) 
30 
 
 
Existing literature reveals that the positivist and interpretive paradigms are the two 
main paradigms mostly used within the field of information systems (Oates, 2006). 
Based on the research problem being investigated in this study, the positivism 
research paradigm has been identified as the most suitable philosophical 
assumption. This is based on the fact that the research objective, the research 
strategy, and the data gathering processes are strongly associated with the 
positivism research paradigm (Rajasekar, et al., 2013). The characteristics of 
positivism, presented in Table 2.1, align with the characteristics of this study. This is 
because this study uses foundational theories which are derived from valid and 
objective global best practice frameworks and standards to formulate the proposed 
ITSRB approach.  
 
2.2.1.6. Presentation: means through which the research is disseminated and 
explained to others 
This study is conducted in order to fulfil the requirements of a specific academic 
degree. The product of this study is a dissertation. The dissertation produced will be 
available and shared with the academic public as well as professionals in the field of 
IT security. Furthermore, opportunities to present this study in academic conferences 
will be used to ensure that the proposed ITSRB approach is used as widely as 
possible. 
 
Figure 2.2 presents the research methodology that was executed for this study. It 
also shows the theory formulation process, chosen research strategy, chosen data 
generation, and chosen data analysis techniques highlighted in red.  
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Figure 2.2 The Research Methodology Model 
Source: Oates (2006) 
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review, the motivating factors were discovered, and the research objective and sub-
objectives were formulated.  
 
2.2.2.1. Background and motivation 
This study was motivated by the following factors observed during the preliminary 
literature review: 
• Increasing trend of IT security attacks: Despite the efforts that organisations 
employ to reduce IT security risks, the trend of IT security attacks is still 
increasing (Krichene, 2008; Netland, 2008; Straub, 2011). Failure to ensure that 
IT security risk is mitigated adequately may have dire consequences, resulting in 
reputational damage and financial losses. 
• Poor risk management practices: Often superseding the technological risk 
aspects of IT security, many organisations leave the responsibility of managing IT 
security risk to IT security technologists because of the complexity of this 
discipline (Soo Hoo, 2000). Rather than treating IT security as just an 
independent technical concern, it should be considered as another risk that 
needs to be managed alongside all other business risks by professional risk 
managers (Soo Hoo, 2000; Foley, 2009). IT security is not just about technology; 
it is about the business (Van Cleeff, 2010). 
• The incomplete mitigation of IT security risk: Organisations employ security 
technologies such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), encryption, 
biometric systems, and other authentication systems to protect themselves 
against IT security attacks (Ogut, 2006). However, complete prevention of IT 
security breaches is technologically impossible and prohibitively expensive 
(Klemen & Biffl, 2004; Reid & Gilbert, 2007). For these reasons, organisations 
struggle to determine what controls to prioritise in mitigating IT security risk (Reid 
& Gilbert, 2007).  
2.2.2.2. Research objectives 
The main objective and sub-objectives that guided this study are revisited below. 
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2.2.2.2.1. Main objective 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether strong characteristics of the 
existing IT security frameworks and standards, the basic risk management 
principles, and the IT security threat modelling processes within the best practice 
body of knowledge can be extended to develop a formal and proactive approach for 
managing IT security risk. 
 
2.2.2.2.2. Sub-objectives 
The sub-objectives of the study are as follows: 
 
1. Investigate the best practice IT security frameworks and standards which are 
most commonly used within the financial institutions in South Africa by identifying 
their common characteristics and limitations. 
2. Investigate basic risk management principles and IT security threat modelling 
processes to assess their benefits for IT security risk management. 
3. Consolidate the strong characteristics of the investigated IT security frameworks 
and standards, basic risk management principles, as well as IT security threat 
modelling processes to develop characteristics and attributes of a dynamic IT 
security risk management approach. 
Having discussed the theory formulation of this study, including the research 
paradigm, the background and motivation as well as the objectives of this study, it is 
important to discuss the research strategy that is used. The following section 
discusses the research strategy executed. 
 
2.2.3. Research strategy 
A research strategy refers to the overall approach used to achieve the research 
objective and answer the research question (Oates, 2006). Oates (2006) and 
Sivasubramaniyan  )2012( describe six strategies which can be used to conduct 
research in the field of information systems, namely, survey; design and creation; 
experiment; case study; action research; and ethnography.  
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2.2.3.1. Examples of research strategies  
This section discusses the research strategies used in the field of information 
systems. 
 
2.2.3.1.1. Survey 
According to Kalain (2008), a survey is a systematic research strategy for gathering 
data from an illustrative sample of individuals using instruments composed of closed-
ended and/or open-ended questions, observations or interviews. 
 
2.2.3.1.2. Design and creation 
Design and creation focus on developing new IT artifacts or products (Oates, 2006). 
The development of new IT artefacts involves creating new knowledge that 
demonstrates academic qualities with emphasis on improvement and invention 
(Kalain, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.1.3. Experiment 
Experiment refers to the process investigating cause-and-effect relationships, 
through testing of hypotheses to prove or disprove causal links between a factor and 
an observed outcome (Sivasubramaniyan, 2012). 
  
2.2.3.1.4. Case study 
A case study focuses on one instance that is to be investigated in order to gain 
detailed insight of that single instance (Oates, 2006). A case study is preferred in 
examining contemporary context when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated 
(Kalain, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.1.5. Action research 
Action research focuses on conducting research in the real world and then reflecting 
on what happened (Oates, 2006). Action research is a practical approach to 
researching either to solve an immediate problem or to gain insight through a 
reflective process of progressive problem-solving (Sivasubramaniyan, 2012).  
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2.2.3.1.6. Ethnography 
Ethnography is described as the study of cultures through close observation and 
interpretation (Kalain, 2008). Ethnography focuses on getting a detailed 
understanding of a specific culture through participating in the field (Oates, 2006).  
 
2.2.3.2. Conceptual framework used in this study 
To test the conceptual framework (i.e. the ITSRB approach) proposed in this study, a 
survey was selected as a research strategy. A survey was chosen because it was 
most suitable for assessing the level of agreement on the characteristics of the 
ITSRB approach from the research sample in a systematic way. Furthermore, Adèr, 
Mellenbergh, & Hand (2008) highlight that surveys are one of the widely used 
research strategies that can be used to look for patterns in large groups of people for 
generalising responses.  
 
Surveys are not limiting because they allow the researchers to use a variety of data 
generation methods as well as a variety of delivery methods including 
questionnaires, interviews, observations and documents (Dawson, 2002). According 
to Oates (2006), surveys are strongly associated with the positivism paradigm, as 
they seek patterns and generalisations. 
 
There are a number of drawbacks to using surveys, including lack of depth; low 
response rates; inability to establish cause-and-effect relationships; and poor levels 
of accuracy (Adèr, et al., 2008). However, every research strategy has its own 
drawbacks, and in this case, the benefits of using a survey outweighed the 
disadvantages thereof. 
 
The planning for conducting the survey for this study was structured according to six 
activities, as recommended by various authors (Dawson, 2002; Oates, 2006; Adèr, 
et al., 2008). These activities include data requirements, data generation method, 
data analysis technique, measurement, measuring scale and validity testing. 
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2.2.3.3. Data requirements 
To conduct a survey, the researcher needs to consider the type of data that needs to 
be generated (Oates, 2006). Since this study intends to assess the characteristics of 
the ITSRB approach as well as its applicability effectiveness, the survey ensured that 
the data gathered from the sample size is directly associated with the research 
objective and research question. Additionally, the survey was structured in a way 
that allows for a seamless analysis of data patterns and interpretations. 
 
2.2.3.4. Data generation method 
A data generation method is described as a means by which a researcher will 
produce data (Kalain, 2008). Oates (2006) outlines four types of data generation 
methods, namely, interviews, questionnaires, observations, and documents. An 
interview refers to a controlled conversation between the researcher and the 
respondent, where the researcher asks questions associated with the research topic 
being investigated (Sivasubramaniyan,  2012). 
 
A questionnaire refers to research conducted through the use of a predefined set of 
questions, assembled in a predetermined manner (Trobia, 2008). Observation refers 
to the process of a researcher watching and paying attention to what people actually 
do instead of what they report they do (Oates, 2006). Documents data generation 
method refers to the process of using existing documents to investigate a specific 
research topic (Oates, 2006). 
 
According to Trobia (2008), the most commonly used technique for collecting data 
for a survey is a questionnaire. After careful examination of the available data 
generation methods which could be used to collect data for this study, a 
questionnaire was identified as the preferred data generation method. A 
questionnaire was selected because of its ability to allow for predefined questions 
relating to the ITSRB approach.  
 
Existing literature demonstrates that the Internet offers researchers the possibility of 
accessing many people quickly and cheaply (Fricker & Schonlau, 2002; Trobia, 
2008). In delivering the questionnaire for a survey, an email or a website can be 
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used (Oates, 2006). Fricker and Schonlau (2002) conducted a study to assess the 
key characteristics of using Internet surveys (i.e. response rate, timelines, data 
quality and cost) and the results illustrated that Internet-based surveys offer more 
advantages over conventional surveys, depending on the target population.  
 
This is because Internet surveys are easier to create and can be delivered quicker, 
at the click of a button (Fricker & Schonlau, 2002; Oates, 2006). The main 
challenges are associated with accuracy of data as well as the potential low 
response rate that can be controlled when the researcher creates the survey via 
input data validation processes and larger sample groups respectively (Fricker & 
Schonlau, 2002).  
 
A number of authors (Cobanoglu, et al., 2001; Eaton & Struthers, 2002; Perkins, 
2004) have demonstrated the many benefits that can be realised from using Internet-
based surveys, some of which are summarised as follows: 
 
• Cost efficient: Internet-based surveys are less expensive than traditional 
paper-and-pencil, physical mail, fax and telephonic survey methods. Fewer 
material resources of paper, ink, and mailing are required. 
 
• Broader sample size: The potential pool of participants that can be reached 
via Internet-based surveys is much larger than other traditional methods. 
 
• High availability: Internet-based surveys are available all the time at a 
location that is convenient for participants. 
 
• Fast delivery and response rate: Internet-based surveys allow for shorter 
delivery time to participants. The response rate is higher, as there is less 
effort required from the participants. 
 
• More flexible: Internet-based surveys allow the researcher to use various 
interactive and dynamic instruments such as images, videos, text and audio 
transmission. 
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• Improved data quality: With Internet-based surveys, the researcher is able 
to control the responses by putting in place input validation processes (e.g. a 
text field which only allows numbers). In some instances, there is even no 
need for manual data entry. Easier analysis, direct transmitting (i.e. through 
coding and analysis) of data is more accurate and there are more complete 
responses to open-ended questions. 
 
On the contrary, there are other researchers (Sheehan, 2001; Fricker & Schonlau, 
2002) who have revealed some of the key disadvantages of Internet-based surveys, 
which include the following: 
 
• Lower response rates: No commitment from participants because there is 
no reward or motivation for participating. 
 
• Higher resistance: Participants may often mistake such surveys as spam 
email with the threat of viruses. 
 
In order to mitigate the potential risk of non-response, all the participants of the 
survey were contacted and provided with a formal invitation letter (Appendix A) 
before the survey was sent out (found in Appendix A). The formal invitation letter 
specified the title of the study, the objective of the study, the objective of the survey, 
and the survey process and timelines. Upon completion of the survey, the results are 
shared with the respondents. 
 
Furthermore, an application for ethical clearance had to be made to the university 
(i.e. University of South Africa (UNISA)) to ensure that the questionnaire that is sent 
for the purposes of this study satisfies the minimum requirements and principles set 
by UNISA. The ethical clearance letter is presented in Appendix B.  
 
This study collected data through the use of an Internet-based questionnaire. The 
questionnaire used in conducting the survey was developed in a manner that 
allowed for respondents to assess the attributes and elements of the proposed 
ITSRB approach in order to ascertain its effectiveness. Additionally, the Internet-
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based questionnaire was selected because of its ease of use and creation, quick 
delivery, and easy accessibility. 
 
2.2.3.5. Data analysis technique 
Some authors (Fricker & Schonlau, 2002; Oates, 2006; Rajasekar, et al., 2013) state 
that the two main data analysis techniques for conducting research are quantitative 
and qualitative techniques. Quantitative data analysis is based on the measurement 
of quantity or amount where the results are essentially a number or a set of numbers 
(Oates, 2006). Qualitative research is concerned with quality and non-numeric data 
(Fricker & Schonlau, 2002; Oates, 2006). Qualitative research refers to the 
meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and 
description of things (Berg, 2004). Table 2.2 contrasts the characteristics of the two 
data analysis techniques (Rajasekar, et al., 2013). 
 
Table 2.2 – Data Analysis Techniques 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Numerical, non-descriptive, applies statistics or 
mathematics and uses numbers. 
Non-numerical, descriptive, applies 
reasoning and uses words. 
Iterative process whereby evidence is evaluated. It aims to get the meaning, feeling 
and description of the situation. 
The results are often presented in tables and 
graphs. 
Qualitative data cannot be graphed. 
It is conclusive. It is exploratory. 
It investigates the what, where and when of 
decision-making. 
It investigates the why and how of 
decision-making. 
Source: Rajasekar, et al. (2013) 
 
The quantitative data analysis technique was selected for this study, as it possesses 
characteristics that are suitable when attempting to make generalisations and 
seeking data patterns for a survey research. According to Oates (2006), the 
quantitative data analysis is the main type used in surveys and experiments.  
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2.2.3.6. Measurement 
In order for survey research results to be assessed, there should be some form of 
measurement criteria that are applied on the results (Dykema, et al., 2008). 
Measurement is described as the process of associating values to characteristics of 
individual aspects to indicate their position in relation to the fundamental concept 
(Dykema, et al., 2008).  
 
There are five levels of measurements as defined by Oates (2006) and Gershkoff 
(2008), namely, nominal, binary, ordinal, interval, and ratio. The numeric values of 
the variables follow an increasing trend as the ranges move from nominal level to 
ratio level (Dykema, et al., 2008; Gershkoff, 2008). These levels of measurement are 
described below. 
 
Nominal measurement: With nominal measurement level, there is no relationship 
between the numeric values of the specified variable and characteristics that those 
variables represent (Oates, 2006; Gershkoff, 2008). For researchers to use nominal 
variables for association, they must first be parted into sequences of binary values 
(Gershkoff, 2008). Statistical calculations (e.g. average, median and variance) as 
well as computations such as correlations and regressions cannot be performed on 
nominal data because they will have no native meaning (Gershkoff, 2008).  
 
Binary measurement: Oates (2008) defines binary variables as special nominal 
variables that can have two mutually exclusive values. Unlike nominal variables, 
binary variables can be used in association analyses (Gershkoff, 2008). For 
example, a variable can be given to gender (i.e. 0 = male and 1 = female) in a 
questionnaire. Under normal circumstances, there is no way that someone can be 
both male and female at the same time (i.e. they can be either male or female). 
Furthermore, there is no mathematical relationship between the number zero being 
male and the number one being female. 
 
Ordinal measurement: Ordinal variables are variables that have assigned values 
which can be ranked or methodically categorised (Gershkoff, 2008). According to 
Gershkoff (2008), general comparison analyses can be performed between ordinal 
variables; however, it is not possible to make mathematical comparisons between 
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the values of the variable. For instance, a researcher might ask the participants’ 
views about a certain subject (e.g. 5 = very high, 4 = high, 3 = medium, 2 = low, and 
1 = very low). In this instance, it is possible to rank the values as well as make 
general comparisons between the values (e.g. 5 = very high is greater than 4 = 
high), but one cannot assume that a response of four is twice the value of the 
response of two (Gershkoff, 2008).  
 
Interval measurement: Interval variables are variables where distances between 
the values of the variable are equal and mathematically meaningful, but the 
assignment of the zero value is illogical (Gershkoff, 2008). With interval variables, 
researchers are able to use a full range of parametric statistics because the 
differences between values allocated to the variables are meaningful (Gershkoff, 
2008).  
 
Ratio measurement: Ratio variables can be defined as variables where distances 
between values allocated to the variables are mathematically meaningful, and zero is 
a logical value (Gershkoff, 2008). With ratio variables, it is possible to analyse 
parametric associations and various mathematical computations such as addition, 
subtraction, multiplication and division, and such computations can be performed on 
the assigned values (Gershkoff, 2008). Likewise, it is possible for statistical 
computations such as the mean, median, mode and variance to be performed 
(Gershkoff, 2008).  
 
This study uses the ordinal measurement level for measuring the survey responses 
from the research sample. The ordinal measurement offers more meaningful results 
than nominal and binary measurements even though it is less statistically powerful 
than interval and ratio measures (Dykema, et al., 2008).  
 
Since the intention of the survey used in this study was to get the participants’ views 
on the ITSRB approach and test if the approach would actually add more value on 
how they manage IT security risk, variables across a range will be measured. As 
previously stated, ordinal measures can be used to demonstrate information about 
the relationship between two values (e.g. 5 = very good and 4 = good), indicating 
that one value is greater than the other (Gershkoff, 2008; Dykema, et al., 2008).  
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Moreover, ordinal measures are logically obtained with ordinal scales which normally 
use close-ended questions and answers where categories are classified either using 
numbers only, words only or a combination of both (e.g. a Likert scale which include 
classification of both positive and negative results) (Dykema, et al., 2008). A typical 
example is where research participants are probed to provide their level of 
agreement with a certain statement, with response options as follows: 5 = strongly 
agree; 4 = somewhat agree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 
and 1 = strongly disagree. For this reason, the characteristics that ordinal measures 
possess substantiate the motives for using them for the survey in this study. This 
way, the data quality will be optimised; the measures being used will be more 
reliable and valid; and the quantitative analysis will be more feasible. 
 
2.2.3.7. Measuring scale 
The choice of a measuring scale when a questionnaire is designed is very important 
(Brill, 2008). An ordinal scale was used for this study, as it seemed to be the most 
appropriate measuring scale. The Likert scale is one of the common forms of ordinal 
measuring scales and will be used for the questionnaire (Brill, 2008). Brill (2008) 
describes the Likert scale as a special type of the more general class of summated 
rating scales created from multiple ordered-category rating items. It has the following 
distinctive characteristics, as defined by Brill (2008): 
 
• Each item uses a set of proportionally balanced bipolar response categories 
which indicate varying levels of agreement or disagreement with a specific 
statement expressing an attitude or opinion. 
• The response category points for each item are individually labelled (e.g. strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) and typically include four or more 
points. 
• The descriptive text of the chosen labels should demonstrate similar progressions 
or gradations between each pair of consecutive points. 
A Likert scale which has five categories has been selected for this study, with the 
points defined in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 – The Likert Scale (used in this study) 
Scale Value Scale Description 
1 
Strongly Disagree: Indicates that the respondent certainly does not agree with the 
statement presented. 
2 
Disagree: Indicates that the respondent probably does not agree with the 
statement presented. 
3 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: Indicates that the respondent does not have a 
viewpoint about the statement presented. 
4 
Agree: Indicates that the respondent does agree with the statement presented to 
some level. 
5 
Strongly Agree: Indicates that the respondent certainly does agree with the 
statement presented. 
 
The scale descriptions were modified in each section of the questionnaire to assess 
the respondents’ level of agreement with that presented statement. This type of 
Likert scale was selected because it seemed more viable to analyse the values of 
the score after the data collection process.  
 
2.2.3.8. Validity testing 
To determine the effectiveness of the survey for this study, it was deemed necessary 
to pretest it before using it (Chisnall, 1997; Hutt & Speh, 2001; Singh, 2007). 
Pretesting assists in assessing the reliability, validity, accuracy, integrity and 
ambiguity of the questionnaire. It also assists in identifying any omission of important 
factors and assists in examining any requirements to integrate or remove certain 
factors from the questionnaire (Chisnall, 1997; Hutt & Speh, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, pretesting a survey usually involves validity testing. It will assist in 
identifying weaknesses such as question format, order of questioning, as well as 
reduce the risk of obtaining incorrect answers (Chisnall, 1997). 
 
Validity is primarily a measurement term which refers to the relevance of a 
measuring instrument for a particular objective (Knapp, 2008). Validity is concerned 
about whether findings are actually about what they appear to be about (Chisnall, 
1997; Knapp, 2008).  
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There are two types of validity which should be evaluated in quantitative research: 
internal and external validity (Singh, 2007). Internal validity is the consistency with 
which the study is conducted (e.g. the manner in which measurements were taken), 
whereas external validity refers to the extent to which the research results would be 
generalised to other circumstances (Howell, et al., 2005). In simple terms, research 
conducted is considered to have external validity if the results can be generalised 
(Howell, et al., 2005). 
 
There are several types of validity which are explained within various pieces of 
literature: 
 
• Content validity: This is the extent to which a measurement reflects the 
specific intended domain of content (Howell, et al., 2005).  
 
• Face validity: This refers to how a measure or a procedure appears and is 
normally required when a new measure is developed (Bryman & Cramer, 
2001; Howell, et al., 2005). Face validity intuitively assesses the measure by 
asking other people if the measure seems to capture the concept or not 
(Singh, 2007). 
 
• Construct validity: It refers to the process of seeking agreement between a 
specific measurement tool or procedure and a theoretical concept (Howell, et 
al., 2005).  
 
• Criterion-related validity: It is used to reveal the accuracy of a measure or 
procedure by comparing it with another measure or procedure that has been 
demonstrated to be valid (Bryman & Cramer, 2001). Criterion-related validity 
is also referred to as instrumental validity (Howell, et al., 2005). 
 
After much consideration, content validity is the most appropriate validity type for this 
study. This is due to the fact that the proposed questionnaire attempts to measure 
opinions and attitudes of individuals from the target population towards the ITSRB 
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approach proposed in this study with the objective of evaluating internal and external 
validity.  
 
2.3. DATA COLLECTION 
The preceding sections described the research methodology followed in conducting 
this study. This section presents the data collection process followed. The 
behaviours, thoughts and attitudes of IT security professionals are assessed to 
determine their level of agreement with the attributes and characteristics of the 
ITSRB approach. A survey was selected as a research strategy using a 
questionnaire as a data generation method. A set of closed-ended questions were 
used in order to collect individual data about one or more specific topics relating to 
the characteristics of the ITSRB approach.  
 
2.3.1. Research Objective Mapping 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether strong characteristics of the 
existing IT security frameworks and standards, the basic risk management 
principles, as well as the IT security threat modelling processes within the best 
practice body of knowledge can be extended to develop a formal and proactive 
approach to managing IT security risk. There were three sub-objectives defined in 
order to achieve the main research objective. The questionnaire (Appendix C) was 
developed in a way that ensured alignment to the research objective, thereby linking 
each section to the sub-objectives. Figure 2.2 presents the mapping of the 
questionnaire to the research sub-objectives and research questions. 
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Figure 2.3– Research Objective Mapping to the Questionnaire 
Sub-objective 1 
Investigate the best practice IT security frameworks 
which are most commonly used within the financial 
institutions in South Africa by identifying their common 
characteristics and limitations. 
 
Main Research Objective 
Investigate whether strong characteristics of the existing IT security frameworks, the basic risk 
management principles, and the IT security threat modelling processes within the best practice 
body of knowledge can be extended to develop a formal and proactive approach for managing 
IT security risk. 
Sub-objective 2 
Investigate basic risk management principles and IT security 
threat modelling processes to assess their benefits for IT 
security risk management. 
 
Sub-objective 3 
Consolidate the strong characteristics of the investigated 
IT security frameworks, basic risk management principles, 
and the IT security threat modelling processes to develop 
characteristics and attributes of a dynamic IT security risk 
management approach. 
 
Research question 1 
Do the selected best practice IT security frameworks 
most commonly used within the financial institutions in 
South Africa assist in managing IT security risk? 
 
Research question 2 
Can best practice risk management principles and IT 
security threat modelling processes be adopted for IT 
security risk management? 
 
Research question 3 
Do the characteristics and attributes deduced from the 
investigated IT security frameworks, risk management 
principles, and IT security threat modelling processes 
provide a good base for a proactive and dynamic IT 
security risk management approach? 
 
Question 5(a): OCTAVE 
Question 5(b): ISO 27001 
Question 5(c): COBIT 
Question 5(d): ITIL 
Question 5(e): ISF Standard of Good Practice 
Question 7(a): Organisational strategy and IT strategy as 
input elements for an IT security risk strategy 
 
Question 7(b): Consideration of previous IT security risks 
and incidents for IT security risk identification 
Question 7(c): Consideration of previous IT security audit 
findings for IT security risk identification 
Question 7(d): Formal, periodic (e.g. quarterly) workshops 
for IT security risk assessments 
Question 7(e): Threat modelling (IT security) at a business 
unit level at least once a year 
Question 7(g): Formal communication (i.e. reporting) of IT 
security risk to senior management on a quarterly basis 
Question 7(f): Development of an IT security risk register 
that is reviewed at least once a month 
Question 6(a): Use of a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to identify IT security risk (i.e. Hybrid 
Approach) 
 
Question 6(b): Use of an iterative process for an IT security 
risk management approach (i.e. Iteration) 
 
Question 6(c): Responsibility assignment for an IT security 
risk management approach (i.e. RACI model) 
Question 6(d): Definition of input and output elements for an 
IT security risk management approach (i.e. Input & Output) 
Question 6(e): Inclusion of threat modelling to increase 
dynamicity of the IT security risk management approach (i.e. 
Dynamicity) 
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The full questionnaire of the survey is found in Appendix C. Section 1 of the 
questionnaire aimed to gather information about the demographics of the respondents 
with the objective of determining if they actually fall within the target population. Section 
2 of the questionnaire is aligned to the first research sub-objective. The objective of 
section 2 is to evaluate the respondents’ views about the selected frameworks and 
standards’ ability to manage IT security risk. 
 
Section 3 of the questionnaire evaluates the attributes of the proposed approach. The 
attributes were extracted from the best practice IT security frameworks and standards, 
risk management principles, and threat modelling. Section 3 of the questionnaire is 
aligned to the second research sub-objective. 
 
Section 4 of the questionnaire is aligned to the third research sub-objective. Section 4 
of the questionnaire assesses the core characteristics of the proposed ITSRB approach 
in order to evaluate the respondents’ level of agreement on its ability to assist in 
managing IT security risk.  
 
2.3.2. The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was created by means of SurveyMonkey, a web-based survey tool. 
The questionnaire was structured into five main sections, namely, the introduction; the 
background about the respondent and their professional experience; best practice risk 
management frameworks and standards for IT security; approach to IT security; and the 
primary principles of the proposed ITSRB approach. 
Questionnaire design 
In designing the questionnaire, the following principles proposed by Barribeau, et al. 
(2005) were followed: 
 
• Directness: This principle ensures that questions are specifically tailored for a 
group of respondents, and are written in a straightforward and direct language. 
• Simplicity: This principle ensures that questions are kept short, simple and do not 
have complex information which has to be learned before respondents answer 
questions. 
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• Specificity: This principle ensures that more specific questions are asked as 
opposed to general ones. 
• Discreteness: This principle ensures that questions that are overly personal are 
avoided (e.g. in cases when dealing with sensitive issues). 
 
To encourage researchers to format questions in a consistent manner, Barribeau, et al. 
(2005) proposed that the following types of questions should be avoided: 
 
• double-barreled questions which compel respondents to make two decisions in one; 
• double negative questions which can lead to ambiguous answers; 
• hypothetical questions which typically require more scrutiny; 
• biased questions which indicate the researcher’s feelings or attitudes towards a 
topic; and 
• questions with long lists which may exhaust respondents’ trail of thinking. 
 
To avoid ambiguity when designing the questionnaire, the principles recommended by 
Barribeau, et al. (2005) were applied. Further, Trobia (2008) states that questionnaires 
should usually be composed of three main parts: the introduction (or cover letter) 
including the instructions, the main body, and a ‘thank you note’ to the respondents for 
their contribution.  
 
The cover letter is one of the key elements of improving the response rate because it 
introduces the research, explains the aim of the research and attempts to motivate the 
respondents to cooperate with the survey objectives (Trobia, 2008). Additionally, Trobia 
(2008) highlights that the cover letter should guarantee the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the respondents.  
 
The questionnaire for this study follows the structure that is proposed by Trobia (2008), 
and the questions were designed according to the principles stated by Barribeau, et al. 
(2005). The questionnaire started off with the introduction (or cover letter) which 
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specifies the objective of the survey as well as provides instructions to the respondents. 
Instructions are imperative especially in self-administered questionnaires because they 
provide the respondents with all the rules that must be followed in answering the 
questions (Trobia, 2008).  
 
The introduction provided information about the background of this study and why it is 
being conducted. The first section primarily collected information about the background 
of each respondent with the objective of discovering their level of experience within the 
field of IT security as well as the size of the organisation that they work for. The first 
section provided three options for the respondents to choose from.  
 
The main body of the questionnaire was made up of three sub-sections which have 
close-ended questions (i.e. section 2 to section 4). The questions in these sections 
utilised a 5-point Likert scale that provided categories of both positive and negative 
values to indicate the level of agreement of the respondent for each statement 
presented. The response options ranged from “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither 
agree nor disagree”, “agree” to “strongly agree”. 
 
The second section presented the IT security frameworks and standards which were 
used as a basis for the proposed ITSRB approach. The idea behind this section was to 
determine how much the respondents agree with the frameworks and standards’ ability 
to manage IT security risk.  
 
The third section assessed the attributes of the proposed ITSRB approach to test the 
respondents’ level of agreement with its basic attributes. The fourth section was used to 
test the respondents’ level of agreement with the characteristics of the proposed 
approach. Lastly, the questionnaire ended with a conclusion which thanked the 
respondents for participating in the survey. 
 
2.3.3. Population size 
Population size refers to the total number of people that are eligible to participate in a 
survey (Penwarden, 2014). To determine the population size of IT security 
professionals within the financial institutions of South Africa, data from the Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSiRA) was used. PSiRA is a regulatory 
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authority in South Africa responsible for regulating both the private and public security 
industry to ensure the public and national interest of the security industry. It is important 
to note that all financial services institutions listed on the South African stock exchange 
are regulated by PSiRA (PSiRA, 2014).  
 
For this reason, the population size for security professionals within South African 
financial institutions will be less than the population size specified by PSiRA because 
PSiRA’s data encompasses other security professionals outside financial institutions. 
Analysis revealed that the population size of IT security professionals within South 
Africa was 476 in 2014 (PSiRA, 2014). To ensure that an adequate confidence level 
and margin of error are achieved for this study, a population size of 500 was assumed. 
 
Penwarden (2014) emphasises the importance of considering the size of the target 
population, the sample size, the confidence level, as well as the margin of error to avoid 
guessing. Table 2.41 presents the effects of these parameters (i.e. population size, 
sample size, confidence level, and error margin) on the accuracy of the results. 
 
Table 2.4– Level of Accuracy Parameters  
 Parameter Name Value Increased Value Decreased 
Population Size Accuracy Decreases Accuracy Increases 
Sample Size Accuracy Increases Accuracy Decreases 
Confidence Level Accuracy Increases Accuracy Decreases 
Margin of Error Accuracy Decreases Accuracy Increases 
Source: Penwarden (2014) 
 
Sample size refers to the number of people that are selected to participate in a survey 
(Penwarden, 2014). A higher sample size provides a higher confidence level. The 
confidence level describes how certain a researcher can be that their results are 
correct, with a value of between 90% and 99% being acceptable for surveying 
(Penwarden, 2014). A higher confidence level increases the accuracy level of the 
results (Penwarden, 2014). The margin of error refers to the potential amount of 
random sampling error in a survey’s results (Penwarden, 2014). A higher error margin 
decreases the level of accuracy in the results (Penwarden, 2014). 
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In calculating the sample size for this study, the parameters recommended by 
Penwarden (2014) were considered (i.e. population size, sample size, confidence level, 
and margin of error). The population size was approximately 500 individuals, based on 
the data sourced from PSiRA (2014). Penwarden (2014) stated that an average 
response rate for an email survey that has a link to a web-based survey is about 24.8%. 
Acknowledging that the response rates for web-based surveys are very low, a 
confidence level of 90% and a margin of error equal to 10% were used to determine the 
minimum sample size of 60. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to 150 IT security professionals within South African 
financial institutions. The target was to get at least 60 responses in order to achieve an 
acceptable confidence level of 90%. The questionnaire consisted of 21 questions which 
were dispersed amongst the four sections illustrated in Figure 6.2 found in section 6.2 
of this chapter. 
 
2.3.4. Target population 
The target population is the total group of individuals from which the sample is drawn 
(Penwarden, 2014). The target population consisted of individuals who work for 
different financial institutions within South Africa including Standard Bank, Absa, 
Nedbank, FirstRand, Alexandra Forbes, Mutual & Federal, Momentum, and Old Mutual. 
The questionnaire was administered to personnel who are directly or indirectly involved 
with IT security risk management, IT security governance, IT security operations, and IT 
security advisory. The roles of the sample group included IT security officers; IT security 
managers; IT security internal and external auditors; IT security operations personnel; 
IT risk managers; and IT security risk consultants. 
 
The questionnaire’s invitation letter was sent to the indicated sample group via email 
with the link to the questionnaire included. The initial communication detailed the 
purpose of the study, process and timeline. The questionnaire’s invitation letter is in 
Appendix A.  
 
Confidentiality of the responses was ensured because the questionnaire was designed 
in a way that made it impossible to determine who responded. Respondents’ computer 
public IP addresses could be seen from SurveyMonkey; however, because most 
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organisations make use of dynamic IP addresses, it would be a challenge to trace any 
IP address back to a specific person (Van Horne, et al., 2001). 
 
Dynamic IP addressing refers to a method for remotely connecting client computers to a 
communication network by way of a server system, thereby allowing client computers to 
change IP addresses with every connection (Miller, 2001; Van Horne, et al., 2001). It 
was therefore not possible to know who the different respondents were. This further 
strengthened the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents. 
 
2.3.5. Sampling 
Oates (2006) states that there are two types of sampling techniques: probability and 
non-probability sampling. Probability sampling is used when there is a high probability 
that the sample of respondents chosen is a representation of the overall population 
being studied (Oates, 2006). With non-probability sampling, the research samples are 
gathered in a process that does not give all the individuals in the population equal 
chances of being selected (Oates, 2006). An overview of sampling techniques is 
depicted in Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 – Sampling Techniques 
 
 
Source: Oates (2006) 
 
There are four types of probabilistic sampling, namely, random, systematic, stratified, 
and cluster probabilistic sampling (Oates, 2006). Random probabilistic sampling 
involves a random selection of the population being studied and is often carried out for 
widespread research (Oates, 2006). With systematic probabilistic sampling, the 
population must be listed in a random order based on the characteristics being studied. 
Systematic sampling is more precise than random sampling (Trochim, 2006). Stratified 
probabilistic sampling involves selecting a random proportion from random sampling, 
dividing the population into homogeneous sub-groups and then taking a simple random 
Probabilistic Non-probabilistic 
Random Purposive 
Systematic Snowball 
Stratified Self-selection 
Cluster Convenience 
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sample in each sub-group (Oates, 2006). In cluster sampling, the population is divided 
into clusters; the clusters are randomly sampled and thereafter all the samples within 
the sampled clusters are measured (Trochim, 2006).  
 
Similarly, there are four types of non-probabilistic sampling techniques; these are 
purposive, snowball, self-selection, and convenience non-probabilistic sampling 
techniques. In purposive sampling, the researcher samples with a purpose in mind and 
needs to reach a targeted sample (Oates, 2006). With snowball sampling, the 
researcher starts by identifying individuals who meet the criteria for inclusion in their 
study; thereafter, the researcher requests those individuals identified to recommend 
others whom they may know who also meet the criteria (Trochim, 2006). With the self-
selection non-probabilistic sampling technique, the researcher publicises their need for 
samples, checking the relevant samples and thereafter inviting or rejecting the samples 
based on the specified criteria (Oates, 2006). With convenience non-probabilistic 
sampling, the researcher seeks volunteers to form part of their sample size and utilise 
them in the study assuming that they meet his or her criteria for the target population 
(Oates, 2006).  
 
A non-probabilistic purposive sampling technique was used because its characteristics 
resonate with goals of conducting the survey for this study (i.e. to assess IT security 
professionals’ level of agreement with the ITSRB approach). IT security professionals in 
the South African financial institutions were selected to participate in the survey, as they 
were more likely to produce valuable data that meets the purpose of this study. 
 
To analyse the data collected, the quantitative data analysis technique was selected, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The quantitative data analysis technique possesses 
characteristics that are suitable when attempting to make generalisations and seeking 
data patterns for a survey research such as this one. According to Oates (2006), 
quantitative data analysis is the main type used in surveys and experiments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the research methodology used to conduct this study. 
Investigation of the literature revealed the survey strategy as the most suitable strategy 
for this study, as it possesses characteristics which are anticipated to assist this study 
in attaining the research objectives as well as answering the associated research 
questions.  
 
Since there are different data generation methods which exist, an analysis was also 
conducted to review the advantages and disadvantages of the different methods 
available, and a questionnaire was selected as the most appropriate data generation 
method for this study. The delivery method selected was the Internet (i.e. web-based 
questionnaire), as it presented the most appealing characteristics that aligned to the 
objectives of this study. The quantitative data analysis technique was selected because 
it allowed for generalisations of data that would yield the findings of this study.  
 
Furthermore, the data collection process followed as well as the questionnaire used for 
the survey were presented. The questionnaire was mapped to the research objective of 
the study to ensure alignment. The process of formulating the questionnaire was 
discussed. Furthermore, the process of administering the questionnaire including the 
population size, the target population and the survey tool used were presented.  
 
The chapter that follows discusses the risk management and IT security frameworks 
and standards with the objective of understanding their benefits in managing IT security 
risk. 
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3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Management of IT security risk requires efficient and effective governance and risk 
management practices which are holistic, taking into account several interacting 
components (IT Governance Institute [ITGI], 2012). This chapter reviews the basic risk 
management frameworks as well as IT security frameworks and standards within the 
current body of knowledge. Since risk management forms an integral part of the 
proposed IT Security Risk Based (ITSRB) approach, it is discussed in depth in this 
chapter. Additionally, the basic concepts underlying the concept of IT security and the 
characteristics of the frameworks and standards are discussed in order to accentuate 
the importance of managing risk for IT security. The objective of reviewing 
characteristics of the frameworks and standards is to identify similarities which may 
exist amongst the frameworks and standards. The output of the review is leveraged 
when developing the ITSRB approach. 
 
The foregoing chapter discussed the research methodology employed in this study. 
This third chapter is divided into five sections. Section 3.2 provides the background of 
the basic IT security concepts. Section 3.3 provides an overview of risk management 
for IT security. Section 3.4 presents the selected IT security frameworks and standards 
by analysing the strong areas and weaknesses of each framework and standard. The 
chapter concludes with Section 3.5.  
 
3.2. BACKGROUND 
Information is deemed to be a critical asset to any organisation regardless of the nature 
of the business because it enables business operations (Walser, et al., 2009). Today’s 
world requires information to be accessible and dependable across the globe (Panda, 
2009). Organisations use Information Technology (IT) to process their information for 
better support of their missions, business critical functions, as well as their strategies 
(Maphakela, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, organisations and individuals always find themselves under pressure to 
stay abreast with current IT in order to run their businesses or their private lives better 
because of the need to communicate over the Internet (Krichene, 2008). Unfortunately, 
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this need for accessing the Internet also exposes organisations and individuals to a 
variety of threats that can have adverse effects on IT assets (Walser, et al., 2009).  
 
The development of personal computers over the past 20 years is indicative of how 
change has been continuous in the field of IT (i.e. from big desktop computers to small 
mobile computing devices) (Winter & Schelp, 2008; Poolsappasit, 2010). The 
development of personal computers shows an increasing trend of personal portable 
devices which are Internet-enabled, allowing people to communicate in their own 
comfort (Winter & Schelp, 2008). The IT security threats emanating from desktop 
personal computers are different from the IT security threats emanating from portable 
personal computers (Poolsappasit, 2010). The changing environment in IT has 
therefore necessitated the need for IT security professionals to stay abreast with current 
technology to ensure that the correct IT security controls are put in place for the 
protection of IT assets (Winter & Schelp, 2008). 
 
3.2.1. The need to protect IT assets 
Today’s world requires that digital data be accessible, dependable and protected from 
misuse (Panda, 2009). Information is deemed to be a critical asset to any organisation 
irrespective of the nature of the business (Walser, et al., 2009). In this digital era, 
organisations use IT to transform their information to better support their missions, 
business critical functions, and their strategies, which make IT one of the key enablers 
of business (Stoneburner, et al., 2002). The process of transforming information within 
the context of IT involves creating, processing, transmitting and storing of information 
with the use of IT (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). Information gathers meaning and value 
as it goes through the different processes of transformation (Panda, 2009). Information 
is a vital part of IT; as such, it is regarded as a significant IT asset (Whitman & Mattord, 
2005; Panda, 2009).  
 
Organisations have transitioned to conducting over 99% of their essential functions 
electronically using IT (Walser, et al., 2009). The motivation of this significant reliance 
on IT has shifted from egotistical to monetary, as the requirement for protecting IT has 
become a continuous point of concern (Walser, et al., 2009). Therefore, the need to 
protect IT assets has necessitated the discipline of IT security (Krichene, 2008). 
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3.2.2. The need for IT security 
To safeguard IT, the process of IT security is applied. The goal of IT security is to 
protect the confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and authentication of IT 
assets (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). Confidentiality refers to the principle of 
preserving IT assets, thereby ensuring that information is not disclosed to unauthorised 
individuals, entities or processes (Taylor, et al., 2008). 
 
Integrity is concerned with protecting unauthorised modification of IT assets, thus 
ensuring the completeness and accuracy of information (Bishop, 2005). Availability 
refers to the principle of ensuring that IT assets are accessible and usable upon 
demand by authorised entities (Bishop, 2005). 
 
The goal of non-repudiation is to guarantee that parties involved in accessing IT assets 
cannot deny their activities at a later stage (Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). 
Authentication involves confirming the identity of people who access IT assets (Siponen 
& Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). 
 
Various pieces of literature use the terms “IT security”, “computer security”, “information 
security” and “information assurance” interchangeably, which all share the common 
goal of protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information and IT 
(Ajibuwa, 2008). There are some subtle differences between the terms that define IT 
security, which lie primarily in the approach to the subject, the methodologies used and 
the areas of concentration (Taylor, et al., 2008; Ajibuwa, 2008). For the purpose of this 
study, the term “IT security” is used.  
 
Having reviewed the basics of IT security, it is now important to examine the concepts 
of corporate governance and its sub-components. These include IT governance and 
risk management, which have been identified as an area of weakness within IT security 
(Krichene, 2008). 
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3.3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is the framework that strategically monitors whether the 
outcomes of an organisation are in accordance with its set plans (Maphakela, 2008; 
Bradley & Pratt, 2011). Corporate governance involves many activities within an 
organisation which form an integrated system of administration, accountability and 
supervision (IT Service Management Forum [ITSMF], 2007; Tang-Jing & Shen-LePing, 
2010; Bradley & Pratt, 2011). The goal of corporate governance is to ensure that 
leadership teams within organisations make their decisions in a responsible manner 
(ITSMF, 2007; Institute of Directors, 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers [PwC], 2009). The 
two disciplines under corporate governance which form the basis of this study are IT 
governance and risk management.  
 
Likewise, the King III Code, a global corporate governance framework, encourages 
organisations’ boards to place great emphasis on ensuring that they are satisfied with 
the governance of IT and management of risk, as they form the cornerstones of 
corporate governance (Institute of Directors, 2009). For the purpose of this study, the 
principles recommended by King III Code (2009) have been adopted. These disciplines 
are discussed in the ensuing sections. 
 
3.3.1. IT governance 
The pervasiveness of IT has led to the development of a formal subset of corporate 
governance – IT governance (Institute of Directors, 2009; Bradley & Pratt, 2011). IT 
governance is described as a discipline that is primarily concerned with IT management 
processes, regulations, inspection standards, control frameworks and standards, 
measurement tools, and the protection of IT assets (Tang-Jing & Shen-LePing, 2010). 
IT governance enables the leadership of an organisation to adequately control the 
foundation and execution of IT through the existing organisational structures and 
processes to produce desirable results (Maphakela, 2008). IT governance assists 
organisations to better align their IT initiatives and the organisation’s overall strategic 
objectives (Tang-Jing & Shen-LePing, 2010). The protection of IT assets necessitates a 
risk management process that aims to manage risk emanating from IT (Tang-Jing & 
Shen-LePing, 2010). 
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3.3.2. Risk management 
To understand the intricacies that come with managing risk within IT security, it is 
important to understand the concept of risk management, as it provides the basis of 
how risk for IT security should be managed (Ketel, 2008). Risk management is 
described as the process of forecasting, evaluating and treating risks with the objective 
of minimising the impact of unacceptable risk (Felegyhazi, 2011).  
 
The principal goal of an organisation’s risk management process should be to protect 
the organisation and its ability to perform its mission, including its IT assets (Walser, et 
al., 2009). Risk management process within IT should not be treated primarily as a 
technical function carried out by IT experts who operate and manage the IT system but 
as an essential management function of the organisation alongside other business risks 
(Stoneburner, et al., 2002).  
 
Risk management is an iterative process which should lead to continuous improvement 
in an organisation’s risk posture (Ketel, 2008). Risk management is positioned as the 
cornerstone of corporate governance and greater emphasis is placed on the 
organisation’s board to ensure that it is satisfied with the management of risk 
(Maphakela, 2008; Institute of Directors, 2009; PwC, 2009).  
 
To achieve the goal of adopting a robust process for risk management, the ISO 31000 
framework was adopted. ISO 31000 is a risk management framework developed by the 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), which are international bodies whose members are 
subject matter experts responsible for participating in developing international 
standards through technical committees (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009). ISO 31000 is cited as 
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 and provides principles, guidelines and a process for managing 
risk for any organisation regardless of its size, activity or sector (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.2 depicts the basic risk management framework based on ISO 31000. It 
highlights the key focus areas of a generic risk management process as well as the 
continuous life cycle of risk assessment, risk treatment, risk monitoring, and 
communication. 
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Figure 3.2 – Generic Risk Management Process 
Source: ISO/IEC 31001 (2009) 
 
3.3.2.1. Establish context 
Prior to the commencement of a risk assessment process, a context setting activity 
must be carried out to determine the scope and boundaries of the assessment (ISO/IEC 
31001, 2009). Establishing the context provides a basic understanding of the risk and 
its risk universe (Gibson, 2012). Furthermore, establishing the context assists in 
identifying the criteria that will be applied and the activities involved in determining the 
initial risk rating of the object being assessed (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009). The initial risk 
rating allows the risk assessment process to prioritise the assessments by focusing 
effort and resources on areas with higher risk (Ketel, 2008). 
 
3.3.2.2. Risk assessment (risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation) 
The risk assessment process consists of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation. Risk identification establishes the exposure of the organisation to risk and 
uncertainty (Maphakela, 2008). This includes knowledge of the factors critical to 
success as well as the threats and opportunities related to the achievement of 
objectives (Gibson, 2012). The risk analysis and evaluation activity assists the effective 
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and efficient operation of the organisation by identifying risks that require attention from 
management (Commission, 2015). Moreover, the risk assessment activity provides 
organisations with the ability to prioritise risk and control actions with respect to their 
potential for benefiting the organisation (Institute of Risk Management [IRM], 2010). 
 
3.3.2.3. Risk treatment 
Risk treatment is the process of selecting and implementing measures to control risk 
(IRM, 2010). Risk treatment consists of four options, namely, risk mitigation, risk 
avoidance, risk transfer and risk acceptance (Jahankhani & Nkhoma, 2009).  
 
Risk mitigation refers to the process of implementing controls to reduce either the 
likelihood or the impact of risks that are borne by the object (Ketel, 2008). Risk 
avoidance is the process of evading the risk in a case where the cost and likelihood of 
the risk are large and it is no longer feasible to continue operation in the area of activity 
that incurs the risk (IRM, 2010). 
 
Risk transfer is concerned with sharing the cost of the risk through tools such as 
insurance, contracts and warranties or joint-venture agreements in cases where the risk 
is part of the business, but the cost is predictable (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009). Risk 
acceptance refers to a case where the risk is unlikely to materialise or its impact is so 
low that it warrants no further action (Gibson, 2012). 
 
3.3.2.4. Monitoring and review 
During the process of risk assessment, it is imperative to monitor and review risk 
performance to ensure that the risks facing the organisation are still valid as well as to 
ensure that the organisation learns from past experiences (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009; IRM, 
2010).  
 
3.3.2.5. Communication and consultation 
Communication and consultation are also considered to be part of the supporting 
activity in managing risk (ISO/IEC 31001, 2009). The key stakeholders or risk owners 
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should be kept informed about risk performance to ensure that focus is placed on the 
risk that matters (Institute of Directors, 2009; IRM, 2010). 
 
Jahankhani and Nkhoma (2009) demonstrated in their study that risk is seldom 
eliminated; it is merely mitigated or controlled. This is the same reason that a risk 
management process is an endless or iterative loop (Gibson, 2012). Once a risk is 
mitigated, it should be periodically reviewed, and controls should be tested for 
compliance at regular intervals (Maphakela, 2008; Jahankhani & Nkhoma, 2009; IRM, 
2010).  
 
The relationship between corporate governance, risk management and IT governance 
is fundamental for organisations to deliver on their strategies and missions (Tang-Jing & 
Shen-LePing, 2010). According to Krichene (2008), there is a need to extend the 
principles of risk management into the area of IT security. Management of risk in IT 
security is an essential process in IT governance as well as corporate governance and 
has motivated the need for IT security risk management (Tang-Jing & Shen-LePing, 
2010). 
 
3.3.3. IT security risk management 
The interpretation of corporate governance, IT governance and risk management 
adopted from King III Code (2009) are summarised in Figure 3.3 with the objective of 
highlighting the foundation of IT security risk management.  
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
King III Code 2009 
CHAPTER 4:  
THE 
GOVERNANCE 
OF RISK 
 
Principle 5.5: IT should form 
an integral part of the 
company’s risk management 
 
Principle 5.6: The board should 
ensure that information assets 
are managed effectively 
MANAGEMENT OF IT 
SECURITY RISK 
 
The board should ensure that 
processes have been established to 
ensure a formal information security 
management system is in place to 
ensure: 
• the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information;  
• that company information is 
adequately protected; and 
• that personal and sensitive 
information has been identified 
and is protected according to 
relevant laws and regulations. 
 
CHAPTER 5:  
THE 
GOVERNANCE 
OF IT 
 
Figure 3.3 – The Foundation of IT Security Risk Management 
 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (2010), the 
process of due care and due diligence for protecting IT assets is required to exercise a 
robust risk management process. This raises the need for IT security risk management 
(NIST, 2010).  
 
Chowdhury, et al. (2012) demonstrated in their study that the significance of IT security 
is globally accepted and that it involves a risk management process to justify the 
investment for IT security measures in order to support the IT security risk management 
process throughout all stages of IT. IT security is considered a risk management 
strategy and should be addressed as one of the many key risk areas (Jahankhani & 
Nkhoma, 2009). An effective IT security risk evaluation considers both organisational 
and technological issues, examining how people use their organisation’s IT 
infrastructure on a daily basis (Alberts, et al., 2003). 
 
Figure 3.3 demonstrated that IT security risk management embodies the primary goals 
of corporate governance, risk management, and IT governance. The ultimate goal of 
the process of IT security risk management is to make senior management within an 
organisation aware of possible risks including threats and consequences (NIST, 2010). 
IT security risk management guides organisations towards the adoption of a set of 
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actions which can bring the overall IT security risk to an acceptable level, thereby 
realising the return on security investment (Ketel, 2008).  
 
Having reviewed the key principles of well-founded frameworks and standards for 
corporate governance and risk management (i.e. King III Code:2009, ISO 31000:2009), 
it is safe to conclude that a typical IT security risk management framework should be 
guided by the following principles: 
 
• The starting point in the process of IT security risk management is to categorise IT 
assets as per their criticality to the organisation. 
• The risk (likelihood and its impact) should be viewed holistically (i.e. from the 
perspective of the entire organisation, not only IT). 
• The identified risks should have a business impact or quantifiable loss.  
• The base of the evaluation of risk should encompass all kinds of risk, from minor IT 
security incidents to potentially catastrophic events. 
• Once IT assets have been classified, IT security controls can be selected, 
implemented, assessed, authorised and then monitored on a periodic basis.  
 
Now that the foundation of IT security risk management has been discussed, it is 
important to analyse the selected best practice frameworks and standards in order to 
evaluate their strengths and weaknesses for IT security risk management in the next 
section. 
  
3.4. IT SECURITY FRAMEWORKS AND STANDARDS 
This section describes some of the common IT security frameworks and standards 
used within South African financial institutions (Amsenga, 2005; Maphakela, 2008). It is 
important to note that there are many other IT security frameworks and standards within 
the current body of knowledge developed by local governments within different 
European countries such as Austrian IT Security Handbook; Cramm Tool developed by 
British Central Communication and Telecommunication Agency; Dutch A&K Analysis; 
Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité (Ebios) from France; 
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and Information Security Assessment & Monitoring Method (ISAMM) from Belgium 
(ENISA, 2005). However, these frameworks and standards are beyond the scope of this 
study, as this study examines the common IT security frameworks and standards used 
within South African financial institutions. 
  
The frameworks and standards selected are Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE); ISO 27001/2; Control Objectives for Information 
and related Technology 5 (COBIT 5); Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
version 3 (ITIL v3); and Information Security Forum Standard of Good Practice (ISF 
SoGP). These frameworks and standards were selected because they provide a 
focused scope that is exhaustive and they are commonly used within South African 
financial institutions.  
 
OCTAVE is an IT security risk management framework (Alberts, et al., 2003). COBIT 5 
and IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) are categorised as IT governance frameworks even 
though COBIT 5 is more strategic and ITIL is more operational; however, both of them 
have IT security as sub-components (ITSMF, 2007; ITGI, 2012). Similarly, ISF SoGP 
and ISO 27001/2 are purely IT security standards with the objective of assisting 
organisations in managing IT security adequately (ISO/IEC 27001, 2007; Chaplin & 
Creasy, 2011).  
 
Although the discussed frameworks and standards approach the subject of IT security 
differently, their ultimate goal is to reduce IT security risk to an acceptable level as per 
the organisation’s risk appetite. The analysis presented in this section explores the 
selected frameworks and standards with emphasis on their strong characteristics, which 
are consolidated in developing the proposed ITSRB approach. 
 
The following sections discuss the selected frameworks and standards (i.e. OCTAVE, 
ISO 27001, COBIT 5, ITIL, and ISF SoGP) in detail to highlight their characteristics, key 
strengths and shortcomings.  
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3.4.1. OCTAVE  
OCTAVE is a process-driven framework that enables organisations to understand, 
assess and address their security risks from the organisation’s perspective by 
identifying, prioritising and managing security risks (Panda, 2009). OCTAVE is 
described as a self-directed approach that people from an organisation can use to 
administer and direct security risk evaluation activities (Marek & Paulina, 2006).  
 
3.4.1.1. Characteristics of OCTAVE 
OCTAVE is an IT security risk management framework (Alberts, et al., 2003). OCTAVE 
is a systematic approach because it enables people within an organisation from 
different dimensions (i.e. top management, middle management and operational staff) 
to identify security issues within their immediate areas (Marek & Paulina, 2006). The 
ability for IT security to be managed at various levels tends to improve an entire 
organisation’s security posture without placing unnecessary reliance on outside experts 
and vendors (Alberts, et al., 2003).  
 
Alberts, et al. (2003) point out that for an organisation to understand its security needs, 
OCTAVE is ideal because it is a holistic risk based strategic assessment and planning 
technique for security. OCTAVE emphasises that the level of risk tolerance for an 
organisation should be determined first before the security strategy in order to ensure 
the highest possible level of protection, without hindering business activities (Marek & 
Paulina, 2006). OCTAVE allows a balance to exist between the protection of critical 
information assets and the cost of providing protective and detective controls (Albert & 
Dorofee, 2001; Alberts, et al., 2003).  
 
OCTAVE strives to balance three aspects: operational risk, security practices, and 
technology (White, 2012). Balancing risk, security and technology ensures that all other 
aspects outside the IT environment are considered during an OCTAVE assessment 
(Alberts, et al., 2003; White, 2012). In principle, the risk management activities are built 
as foundational activities during the OCTAVE assessment (Alberts, et al., 2003). Unlike 
the typical technology-focused assessments, which are targeted at technological risk 
and focused on tactical issues, OCTAVE is targeted at organisational risk and focused 
on strategic, practice-related issues (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001).  
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OCTAVE has four major components: Asset, Threat, Vulnerability, and Impact (Panda, 
2009). A security risk evaluation must have an accountability of all of the four major 
components of OCTAVE (Alberts, et al., 2003; Whitman & Mattord, 2005; Panda, 
2009). 
 
OCTAVE is organised into three phases to assess the organisational view, the 
technological view and the actual security risk analysis process. The OCTAVE 
framework is depicted in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.4 – The OCTAVE Phases 
Source:  Panda (2009) 
 
Phase 1: Build asset-based threat profiles – This is an organisational evaluation. 
The analysis team determines what is important to the organisation (information-related 
Phase 3 
Risk Analysis 
Output Phase 1 
Consolidated organisational view of  
• Critical assets 
• Security requirements for critical 
assets 
• Areas of concern and impact 
descriptions 
• Current security practices 
• Current vulnerabilities 
• Threat profiles 
Output Phase 2 
• Key components for critical 
assets 
• Current technological 
vulnerabilities for key 
components 
Output Phase 3 
• Risk measures 
• Risks to critical assets 
• Protection strategies 
• Mitigation plans 
• Next steps 
• Senior management approval 
Process 1: Identify senior 
management knowledge 
Phase 1 
Organisational View 
Process 3: Identify staff 
knowledge 
Process 2: Identify 
operational area 
management knowledge 
Process 4: Create threat 
profile 
Phase 2 
Technological View 
Process 5: Identify key 
components 
Process 7: Conduct risk 
analysis 
Process 6: Evaluate 
selected components 
Next Steps 
Process 8: Develop 
protection strategy and 
mitigation plan 
The OCTAVE Phases 
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assets) and what is currently being done to protect those assets (Panda, 2009). 
Important assets to the organisation are then selected; IT security requirements and 
threats for each of the organisational assets are described (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). 
The output of this phase is an IT security threat profile for each important organisational 
asset (Panda, 2009).  
 
Phase 2: Identify infrastructure vulnerabilities – This is an evaluation of IT. The 
network access paths and classes of IT components related to each critical asset are 
examined (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). The output of this phase provides a view of the 
potential vulnerabilities of IT assets relating to organisational assets (Panda, 2009). 
 
Phase 3: Develop security strategy and plans – During this part of the evaluation, a 
risk analysis of the identified IT security risks is conducted (Alberts & Dorofee, 2001). 
The output of this phase is an IT security strategy which details the IT security 
mitigation plans to address the risks to critical assets, based on an analysis of the 
information gathered (Panda, 2009).  
 
3.4.1.2. Advantages of OCTAVE 
OCTAVE is self-directed 
  
This means that the organisation’s personnel are involved in the decision-making 
process (Marek & Paulina, 2006). The OCTAVE method also emphasises that the 
analysis team can add personnel (i.e. subject matter experts to provide further detail) as 
and when needed during assessment workshops (White, 2012).  
 
OCTAVE is systematic and context-driven 
  
OCTAVE develops risk evaluation criteria based on operational risk tolerances from 
both strategic and operational areas (Panda, 2009). Developing risk evaluation criteria 
aids in identifying vulnerabilities and threats of importance, and evaluating potential 
consequences to the organisation should the risk materialise (White, 2012).  
 
24 
 
OCTAVE is a risk based approach 
  
As previously discussed, information and IT are essential to organisations, and 
ensuring adequate protection to them is important to organisations’ missions (Whitman 
& Mattord, 2005). There is a need for organisations to focus on their most important 
information assets when making decisions about protecting them in order to achieve 
optimal return on security investments (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). Adopting security 
controls to protect information assets without proper assessment of risks will either 
overprotect assets, making security a hindrance to business operations, or under 
protect assets, resulting in the exposure of business-critical assets to threats (Panda, 
2009). OCTAVE allows organisations to balance the protection of critical information 
assets against the costs of providing protective and detective controls (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2005; Panda, 2009).  
 
The benefits associated with the use of OCTAVE are indescribable and demonstrate 
value to organisations by ultimately saving money in the long run (Whitman & Mattord, 
2005; Panda, 2009). Having reviewed the key strengths of OCTAVE, it is also important 
to discuss its shortcoming, which may present challenges when OCTAVE is used within 
organisations. 
  
3.4.1.3. Disadvantages of OCTAVE 
Dedication of top management to the assessment exercise 
 
Time invested in conducting an OCTAVE assessment is significant (White, 2012). For 
organisations with a low maturity level towards risk, the assessment may be perceived 
to be interfering with normal business operations (Whitman & Mattord, 2005). Different 
departments within organisations are all about meeting deadlines and delivering 
tangible results to the business; therefore, something that anticipates adding value 
without immediate tangible results may derail the end goal of implementing OCTAVE 
(White, 2012).  
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Implementation, monitoring and control 
 
OCTAVE only focuses on identification, analysis and planning of the risk management 
activities. Once these activities have been completed, the OCTAVE assessment is 
complete (Whitman & Mattord, 2005; White, 2012). The implementation of the proposed 
controls is left to the management teams (White, 2012). This might mean that the 
efforts put into the OCTAVE exercise are neglected if the implementation, monitoring 
and control assessment exercises are not conducted on a periodic basis (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2005; White, 2012).  
 
Misinterpretation of the information gathered 
 
There is often a chance of information gathering being misunderstood due to many 
factors such as time or language barriers (White, 2012). If those in the OCTAVE 
analysis team are not experienced enough, they may end up gathering wrong 
information, thus making this exercise superfluous (White, 2012).  
 
3.4.2. ISO 27001 
ISO 27001 is an international standard for information security cited as ISO/IEC 
27001:2013, which is superseded by ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). ISO 
27001 was developed by ISO and IEC, which are international bodies whose members 
are subject matter experts responsible for participating in developing international 
standards through technical committees (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). The primary goal of 
ISO 27001 is to provide its users with guidelines on security controls which can be 
applied within an organisation to manage risk associated with IT security (ISO/IEC 
27001, 2013). ISO 27001 recommends a risk based security management system that 
is developed to ensure that organisations select and operate adequate and 
proportionate security controls to protect organisational assets from security threats 
(ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). 
 
3.4.2.1. Characteristics of ISO 27001 
Both ISO 27001 and ISO 27001 are subsets of the ISO 27000 series. ISO 27001 
encompasses process descriptions which may be used to select and implement 
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controls; and ISO 27002 contains a comprehensive list of controls. ISO 27001 is used 
as a model to build an Information Security Management System (ISMS). The ISMS is 
a structured approach to managing organisational information assets by recommending 
security controls (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). The ISMS stipulates a risk based security 
management system that is designed to ensure that organisations select and operate 
adequate and proportionate security controls to protect information assets (Pelnekar, 
2011; Verheul, 2011).  
 
The ISMS framework illustrates the components that are needed to ensure a holistic 
risk based view while enabling benefits from business opportunities (ISO/IEC 27001, 
2013). Establishing an ISMS framework is a strategic decision and shows management 
commitment to good governance through managing and mitigating information and IT 
security risk (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013).  
 
ISO 27001 recommends that senior management within an organisation should 
systematically examine security risks, design and implement security controls, and 
adopt the controls using a risk based approach (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). ISO 27001 
comprises 11 domains, 39 control objectives and over 130 controls.  
 
In applying the recommended controls, internal and external factors including 
outsourced IT services should be considered (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). Considering 
external factors will ensure that security requirements for interfaces and dependencies 
of an organisation with third parties are also accounted for (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). 
 
Verheul (2011) states that the responsibility for security within the organisation should 
not be placed solely on information security personnel or the IT department, as they 
typically do not know all the characteristics of the business processes. The 
responsibility of security should be placed at the senior management level that is 
responsible for the organisations as a whole as well as the business process (Verheul, 
2011).  
 
Furthermore, ISO 27001 enables organisations to benchmark against competitors, 
thereby allowing organisations to provide relevant information about security through 
demonstration of security due diligence to vendors and customers if necessary 
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(Pelnekar, 2011). The ISO 27001:2005 version emphasised the Plan-Do-Check-Act 
The ISO27001:2005 version emphasised the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle (Figure 
3.5) also known as the Deming cycle which allows for management to know how far 
and how well the organisation has progressed during each cycle of implementation 
(ISO/IEC27001, 2005; Pelnekar, 2011; Verheul, 2011).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – The Plan-Do-Check-Act Process  
Source: ISO/IEC 27001 (2005) 
 
The PDCA cycle for ISO 27001 is described as follows: 
 
Plan: The planning process of ISO 27001 involves identifying business objectives while 
involving management of an organisation to get support (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
Afterwards, the scope of implementation is prioritised and selected (Pelnekar, 2011). A 
method of risk assessment is then defined and executed, ranking assets according to 
risk classification and selecting adequate controls from the ISO 27002 standard 
(ISO/IEC 27001, 2005; Pelnekar, 2011; Verheul, 2011).  
 
Do: The actual risk management activities are carried out in this phase (ISO/IEC 
27001, 2007; Pelnekar, 2011). A risk treatment plan is executed, hence setting up and 
implementing policies and procedures to control risk, as well as allocating resources 
thereof (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
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Check: This phase involves monitoring activities of the implemented ISMS (Verheul, 
2011). An internal review of the performance of implemented processes and controls is 
conducted (Pelnekar, 2011; Verheul, 2011). 
 
Act: The effectiveness of the controls is reviewed by conducting periodic 
reassessments with the objective of adjusting the ISMS for continual improvement 
(Verheul, 2011). 
 
3.4.2.2. Advantages of ISO 27001 
ISO 27001 is globally recognised  
 
Implementing ISO 27001 can enable organisations to benchmark against competitors 
and to provide relevant information and a level of assurance about IT security to 
vendors and customers (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). Furthermore, proper implementation of 
ISO 27001 can promote compliance with laws and regulations (Verheul, 2011; 
Pelnekar, 2011; Susanto, et al., 2012). 
 
ISO 27001 can increase business and IT alignment 
 
Most organisations regard security as a technology issue that security professionals 
can deal with (Pelnekar, 2011). One of the first things to accomplish when implementing 
ISO 27001 is to identify objectives of the organisation prior to creating a vision for 
security (Pelnekar, 2011). This process will ensure that ISO 27001 is aligned with both 
the business and IT objectives, thereby making certain that the security pain points are 
addressed in a prioritised manner that provides value to the business (Calder, 2013). It 
therefore becomes easier to communicate security decisions to business and show the 
value of security risk reduction because security becomes an integral part of business 
operations (Pelnekar, 2011; Calder, 2013). In turn, the responsibility of information 
security will shift to the business rather than IT (Pelnekar, 2011; Calder, 2013). 
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Improved effectiveness of information security  
 
ISO 27001 provides tried-and-tested best practice guidance (Susanto, et al., 2012). The 
regular checkpoints via the PDCA allow for organisations to assess their security 
posture, thereby providing a mechanism for improving what could have been missed in 
the previous iterations (Pelnekar, 2011; Calder, 2013). 
 
Better awareness of security across an organisation 
 
Implementation of ISO 27001 can raise security awareness across the organisation, 
from senior management to junior staff (Calder, 2013). The organisations’ employees 
will be aware of their roles and responsibilities in looking after the organisations’ 
security risk as they are provided with the correct responsibilities of security (Susanto, 
et al., 2012; Calder, 2013). 
 
Competitive advantage 
 
Organisations across the globe are now concerned with information protection 
(Susanto, et al., 2012). If an organisation intends to outsource some of its services to 
external vendors, it would go for the vendor that has accreditation such as ISO 27001 
(Calder, 2013). Accreditation to ISO 27001 provides the organisation with competitive 
advantage against other organisations within the same industry because it 
demonstrates the level of commitment by management to security (Susanto, et al., 
2012). 
 
3.4.2.3. Disadvantages of ISO 27001 
Limited expertise within organisations’ resources 
 
The skill set within the security industry is limited (Pelnekar, 2011). Imprecise 
understanding of the ISO 27001 standard and its requirements makes it difficult to 
envisage what the end result should be (Susanto, et al., 2012). A significant number of 
ISO 27001 implementations fail due to the fact that the implementation is performed by 
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people with wrong skill sets and not external specialist consultants who come at a high 
cost (Susanto, et al., 2012; Calder, 2013). 
 
Scope of implementation 
 
ISO 27001 is a considerably large standard and cannot be implemented all at once 
(Susanto, et al., 2012; Calder, 2013). Implementation requires a phased approach to 
ensure that the correct scope is selected and focused on (Calder, 2013). Organisations 
that prefer using phased approaches to implementing projects might see ISO 27001 as 
a “big elephant” and then opt for other standards (Susanto, et al., 2012). 
 
Cost and effort of implementation 
 
The associated costs and project length that come with implementing ISO 27001 may 
be seen as a big factor and need to be taken into consideration (Pelnekar, 2011). 
Keeping up with industry trends may be regarded as a burden, as many people see 
standards such as ISO 27001 as a “nice-to-have” (Calder, 2013). 
 
3.4.3. COBIT 5 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) is an IT governance 
framework that provides best practice processes for different IT domains (ITGI, 2012). 
The COBIT framework was defined and created by a group of experts in various areas 
of IT with a concerted effort of creating a framework which could allow organisations to 
realise the benefits of their IT investment (ITGI, 2012). The COBIT framework was 
initially released in 1996 (ITGI, 2012). The revised version (i.e. COBIT 4.1) was later 
released in 2007 and has now been improved with the latest version (i.e. COBIT 5), 
which was released in 2012. For the purpose of this study, COBIT 5 will be focused on, 
as it encompasses the principles of previous COBIT versions.  
 
COBIT 5 is developed in a way that allows for its users to meet the current needs of 
stakeholders by aligning to the latest thinking of corporate governance and IT 
management principles (ITGI, 2012). As previously stated, the COBIT 5 framework 
uses COBIT 4.1 as a foundation and incorporates the Val IT and Risk IT frameworks. 
The objective of Val IT is to assist organisations with deriving business value from IT 
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investments through effective IT governance practices (ITGI, 2012). The Risk IT 
framework provides a holistic view of risks related to the use of IT and recommends a 
thorough treatment of risk to operational issues (ITGI, 2012). 
 
3.4.3.1. Characteristics of COBIT 5 
The primary idea behind COBIT 5 is to explicitly provide organisations with a strong 
foundation of processes which should be performed within the IT environment (ITGI, 
2012). The objective is achieved through balancing benefit realisation while optimising 
risk levels (ITGI, 2012). The ultimate goal of COBIT 5 is to enable organisations to 
optimise their IT-enabled investments, thus ensuring service delivery to the business as 
well as providing tools to measure against when things go wrong (ITGI, 2012). COBIT 
emphasises that the IT strategy should be derived from the business strategy (ITGI, 
2012). In addition to that, the commitment of senior management into embedding the 
COBIT 5 framework is fundamental to its success (ITGI, 2012).  
 
COBIT 5 emphasises the importance of measuring performance through setting and 
monitoring objectives regarding what the IT processes need to deliver (ITGI, 2012). 
Additionally, performance measurement provides organisations with a way of providing 
transparency of IT cost, value and risks, which have proven to be drivers for IT 
governance (ITGI, 2012).  
 
Understanding roles and responsibilities for each process is important and forms the 
basis for effective governance (ITGI, 2012). COBIT 5 recommends a RACI model (i.e. 
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted and Informed) for each process within its 
domains (ITGI, 2012). Responsibility refers to the person who executes a task (ITGI, 
2012). Accountability refers to the person who provides direction and authorises an 
activity (ITGI, 2012). The Consulted and Informed roles are two roles played by 
individuals who are involved and support the processes (ITGI, 2012). 
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COBIT 5 advocates that organisations must implement fit-for-purpose IT processes in a 
way that will satisfy governance and management requirements, as depicted in Figure 
3.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – COBIT 5 Process Reference Model  
Source: ITGI (2012) 
 
Business requirements are deemed to be the drivers of the COBIT 5 framework, as 
they prescribe IT requirements (ITGI, 2012). 
 
3.4.3.1.1. Governance 
The goal of the governance component is to ensure that requirements of IT are 
assessed to determine balanced organisational objectives that need to be achieved by 
IT (ITGI, 2012). The governance domain consists of three basic processes: evaluate, 
direct, and monitor.  
 
The evaluate component ensures that business requirements are assessed from a 
governance perspective, ensuring that IT delivery is adequate (ITGI, 2012). The direct 
component ensures that IT activities are prioritised as per the business requirements 
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and are performed adequately (ITGI, 2012). The monitor component involves providing 
oversight to the execution of IT activities, ensuring that any areas of improvement are 
recognised and improved upon (ITGI, 2012). 
 
3.4.3.1.2. Management 
The goal of the management component is to define, implement and execute plans to 
run monitoring activities set by the governance domain to achieve organisational goals 
(ITGI, 2012). The management component consists of four processes: Align, Plan and 
Organise (APO); Build, Acquire and Implement (BAI); Deliver, Service and Support 
(DSS); and Monitor, Evaluate and Assess (MEA).  
 
Align, Plan and Organise (APO): The process of “aligning, planning and organising” is 
about reviewing the IT resources and capabilities that the organisation has, determining 
the best way on how to utilise them, and devising a plan on how they will be used 
through a strategy (ITGI, 2012). Aligning ensures that IT requirements are aligned with 
the business requirements (ITGI, 2012). Planning provides the direction that IT should 
follow in a way that will appreciate the activities and risks within IT that need to be 
managed (ITGI, 2012).  
 
Build, Acquire and Implement (BAI): This domain is concerned with the development 
or procurement and implementation of IT solutions which are harmonised with the 
business requirements (ITGI, 2012). The solutions can be developed internally or can 
be obtained externally from third parties, but the primary goal is to ensure that these 
solutions deliver the IT strategy that is aligned with the business strategy (ITGI, 2012).  
 
Deliver, Service and Support (DSS): This domain is concerned with the actual supply 
of the IT services which have been acquired in line with business operations (ITGI, 
2012). Failure of the IT services delivered might result in dire consequences for the 
business operations (ITGI, 2012). The requirement to ensure systems security, which is 
a core focus of this study, is found in this domain.  
 
Monitor, Evaluate and Assess (MEA): The monitor, evaluate and assess domain can 
be seen as a reflection process for the IT environment (ITGI, 2012). It is focused on 
assessing what works and what does not work within the IT environment (ITGI, 2012). 
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The assessment emphasises on performance monitoring of other processes, internal 
controls, governance, as well compliance with regulatory bodies (ITGI, 2012).  
 
Across the five domains, COBIT 5 comprises 37 IT processes that can generally be 
used to verify completeness of responsibilities and IT activities (ITGI, 2012). In some 
instances, certain processes might not apply or they might be combined with other 
processes; each organisation should use COBIT as appropriate to its internal IT 
environment (ITGI, 2007).  
 
3.4.3.2. Advantages of COBIT 
Making a link to the business requirements 
 
IT is regarded as the business enabler, and the IT strategy is driven by the business 
strategy. COBIT 5 allows for executives within organisations to have better confidence 
in the organisations’ reliance on the IT systems and the information produced by those 
systems, thereby giving them more confidence about their positive return on their IT 
investments (Gartner, 2012). 
 
Organising IT activities into a generally accepted process model 
 
COBIT 5 provides executives within an organisation with a mechanism to better 
understand how to direct and manage their organisations’ IT use and the standard of 
good practice to be expected from IT service providers (Gartner, 2012). This is because 
the domains and process objectives for COBIT 5 are grouped in a way that is generally 
accepted globally. COBIT 5 therefore provides a common language for business 
executives to communicate goals, objectives and results with audit, IT and other 
professionals (ITGI, 2012). 
 
Identifying the major IT resources to be leveraged 
 
COBIT 5 provides organisations with the mechanism to direct and oversee all IT-related 
activities (Gartner, 2012). Once COBIT has been implemented effectively, it becomes 
easier to prioritise as well as measure performance on the IT resources which provide a 
platform to be used when business strategic decisions are made. This way, the 
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organisation will find a balance between leveraging off underutilised and overutilised IT 
resources throughout their life cycle (ITGI, 2012). 
 
3.4.3.3. Disadvantages of COBIT 
High degree of abstraction 
 
COBIT 5 does not include concrete methods and guidelines assisting organisations to 
optimally accomplish its benefits (Zhang & Le Fever, 2013). This is because COBIT 5 is 
more of a governance framework rather than a process framework (Zhang & Le Fever, 
2013). COBIT 5 focuses on what organisations need to do and not how they do it. This 
implies that as a single framework used within an organisation for IT, there might be 
gaps during implementation of COBIT 5 because it provides a broad coverage and 
minimal depth of how things should be done (Zhang & Le Fever, 2013). 
 
Poor focus on IT 
 
Because COBIT 5 is based on many existing practices, it is referred to as the 
‘integrator’, bringing unrelated practices under one umbrella. With COBIT 5, there is a 
lack of implementation guidelines and proven benefits thereof (Gartner, 2012; Zhang & 
Le Fever, 2013). COBIT 5 sets the standard by focusing on a process-based system 
and on the risks generated by the utilisation of IT; it does not set the standard from the 
basic IT services (Zhang & Le Fever, 2013).  
 
3.4.4. ITIL 
IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a framework that provides best practice guidance for IT 
service management (ITSMF, 2007). IT service management is described by ITSMF 
(2007) as a means of delivering value to customers by providing them with 
organisational capabilities that customers need in order to utilise the information that 
they own. ITIL recommends that organisations must recognise IT services as crucial 
strategic assets and ensure that they invest adequate levels of resources into their 
support, delivery and management, as well as the IT systems that underpin them 
(ITSMF, 2007). 
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3.4.4.1. Characteristics of ITIL 
Under ITIL, information is regarded as one of the most important strategic resources 
that any organisation has to collect, analyse, produce and distribute because all 
organisations that use IT depend on IT to be successful (ITSMF, 2007). The primary 
objective of ITIL is to assist organisations to actively support the business (ITSMF, 
2007). Supporting the business is achieved by ensuring that IT services underpin the 
business needs and processes enabling IT to act as an agent for change in order to 
facilitate business transformation (Mohamed, et al., 2008).  
 
IT service management views each IT service, process or infrastructure component as 
an element that has a life cycle (ITSMF, 2007). The capabilities of IT service 
management are applied to the entire life cycle of ITIL, namely, service strategy, 
service design, service transition, service operations, and continual service 
improvement (ITSMF, 2007). Therefore, ITIL basically provides a framework for the 
governance of IT and focuses on the continual measurement and improvement of the 
quality of IT services delivered, from both a business and customer perspective 
(ITSMF, 2007).  
 
Figure 3.7 summarises the ITIL service life cycle stages and the associated sub-
processes of each phase.  
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Figure 3.7 – The Service Life cycle Stages and Activities  
Source: ITSMF (2007) 
 
Service Strategy: Service strategy refers to the approach that will be used by IT 
service providers to service their customers (ITSMF, 2007). Within the ITIL framework, 
service strategy sits at the core of the life cycle because it sets out guidance on how 
customers and service providers should operate (ITSMF, 2007). In order to satisfy 
customers, IT service providers must understand who their customers are; what they 
need; why those needs occur; which market they operate in; what their perceived value 
is; how will value be measured; and how service performance will be measured 
(ITSMF, 2007). The IT service strategy cannot be defined in isolation from the 
overarching organisational strategy because the main idea is to deliver services that will 
ultimately fulfil that organisation’s strategic purpose (ITSMF, 2007). Service strategy 
consists of four processes (ITSMF, 2007), namely, demand management, financial 
management, strategy generation and service portfolio management. 
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Service Design: Service design is concerned with the design of appropriate and 
innovative IT services including service architectures, processes, policies and 
documentation (ITSMF, 2007). IT services for ITIL are designed in a way that assists 
organisations in meeting both current and future agreed business requirements (ITSMF, 
2007). The key activities of service design are service catalogue management, service 
level management, capacity management, availability management, service continuity 
management, information security management, and supplier management (ITSMF, 
2007). 
 
Information security management, which is the focus area of this study, is concerned 
with ensuring that the confidentiality, integrity and availability of services delivered to 
the business are maintained throughout the service life cycle (ITSMF, 2007). 
Information security management assists in delivering corporate governance framework 
goals (i.e. responsibilities exercised by executive management ascertaining that IT 
security risks are being managed adequately) (ITSMF, 2007). 
 
Service Transition: Service transition aims to ensure that designed services required 
by the business are put into operational use (ITSMF, 2007). In cases where business 
circumstances have changed, modifications are carried out in the service transition 
stage (ITSMF, 2007). Service transition focuses on implementing services which are 
robust and can operate under unfavourable circumstances (ITSMF, 2007). Sub-
processes of service transition are change management; service asset and 
configuration management; knowledge management; transition planning and support; 
release and deployment management; service validation and testing; and evaluation 
(ITSMF, 2007). 
 
Service Operations: Service operations stage is primarily concerned with making sure 
that agreed levels of service are delivered to the business and that applications, 
technology and infrastructure are managed in a way that supports delivery of the 
services (ITSMF, 2007). It is only during this stage of the life cycle that the business can 
actually realise the value of the services which are delivered by the IT service provider 
(ITSMF, 2007). Service operations stage consists of ten key sub-processes (ITSMF, 
2007), namely, incident management; problem management; event management; 
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request fulfilment; access management; operations management; service desk; 
application management; technical management; and IT operations. 
 
Continual Service Improvement: This process is concerned with continual evaluation 
and improvement of the quality of the IT services across the service life cycle and 
underlying processes (ITSMF, 2007). Principles, practices and methods from quality 
management are combined, working to improve each stage in the service life cycle as 
well as the services, processes, technology and related activities (ITSMF, 2007). 
Continual service improvement is an iterative activity which assesses the vision of IT 
through the business objectives (ITSMF, 2007). Moreover, the continual service 
improvement stage assists in assessing the performance of IT through baseline 
assessments and measurable targets (ITSMF, 2007). Once performance targets have 
been set, processes to ensure that targets are achieved are implemented in this stage 
of ITIL (ITSMF, 2007). Continual service improvement consists of three sub-processes: 
improvement process, service measurement, and service reporting (ITSMF, 2007). The 
section that follows discusses the key strengths of ITIL. 
 
3.4.4.2. Advantages of ITIL 
Increased user and customer satisfaction 
 
When IT services are explicitly defined, measuring the service levels related to the 
delivered services becomes more manageable, thus improving customer satisfaction 
(ITSMF, 2007).  
 
Improved service availability 
 
Managing the delivered IT service levels closely assists in ensuring that any service 
interruptions are detected swiftly, which leads to high availability (ITSMF, 2007). 
 
Improved decision-making and optimised risk 
 
The comprehensive service life cycle ensures that all aspects relating to each and 
every IT service are taken into account during design, analysis and operation, leading 
to reduced risk and improved decision-making (ITSMF, 2007). 
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Improved time to market for new products and services 
 
Service providers have the opportunity to design and implement new services when the 
IT environment is scalable and well defined (ITSMF, 2007). 
 
Even though ITIL provides various benefits, it is important to note the associated 
shortcoming that it possesses. 
 
3.4.4.3. Disadvantages of ITIL 
Failure to fully understand the breadth and depth of ITIL leads to implementation 
failures 
 
To implement the ITIL framework successfully, service provider teams, as well as 
customers, need to understand the framework and the impact of the framework across 
people, process and technology (ITSMF, 2007). Unfortunately, it is too challenging to 
reach such a level of understanding with all the people or at least the IT staff within an 
organisation (ITSMF, 2007). 
 
Lack of top-level support may lead to implementation failures 
 
This is the case with any framework; if there is no support from the top, there are very 
high chances that implementation of the framework might not be a success. The 
challenge is that ITIL has a high level of detail, which becomes a challenge for senior 
management, especially those with no IT background, to fully understand (ITSMF, 
2007). 
 
All ITIL-aligned processes and their performance require roles or individuals to 
be assigned to them 
 
Depending on the size of the organisation, IT services can be complex, as each ITIL 
service requires a role assigned to it (ITSMF, 2007). Ensuring that all ITIL services have 
responsible roles, which many organisations fail to achieve, can be a daunting task 
(ITSMF, 2007). 
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ITIL is mostly IT-focused  
 
ITIL is more orientated toward IT and therefore lacks focus on business aspects, 
resulting in resistance from the business community within organisations (ITSMF, 
2007). Day-to-day operations of IT can become more about the processes than service 
delivery, as employees tend to focus on ensuring that processes are there, as opposed 
to delivery to the business (ITSMF, 2007). 
 
3.4.5. The ISF Standard of Good Practice 
The Information Security Forum (ISF) Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) for 
information security is a globally recognised standard that provides users with practical 
guidance on information security and information risk-related aspects (Chaplin & 
Creasy, 2011). Although the focus of this study is on IT security, the ISF SoGP is still 
regarded as vital to this study because information is regarded as a significant IT asset. 
The ISF SoGP addresses information security from a business perspective, providing 
an ideal basis for assessing and improving information security arrangements within 
any organisation (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
The ISF SoGP is globally recognised because it is defined and created by information 
security experts around the world (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). Furthermore, the ISF 
SoGP is defined in a way that enables compliance with other recognised frameworks 
and standards such as ISO 27001 and COBIT. Because of this aspect, the ISF SoGP 
allows users to validate information security arrangements with external suppliers in a 
seamless manner (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
3.4.5.1. Characteristics of the ISF SoGP 
Because the ISF standard of good practice guides its users in defining policies, 
standards and procedures for information security, it provides a basis for both detailed 
and high-level information security assessment (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). Information 
security assessment is achieved by first assessing the business impact, followed by a 
threat and vulnerability assessment, and ending with a control selection (Chaplin & 
Creasy, 2011). Further, the ISF standard of good practice is divided into four 
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categories, namely, security governance, security requirements, control framework, and 
security monitoring and improvement (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
Security governance: The primary objective of security governance is to ascertain that 
an organisation’s overall approach to information security supports high standards of 
governance (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). To achieve the goal of security governance, an 
information security governance framework should be established by an organisation’s 
governing body (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
An organisation’s governing body should direct, monitor and communicate the 
information security governance framework within the organisation (Chaplin & Creasy, 
2011). The governing body should ensure that information security is treated as a 
critical business issue and that there is a board-level executive or equivalent who is 
appointed to take overall responsibility for the information security governance 
framework (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
Appointing a board-level executive responsible for information security will assist 
organisations in ensuring that the information security governance framework is 
supported by the information security strategy as well as by an information security 
assurance programme (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). Top-down management structure and 
mechanism for coordinating information security activities allow for organisations to 
have a clear direction that supports the information security governance approach 
(Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
Security requirements: The security requirements domain is focused on information 
risk assessment and compliance (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). Chaplin and Creasy (2011) 
emphasise that information is a key resource within any organisation and thus should 
be adequately managed. Implementation of information risk assessment activities is not 
comprehensive without a compliance process that ensures that there is adherence to 
legal and regulatory bodies as well as information privacy (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011).  
 
Control framework: The control framework has a detailed list of the controls that 
should be applied throughout the organisation, including the IT environment, in order to 
achieve the goal of the information security governance framework (Chaplin & Creasy, 
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2011). The control framework provides guidance in the following areas: security policy 
and organisation; human resource security; asset management; business applications; 
customer access; access management; system management; technical security 
infrastructure; network management; threat and vulnerability management; incident 
management; local environments; desktop applications; mobile computing; electronic 
communications; external supplier management; system development management; 
system development life cycle; physical security and environmental security; and 
business continuity (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
Security monitoring and improvement: The security monitoring and improvement 
domain is solely focused on ensuring that there is continuous improvement in the 
posture of information security (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). The two activities under 
security monitoring and improvement are security audit and security performance 
(Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). Security audit is concerned with assurance activities which 
aim to ensure that an acceptable level of assurance is achieved by the information 
security governance framework (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). The security performance 
activity is focused on monitoring the performance of the information security 
governance framework across the organisation, ensuring that areas of improvement are 
identified, improvement plans are defined and then implemented (Chaplin & Creasy, 
2011). 
 
The ISF standard of good practice has some benefits that should be borne in mind. 
 
3.4.5.2. Advantages of the ISF standard of good practice 
Rigour  
 
The ISF SoGP is comprehensive and, therefore, allows for a more effective process of 
identification of key risks and potential business impact (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
Efficiency 
 
The ISF SoGP provides a detailed set of controls which cover the IT environment 
holistically, thus minimising the need to purchase additional repository of potential 
controls (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
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Integration 
 
The ISF SoGP is completely aligned with other globally recognised security frameworks 
and standards such as ISO 27001, COBIT and IRAM. This means that it can be 
incorporated easily within existing environments (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
Quality 
 
The ISF SoGP provides a trusted standard set of controls for risk assessment across 
the organisation and enables selection of controls and implementation that is 
acceptable in accordance with the risk profile and risk appetite of the organisation 
(Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
Having acknowledged the key strengths of the ISF SoGP, it is also important not to 
overlook shortcomings of this framework which may often present challenges when this 
framework is used within organisations. 
 
3.4.5.3. Disadvantages of the ISF standard of good practice 
Dependant on other frameworks and standards 
 
The ISF standard of good practice is most valuable when it is used as a supporting 
framework and not as a stand-alone framework (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). The ISF 
SoGP does not provide a comprehensive guide to users on “how” the recommended 
controls should be arranged within the organisation (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
 
Ambiguity  
 
The ISF standard of good practice might be interpreted incorrectly by users because as 
much as it provides guidance as regards what controls should be implemented, it 
leaves the users with too much room for flexibility to interpreting how controls should be 
implemented (Chaplin & Creasy, 2011). 
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Compliance-focused 
 
Compliance with regulatory bodies is an excellent thing; however, it does not help if 
one’s organisation is considered compliant because controls exist while they are not 
operationalised effectively to address day-to-day operational challenges (Chaplin & 
Creasy, 2011). 
 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter commenced by defining the key concepts of information, IT and IT security 
in order to provide background information about the concepts used in this study. The 
two pillars of corporate governance, namely, risk management and IT governance were 
discussed in detail. Thereafter, an overview of IT security risk management, which is 
the basis for this study, was explained in depth. This was followed by a detailed 
analysis of the five IT security frameworks and standards, namely, OCTAVE, ISO 
27001, COBIT, ITIL, and ISF SoGP. The analysis of each framework and standard was 
conducted by means of listing the objectives, characteristics, as well as the advantages 
and disadvantages of each framework.  
 
The chapter that follows discusses threat modelling in order to understand the 
underlying concepts that may aid managing IT security risk. 
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4. MODELLING IT SECURITY THREATS 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Management of IT security risk requires a holistic approach which ensures that both 
known and unknown risks are mitigated to an acceptable level (Hardy, 2012; Jouini, et 
al., 2014). IT systems are recurrently exposed to various types of threats which result in 
different types of damages (Jouini, et al., 2014). Damages are consequences resulting 
from exploited vulnerabilities, and examples include denial of service to systems, 
compromised integrity to information and information theft. When vulnerabilities exist in 
an IT system, a threat may be manifested through a threat agent using a particular 
penetration technique to cause undesired effects (Mougouei, et al., 2012).  
 
The preceding chapter analysed frameworks and standards for IT security risk. The 
objective of this chapter is to define a basic threat modelling process which is 
incorporated in the IT security risk management process (Swiderski & Snyder, 2004). 
The threat modelling process described is iterative and systematic, providing a 
continuous proactive process for identification of threats and vulnerabilities (Meier, 
Mackman, Dunner, Vasireddy, Escamilla & Murukan, 2003). Section 4.2 presents the 
discussed threat modelling process developed by Meier, et al. (2003). Additionally, four 
best practice threat classification models are examined in Section 4.3 to demonstrate 
the importance of classifying threats for IT assets. 
 
The output of this chapter is intended to enhance the proactive capability of the IT 
Security Risk Based (ITSRB) approach proposed in this study. The majority of the 
threat modelling processes found in this literature review is based at the application or 
solution level; however, the principles used are regarded as fundamental to the 
proposed ITSRB approach. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, an IT asset 
perspective encompassing the application view as well as the solution view is assumed.  
 
4.2. THE THREAT MODELLING PROCESS 
Threat modelling process is an approach used for evaluating the security of an IT asset, 
thereby identifying, quantifying and addressing IT security risks associated with that IT 
asset (Hardy, 2012). In the current era, organisations are still faced with the issue of 
understanding what threats to their IT assets are, their state of security, and how to 
obtain the necessary means to combat them (Mougouei, et al., 2012). The effects of 
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various threats vary considerably, ranging from small losses to entire IT system 
destruction and may affect the security posture of an IT asset. Underestimation of IT 
security risk from smaller scale security incidents often result in significant losses 
because many such vulnerabilities are not proactively detected, thus allowing IT assets 
to be attacked and damaged (Burns, 2005; Jouini, et al., 2014).  
 
Knowing that a problem exists does not guarantee protection if appropriate action is not 
taken (Hardy, 2012). It is imperative for both individuals and organisations to be able to 
act correctly and in time to keep up with evolving threats in order to mitigate the 
associated risks. Researchers investigating IT security have proposed various theories 
and approaches for managing IT security threats which include modelling IT security 
threats (Jouini, et al., 2014). 
 
A threat modelling process enables organisations to understand the complexity of an IT 
asset and identify possible vulnerabilities to that asset, regardless of whether or not 
those vulnerabilities can be exploited (Myagmar, et al., 2005). Threat modelling is used 
to discover the motives and techniques that an attacker would use to exploit 
vulnerabilities of an IT asset. A threat model should evolve because security threats 
evolve, as IT assets are rarely static and need to be adapted to suit changing business 
requirements (Meier, et al., 2003). Threat modelling should be an iterative process and 
continue throughout an IT asset’s life cycle.  
 
Having a document that identifies both the known threats and how they have been 
addressed (or not) puts an organisation in control of the security of an IT asset 
(Swiderski & Snyder, 2004). During the development of security requirements, threats 
should be analysed based on their criticality and likelihood, and a decision should be 
made on whether to mitigate the threat or accept the risk associated with it (Mougouei, 
et al., 2012).  
 
One of the biggest mistakes that organisations often make is to skip the threat 
modelling process and simply extract IT security requirements and controls from 
industry’s best practice frameworks (Myagmar, et al., 2005). However, industry best 
practice frameworks and standards only provide general IT security guidance and 
cannot address all of the distinctions of a particular IT asset. The threat modelling 
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process goes further by customising the target IT asset, defining additional 
requirements and, moreover, compiles a list of potential threats (Mougouei, et al., 
2012).  
 
Swiderski and Snyder (2004) and Burns (2005) emphasise that threat modelling should 
be a systematic process and cannot be conducted by simply brainstorming attackers’ 
possible intentions. A good threat model should provide organisations with a basis to 
accurately estimate the attacker’s capabilities and not leave large portions of the 
solutions’ attack spaces not investigated (Jouini, et al., 2014).  
 
Employing an adequate threat modelling process provides the following benefits: 
 
• identification of potential threats and vulnerabilities depicting threat scenarios for an 
IT system that may assist to anticipate possible attacks (Swiderski & Snyder, 2004); 
• justification of IT security features for IT assets where vulnerabilities are revealed for 
identified threats (Burns, 2005);  
• development of a credible security classification model through a logical thought 
process in defining the security features of an IT system (Myagmar, et al., 2005); 
and 
• verification of IT security features and increased resilience within the IT systems 
(Swiderski & Snyder, 2004). 
 
Various threat modelling processes were investigated during this literature review, 
including the Microsoft application threat modelling process (Meier, et al., 2003), the 
SANS Institute application threat modelling process (Burns, 2005), Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) Application threat modelling process (OWASP, 
2015), and the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NSCA) threat 
modelling process defined by Myagmar, et al. (2005). Table 4.1 provides a high-level 
analysis of the different threat modelling processes investigated in this study. 
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Table 4.1 – Threat Modelling Processes 
 
Microsoft Threat Modelling 
Process 
SANS Threat Modelling 
Process 
OWASP Threat Modelling 
Process 
NCSA Threat Modelling Process 
High-level Process 
1. Identify assets 
• Identify the valuable assets that 
must be protected 
2. Create an architecture  
overview 
• Use simple diagrams and tables 
to document the architecture of 
the system including 
subsystems, trust boundaries, 
and data flows  
3. Decompose the system 
• Decompose the architecture of 
the asset including the 
underlying network and host 
infrastructure design 
•  Create a security profile for the 
application to uncover 
vulnerabilities in the design, 
implementation, or deployment 
configuration of the asset  
4. Identify the threats 
• Keeping the goals of an attacker 
in mind, and with knowledge of 
the architecture and potential 
vulnerabilities, identify the 
threats that could affect the 
assets  
5. Document the threats 
• Document each threat using a 
common threat template that 
defines a core set of attributes 
to capture for each threat  
6. Rate the threats 
• Rate the threats to prioritise and 
address the most significant 
threats first 
1. View the system as an 
adversary 
• Identify entry and exit 
points 
• Identify the assets 
• Identify the trust levels 
2. Characterise the system 
• Define use scenarios 
• Identify external 
dependencies 
• Identify external security 
controls 
• Identify internal security 
controls 
• Define implementation 
assumptions 
3. Determine the threats 
• Identify the threats 
• Classify the threats 
• Analyse the threats 
• Document the threats 
 
1. Decompose the 
application 
• Identify assets 
• Gain an understanding 
of the assets and how 
they interact with 
external entities 
• Define use cases 
• Identify entry points to 
the assets 
• Identify trust levels 
• Document data flow 
diagrams for the asset 
• Document the threats 
2. Determine and rank 
threats 
• Categorise the threats 
• Define use and abuse 
cases  
• Determine the security 
risk for each threat 
3. Determine 
countermeasures and 
mitigation 
• Rank the threats 
• Document threat-
countermeasure 
mapping lists 
• Document the threats 
and countermeasures to 
be implemented 
 
 
 
1. Characterise the system 
• Define characteristics of the 
system 
• Define usage scenarios 
• Identify assumptions 
• Identify dependencies 
2. Identify assets and access points 
• Define the assets  
• Identify potential adversaries 
• Define the adversaries’ 
motivations and goals 
• Define the information available to 
the adversaries that may be used 
to exploit the vulnerabilities 
• Identify access points to the 
systems 
• Define trust levels and boundaries 
3. Identify threats 
• Use the information gathered in 
the previous steps to identify 
internal and external threats 
4. Specify security requirements 
• Document the threats 
• Use a risk management process 
to prioritise threats 
• Specify security requirements for 
each system or asset 
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The SANS threat modelling process developed by Burns (2005) at a high level involves 
the following: viewing the system as an adversary (i.e. activities such as the 
identification of entry or exit points, identification of assets, and identification of trust 
level); characterising the system (i.e. activities such as defining use case scenarios, 
defining external dependencies, and modelling the system); and then developing a 
threat profile (i.e. defining security requirements).  
 
The OWASP threat modelling process follows a similar process of decomposing the 
application, determining and ranking threats, and determining countermeasures for the 
identified threats (OWASP, 2015). The threat modelling process defined by Myagmar, 
et al. (2005) involves characterising the system, identifying assets and access points, 
identifying threats, and specifying security requirements. 
 
The analysis revealed a common theme amongst the different threat modelling 
processes with variations at a granular level. An interesting point to note is that both the 
SANS threat modelling process defined by Burns (2005) and the OWASP threat 
modelling process make use of the threat modelling process defined by Meier, et al. 
(2003). Given these findings, the Microsoft threat modelling process defined by Meier, 
et al. (2003) is presented in detail, as it resonates all the other threat modelling 
processes analysed for this study. Figure 4.2 presents a basic six-step Microsoft threat 
modelling process developed by Meier, et al. (2003). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – The Microsoft Threat Modelling Process 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003) 
 
3. Decompose the IT asset 
 
 
1. Identify assets 
2. Create an architectural 
overview 
 
4. Identify threats for each 
component 
 
 
5. Document the threats 
 
6. Rate the threat 
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4.2.1. Step 1: Identify assets 
The first step in the threat modelling process is to identify the assets that need to be 
protected (Meier, et al., 2003). Identifying assets will clarify which assets are important 
and why they should be protected (Burns, 2005). Assets that need to be protected may 
be, for example, hardware, customers’ transactional data, and employee salary 
information (Myagmar, et al., 2005).  
 
The different security principles that need to be protected for each asset should be 
defined (Meier, et al., 2003). For instance, the integrity of a financial process may be 
extremely important in one case, whereas confidentiality of employees’ salary 
information may also be extremely important in another case. 
 
4.2.2. Step 2: Create an architectural overview  
The goal of this step is to document the function of the solution, its architecture, the 
software components, as well as the hardware components that form part of the entire 
solution, thus the IT asset (Meier, et al., 2003). Simple diagrams and tables that depict 
subsystems trust boundaries and data flows should be documented (Meier, et al., 
2003). At this point, potential vulnerabilities in the design of the IT asset should be 
examined (Burns, 2005). The tasks performed include identifying what the IT asset 
does, creating an architectural diagram, and identifying technologies used to enable the 
functioning of the IT asset (Myagmar, et al., 2005). 
 
The task of identifying what the IT asset does includes defining how the solution 
interfaces with other IT assets (Myagmar, et al., 2005). The various functions performed 
by the IT asset should be documented in order to set the functionality in context as well 
as help see how that IT asset can be misused or abused (Burns, 2005). The task of 
creating a high-level architecture diagram involves documenting the composition and 
structure of the IT asset, including subsystems and the physical deployment 
characteristics (Myagmar, et al., 2005). Different architectural models (i.e. conceptual, 
logical, physical, data, and business) of the solution should be documented, as they will 
describe the solution from different perspectives (Myagmar, et al., 2005). The last task 
in this step is to identify the technologies that will be used to implement the IT asset 
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such as an operating system in the case that an IT application is the IT asset 
(Myagmar, et al., 2005).  
 
4.2.3. Step 3: Decompose the IT asset 
This step involves creating a security profile for the IT asset (Meier, et al., 2003). The 
function of a security profile is to discover vulnerabilities in the design, implementation, 
or deployment configuration of the IT asset (Burns, 2005). Table 4.2 is an example of 
an IT asset that is decomposed. 
 
Table 4.2 – Example of a Decomposed Solution  
Application Decomposition 
Security Profile Trust Boundaries 
Input Validation Session Management Data Flow 
Authentication Cryptography Entry Points 
Authorisation Parameter Manipulation Privileged Code 
Configuration Management Exception Management  
Sensitive Data Auditing and Logging 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003)  
 
The idea behind this step is to identify and document various aspects of the IT asset. 
These aspects include trust boundaries, data flows, entry points, privileged code, and 
the security profile (Myagmar, et al., 2005). 
 
The task of creating trust boundaries refers to analysing each tangible asset of the IT 
asset and considering whether data flow and user input are trusted to and from 
interfacing systems (Meier, et al., 2003). For example, if data flow and/or user input is 
not trusted between subsystems, then authentication and authorisation should be 
considered (Myagmar, et al., 2005). This task will ensure that all appropriate 
gatekeepers are in place, that they guard all entry points to individual trust boundaries, 
and that they validate all data passed to specific recipients across trust boundaries 
(Burns, 2005). 
 
The second task in decomposing the solution is to identify and create data flows for the 
IT asset (Meier, et al., 2003). Creating data flows should follow a top-down approach, 
starting at the highest level and then iteratively decomposing the IT asset by analysing 
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the data flow between the subsystems (Myagmar, et al., 2005). It is advisable to use 
data flow diagrams as well as sequence diagrams to illustrate the formal decomposition 
of the system (Burns, 2005; Myagmar, et al., 2005). 
 
The third task in this step involves identifying and analysing all entry points to the IT 
asset and subsystems. This is because they will also serve as entry points for attacks 
(Meier, et al., 2003).  
 
The fourth task is to identify privileged code or resources that exist within the IT asset 
(Burns, 2005). Privileged code has the highest level of access which might severely 
compromise the IT asset if an attacker were to gain access to it (Myagmar, et al., 2005).  
 
The last step in the task of decomposing the IT asset is to create the security profile for 
that particular asset (Meier, et al., 2003). Creating a security profile includes identifying 
the design and implementation approaches which are used for input validation, 
authentication, authorisation, and all other remaining areas where the solution might be 
susceptible to vulnerabilities (Burns, 2005). 
 
4.2.4. Step 4: Identify threats for each component of the IT asset  
To identify threats for each component of the IT asset, Meier, et al. (2003) suggests 
workshopping the different components with different subject matter experts. The idea 
behind this step is to ensure that potential scenarios of an attacker are kept in mind 
(Myagmar, et al., 2008).  
 
Additionally, the use of attack trees and attack patterns (as depicted in Figure 4.3 and 
Table 4.3 respectively) is recommended because it assist in identifying other potential 
threats which may not have been considered (Meier, et al., 2003).  
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Figure 4.3 – Example of Using an Attack Tree 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003) 
 
Table 4.3 – Example using an Attack Pattern for Code Injection  
Pattern Code injection attacks 
Attack goals Command or code execution 
Required conditions 
Weak input validation  
Code from the attacker has sufficient privileges on the 
server. 
Attack technique 
1. Identify program on target system with an input validation 
vulnerability.  
2. Create code to inject and run using the security context of 
the target application. 
3. Construct input value to insert code into the address 
space of the target application and force a stack corruption 
that causes application execution to jump to the injected 
code. 
 
Attack results 
 
Code from the attacker runs and performs malicious action. 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003) 
Threat #1: 
Identity theft 
2. Attacker sends the user 
a fake email requesting 
login credentials for 
banking (i.e. phishing) 
1. Attacker uses network  
monitoring tools to 
sniff network traffic  
(i.e. sniffing) 
1.1. Attacker recognises 
and steals user 
credentials 
 
and 
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The use of attack trees and attack patterns assists in probing one’s thinking while 
conducting this exercise because a question is asked after each step (Meier, et al., 
2003). 
 
4.2.5. Step 5: Document the threats  
For documenting threats, Myagmar, et al. (2005) recommends that a common threat 
template which defines the core set of attributes should be used. The threat capturing 
template should capture information for each IT asset, including such information as 
threat description, threat target, attack techniques, vulnerabilities exploited, and 
countermeasures required to address the threat (Meier, et al., 2003). As previously 
stated, threats evolve; on that account, documenting threats should also be an iterative 
process (Burns, 2005).  
 
4.2.6. Step 6: Rate the threats  
This step involves rating the threats in order to prioritise and address the most 
significant threats first (Meier, et al., 2003). Both quantitative (e.g. risk = probability * 
damage potential) and qualitative (e.g. high, medium, low) approaches can be used to 
rate the threats; the decision depends on the preference of an organisation (Myagmar, 
et al., 2005).  
 
Furthermore, a systematic process or an ad hoc process can be applied for rating the IT 
security threats (Burns, 2005). The use of ad hoc methods for rating threats has proven 
to be more subjective because the attributes used to rate the threats are not predefined 
and may differ with every audience that performs the threat rating (Meier, et al., 2003). 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, a systematic method is used. 
 
The Microsoft, NSCA and OWASP threat modelling processes all use the Microsoft 
DREAD as a threat rating method. Microsoft DREAD is a structured method which is a 
hybrid of qualitative and quantitative approaches (Meier, et al., 2003). The rating 
process for Microsoft DREAD weighs the probability of the threat against the damage 
that could result should an attack occur (Meier, et al., 2003). It might turn out that 
certain threats do not warrant any action when you compare the risk posed by the 
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threat with the resulting mitigation costs (Myagmar, et al., 2005). Table 4.4 presents an 
example of the Microsoft DREAD rating table.  
 
Table 4.4 – Example of a Threat Rating Table using DREAD 
   
Rating 
 
High (3) 
 
Medium (2) 
 
Low (1) 
D Damage 
potential 
The attacker can subvert the 
security system; get full trust 
authorisation; run as 
administrator; upload content. 
Leaking sensitive 
information. 
Leaking trivial 
information. 
R Reproducibility The attack can be reproduced 
every time and does not 
require a timing window. 
The attack can be 
reproduced, but only with a 
timing window and a 
particular race situation. 
The attack is very difficult 
to reproduce, even with 
knowledge of the security 
hole. 
E Exploitability A novice programmer could 
make the attack in a short time. 
A skilled programmer could 
make the attack and then 
repeat the steps. 
The attack requires an 
extremely skilled person 
and in-depth knowledge 
every time to exploit. 
A Affected users All users, default configuration, 
key customers. 
Some users, non-default 
configuration. 
Very small percentage of 
users; obscure feature; 
affects anonymous users. 
D Discoverability Published information explains 
the attack. The vulnerability is 
found in the most commonly 
used feature and is very 
noticeable. 
The vulnerability is in a 
seldom-used part of the 
product, and only a few 
users should come across 
it. It would take some 
thinking to see malicious 
use. 
The bug is obscure, and 
it is unlikely that users 
will work out damage 
potential. 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003) 
 
The Microsoft DREAD is used to rate the threats systematically using the five basic 
attributes defined as follows (Meier, et al., 2003):  
Damage potential: How significant is the damage if the vulnerability is exploited? 
Reproducibility: How effortless is it to reproduce the attack? 
Exploitability: How easy is it to launch an attack? 
Affected users: As a rough percentage, how many users are affected? 
Discoverability: How easy is it to find the vulnerability? 
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Once the threat rating table has been defined and agreed, threats are rated by 
aggregating the DREAD attributes and comparing the totals for the different threats, as 
depicted in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 – Microsoft DREAD Rating Example  
Threat D R E A D Total Rating 
Attacker obtains authentication credentials by monitoring 
the network. 
3 3 2 2 2 12 High 
SQL commands injected into application. 3 3 3 3 2 14 High 
Source: Meier, et al. (2003) 
 
As previously stated, the output of the threat modelling process is documentation of the 
security features of an IT asset which includes a list of rated threats (Burns, 2005). The 
next section discusses the classification of threats, another important aspect of threat 
modelling (Myagmar, et al., 2005). 
 
4.3. CLASSIFICATION OF THREATS 
IT security threats have increased exponentially in recent years because there are 
different types of IT security threats emerging on a frequent basis which are more 
complex (Burns, 2005). Threat modelling can be supported by threat libraries which are 
found particularly effective and defined by different organisations in the discipline of 
security (Uzunov & Fernandez, 2013).  
 
Even though threat libraries offer much value, they only encompass a set of specific, 
predefined threats, making the discovery of new threats or the same threats in different 
architectural contexts more difficult (Myagmar, et al., 2005). For that reason, a 
structured approach would potentially provide various benefits such as allowing an 
arbitrary number of threats to be categorised (Meier, et al., 2003). Various authors 
(Amoroso, 1994; Lindqvist & Jonsson, 1997; Jouini, et al., 2014) concur that a robust IT 
security threat classification process should be guided by principles which are used to 
evaluate threat classifications.  
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The common principles extracted by Jouini, et al. (2014) from various studies are 
presented as follows: 
 
• Mutually exclusive: Threat categories should not overlap. Every threat that is 
classified in one category should exclude all other categories, thus only fit in, at 
most, in one category. 
• Exhaustive: The threat classification categories should include as many threat 
specimens as possible to ensure that all threats are catered for. 
• Unambiguous: Threat categories should be consistent, clear and precise to ensure 
that during the process of classifying threats, they are as certain as possible.  
• Repeatable: When a threat classification is performed on one IT asset by different 
individuals, it should result in the same classification. 
• Accepted: Threat categories should be logical, native and easily acceptable by the 
majority. 
• Useful: Threat classifications should provide the user with more insight into the field 
of inquiry and also be easily adaptable to different application needs. 
 
There are various threat classification models which can be used in the threat 
classification process (Alhabeeb, et al., 2010). Some threat classification models are 
more general and less detailed than others based on whether the organisation is more 
stable or not (Alhabeeb, et al., 2010). The simplest way to apply the threat classification 
process is to examine components of the IT asset, consider how each of the threats 
affects each component, and then record all the threats within the specific categories 
(Jouini, et al., 2014). 
 
It is important to note that there are many threat modelling methods developed by 
various authors in the current body of knowledge under the IT security discipline. For 
the purpose of this study, the threat classification models discussed are Microsoft 
STRIDE, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) classification, 
Computer Security Institute (CSI) classification, and the International Standards 
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Organisation/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 17799:2000 
classification. 
4.3.1. Microsoft STRIDE 
Microsoft STRIDE is a threat classification model which uses threat or attack 
taxonomies to classify IT security threats (Burns, 2005). STRIDE is an acronym for 
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and 
Elevation of privileges (Meier, et al., 2003). 
 
Spoofing refers to when adversaries deceive applications or users by using 
authentication information (e.g. username and password) which does not belong to 
them in order to gain access to IT systems or applications which they are not authorised 
to have (Myagmar, et al., 2005). Tampering refers to the malicious modification of 
information by unauthorised parties (Meier, et al., 2003). Repudiation refers to threats 
whereby users or adversaries deny taking accountability for the actions that they have 
performed and there is lack of ability for the system to produce proof (Jouini, et al. 
2014). Information disclosure refers to threats that have the objective of exposing 
information to unauthorised parties (Fenz & Ekelhart, 2009). 
 
Denial of service threats are threats which attack IT systems by denying services 
provided to authorised users, thereby making the IT system unavailable for a specific 
period (Krichene, 2008). Elevation of privileges refers to threats whereby adversaries 
gain unauthorised privileged access and then use it to perform malicious activities (e.g. 
penetrating and deleting all system defences) (Klemen & Biffl, 2004).  
 
4.3.2. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) classification 
The NIST classification threat classification model was initially designed with the 
objective of ensuring that threats categories are not repeated over the different 
departments (NIST, 2004). There are six threat categories: errors and omissions; fraud 
and theft; employee sabotage; loss of infrastructure that supports the system; malicious 
hackers; and malicious code (NIST, 2004). 
 
Errors and omissions refer to threats that affect data and system integrity as a result of 
internal system users making unintentional mistakes (Ajibuwa, 2008). Fraud and theft 
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refer to threats to IT systems that are due to traditional fraud and theft committed by 
people (e.g. employee using an IT application to steal small monies from different 
accounts of customers which amounts to a large sum) (Felegyhazi, 2011).  
 
Employee sabotage refers to threats which arise from employees’ deliberate, malicious 
actions (e.g. destroying hardware or facilities, and crashing systems intentionally) 
(Finne, 1996). Loss of infrastructure that supports the system is a threat which would 
typically result in system downtime, which is beyond the control of the system owners 
(e.g. fire, flood, and power failures) (Foley, 2009).  
 
Malicious hackers are adversaries who attempt to break down the security defences of 
IT systems of a target organisation which often results in unstable IT systems, stolen 
data, and modified data (NIST, 2004). Malicious code includes all threats which come in 
a form of software and then attempts to perform some kind of malicious actions on the 
IT systems (Krichene, 2008). Examples of malicious code include viruses, Trojan 
horses, worms, logic bombs, and backdoors (NIST, 2004). 
 
4.3.3. Computer Security Institute (CSI) classification 
The CSI classification was initially developed by CSI as a result of a survey which was 
conducted in 2008 and which focused on computer crime and security (Alhabeeb, et al., 
2010). The survey has since been conducted on an annual basis, and the target 
audience is security specialists who are urged to provide insight to current and new 
threats (Alhabeeb, et al., 2010).  
 
The threats are classified into denial of service type threats (including laptop theft, 
telecom fraud, unauthorised access, virus, financial fraud, insider abuse, system 
penetration, and sabotage) and all other threats (including abuse of wireless network, 
website defacement, misuse of Web application, bots, DNS attacks, instant messaging 
abuse, password sniffing, and theft/loss of customer data from mobile devices) 
(Alhabeeb, et al., 2010). 
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4.3.4. ISO/IEC 27005 classification 
The ISO/IEC 27005 threat classification categorises threats based on the sources of 
threats (Geric & Hutinski, 2007). The threats are grouped at a high level as follows 
(Geric & Hutinski, 2007): 
 
• Natural sources: fire, earthquake, flood, incidents, storm, and pollution 
• Technical sources: communication errors, technical mistakes, malfunctions, and 
radiation 
• Un-attention people sources: indiscipline, negligence, unsuitable software, and 
unsuitable organisations 
• Attention people sources: destruction, sabotage, diversion, war destruction, 
viruses, fraud, and stealing 
 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a threat modelling process from Microsoft, which is high level 
and generic. The objective was to provide a basic understanding of how threat 
modelling can be applied within organisations. The threat classification models used 
globally by different organisations were discussed. These threat classification models 
include Microsoft STRIDE, NIST classification, CSI classification and the ISO 27005 
classification. Even though the threat classification models were different in the 
categories, there were many similarities when it comes to the actual threats. 
 
Having reviewed the basic risk management principles as well as the IT security 
frameworks and standards in Chapter 3 and the threat modelling process, there is 
sufficient theoretical foundation to define the ITSRB approach. The following chapter 
discusses the ITSRB approach. 
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5.1. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter dealt with modelling IT security threats. The objective of this 
chapter is to propose an approach to identifying, assessing and treating IT security risk 
which incorporates a robust risk analysis and assessment process. The proposed IT 
Security Risk Based (ITSRB) approach uses coherent characteristics of the risk 
management principles and IT security frameworks and standards discussed in Chapter 
3. Additionally, the threat modelling process discussed in Chapter 4 is also used to 
enhance the ITSRB approach.  
 
To ensure that the ITSRB approach integrates all the necessary elements to enable it to 
be more effective when it is applied in a real-world situation, Zachman (2011) 
recommends the Kipling method (i.e. asking the what, why, who, how, when and where 
questions). The use of the Kipling method in defining a framework helps to explore the 
problem by probing the thinking of the problem-solver with the questions: what, why, 
how, who, when and where (Sherwood, et al., 2009). In the same vein, the Kipling 
method was applied to explain the ITSRB approach.  
 
What: The ITSRB approach is a proactive and dynamic method that aims to ensure 
that IT security risk is effectively and holistically managed. In principle, the ITSRB 
anticipates reducing the risks associated with security of IT assets. 
 
Why: The motivation behind defining the ITSRB approach is to formulate a method to 
assist in managing IT security risk, thereby guaranteeing that relevant risk is addressed 
with adequate and effective controls at the right time. 
 
How: The ITSRB approach uses a combination of best practice IT security risk 
management frameworks and standards as well as a threat modelling process to 
ensure that risk emanating from both known and unknown threats in the IT environment 
is managed.  
 
When: A pragmatic tactic is used when applying the ITSRB approach in order for it to 
add value. Using a pragmatic tactic to manage IT security risk ensures that the ITSRB 
approach is guided by the nature of the risk that each organisation faces. 
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Where: The ITSRB approach is applied within the IT environment of an organisation.  
 
Who: IT security professionals within any organisation can use the ITSRB approach. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 5.2 presents a comparative analysis 
of the IT security frameworks and standards discussed in Chapter 3 in a summarised 
manner. Section 5.3 shows the attributes of a good IT security risk management 
approach deduced from Section 5.2. Section 5.4 brings forward the proposed ITSRB 
approach. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SELECTED BEST PRACTICE IT 
SECURITY FRAMEWORKS AND STANDARDS 
The various frameworks and standards discussed in Chapter 3 have similar objectives 
with regard to IT security. These are to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information and/or systems. The primary differences lie in the approach 
followed in managing IT security risk (Ajibuwa, 2008; Saleh & Alfantookh, 2011).  
 
Cheney and Furner (2008) discuss four categories of frameworks which the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards may fall into, namely, strategic, 
technical, compliance, and high-level guidelines. COBIT 5 is an IT governance 
framework with security governance as a sub-component. COBIT 5 focuses on ‘what’ 
must be done rather than ‘how’ it must be done and is strong in providing high-level 
integration required in the cohesion of various IT security programmes (Cheney & 
Furner, 2008). Similarly, ITIL is an IT governance framework with security management 
as a sub-component. ITIL, on the other hand, is more technically orientated in nature, 
focusing on ‘how’ things should be done rather than ‘what’ should be in place (Cheney 
& Furner, 2008).  
 
Table 5.1 provides a summarised view of the five selected IT security frameworks and 
standards discussed in Chapter 3. As previously indicated, there are many IT security 
frameworks and standards found in the current body of knowledge. The reason the five 
frameworks and standards were selected and discussed in detail in this study is 
because they are commonly used within South African financial institutions, which falls 
within the scope of this study.  
P a g e  | 3 
Table 5.1 – Summarised View of the IT Security Frameworks and Standards 
 OCTAVE ISO 27001 COBIT ITIL ISF 
Focus IT and information 
security risk 
Information security for 
both IT and business 
IT governance IT service management Information security and 
information risk 
Applicability Level Strategic Tactical Strategic Tactical Tactical 
Characteristics • Organisational focus 
• Risk based: balances 
operational risk, 
security practices and 
technology 
• Seeks accountability 
for assets, threats, 
vulnerability and impact 
• Consists of three 
phases: Build Asset-
Based Threat Profiles, 
Identify Infrastructure 
Vulnerabilities, and 
Develop Security 
Strategy and Plans 
• Provides guidance to 
organisations on how to 
implement security 
controls 
• Used as a model to build 
an ISMS 
• Holistic risk based view 
while enabling benefits 
from business 
opportunities 
• Based on Plan-Do-Check-
Act cycle 
• Consists of detailed 133 
security measures which 
are organised into 11 
domains and 39 control 
objectives 
• Best practice processes 
for IT domains defined by 
group of experts within 
various areas of IT 
• Grouped in five focus 
areas which summarise 
its activities (i.e. strategic 
alignment, value delivery, 
resource management, 
risk management, and 
performance 
measurement) 
• Consists of four core 
domains related to 
planning, building, 
running, and monitoring 
of the IT environment 
• Applies to all IT 
resources, namely, 
Applications, Information, 
Infrastructure, and 
People 
• Primary objective is to 
provide an organisation 
with good quality 
information collection, 
information analysis, 
information production, 
and information distribution 
• IT services recognised as 
crucial and strategic assets 
invested in which should 
be measured and 
improved  
• Consists of four life cycle 
stages: service strategy, 
service design, service 
transition, and service 
operations with continual 
service improvement 
existing throughout the life 
cycle 
• Defined and created by 
information security 
experts around the 
world, in a way that 
enables compliance with 
other recognised 
frameworks (e.g. ISO 
27001 and COBIT) 
• Provides a basis for a 
detailed or a high-level 
organisational 
information security 
assessment 
• Divided into four 
categories: security 
governance, security 
requirements, control 
framework, and security 
monitoring and 
improvement 
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 OCTAVE ISO 27001 COBIT ITIL ISF 
Key Strengths • Systematic and 
context-driven 
• Self-directed 
• Workshop-based 
approach 
• Involves junior staff up 
to senior/executive 
management 
• Globally recognised, 
enabling enterprises to use 
it as an assurance tool or a 
benchmark tool 
• Can increase business and 
IT alignment  
• Can enable organisations 
to measure which security 
controls provide the largest 
return on security 
investment 
• Improved effectiveness of 
information security 
because of the use of 
tried-and-tested best 
practice guidance 
• More technically detailed, 
and therefore provides 
comprehensive guidance 
on how things should be 
done 
• Can increase business 
and IT alignment  
• Organises IT activities 
into a generally accepted 
process model 
• Enables the organisation 
to see major IT 
resources to be 
leveraged 
• Defines the management 
control objectives to be 
considered 
• Can increase user and 
customer satisfaction 
because IT services are 
explicitly defined and 
service levels are 
measured  
• Improved decision-making 
and optimised risk 
because all aspects 
relating to every IT service 
are taken into account 
during design, analysis 
and operation  
• Can offer financial savings 
from reduced rework, lost 
time, improved resource 
management and usage 
• Service catalogue is 
explicitly defined; 
therefore, there is 
improved time to market 
new IT products and 
services 
• Can improve IT service 
availability because IT 
service levels are closely 
monitored  
• Rigour and 
comprehensive, allowing 
for a more effective 
process of key risks 
identification 
• Provides a detailed set of 
controls which covers the 
IT environment 
holistically, hence 
minimising the need to 
purchase additional 
repository of potential 
controls 
• Seamless integration into 
an organisation because 
it is completely aligned 
with other globally 
recognised security 
frameworks 
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 OCTAVE ISO 27001 COBIT ITIL ISF 
Weaknesses • Resource intense: 
requires human time 
investment and formal 
training in some cases 
• Focus is mainly on 
identification, analysis 
and planning, and no 
focus on 
implementation, 
monitoring and control 
activities 
• Dedication of top 
management is often a 
challenge 
• Assessment of a 
complex organisation 
might consume much 
time, resulting in 
misinterpretation of the 
information gathered 
due to changes 
happening during the 
exercise 
• Scope of implementation is 
considerably large, 
therefore cannot be 
implemented all at once 
• Limited expertise within 
organisations’ resources 
makes it difficult to 
envisage what the end 
result should be 
• Resistance to change from 
employee behaviour might 
be a challenge 
• Associate cost and effort of 
implementation may be 
lengthy and become a big 
factor 
• High degree of 
abstraction 
• Poor focus on IT, 
bringing unrelated 
practices under one 
umbrella, which makes it 
weak to some of the core 
services that IT offers 
• It is thin on detail 
regarding ‘how things 
should be done’ 
• Not an exclusive 
information security 
standard; therefore, 
COBIT cannot be relied 
upon for the entire 
security program within 
an organisation 
• Failure to fully understand 
the breadth and depth of 
ITIL may lead to 
implementation failures 
• Has a high level of detail 
which becomes a 
challenge for senior 
management (especially 
those with no IT 
background) to fully 
understand and support 
• All ITIL-aligned processes 
and performance aspects 
require roles or individuals 
to be assigned to them, 
which is often a daunting 
task for many 
organisations 
• Day-to-day operations can 
become more about the 
processes than service 
delivery, thus failing to 
deliver to the business 
• Limited in the area of IT, 
and security not a core 
focus 
• Dependent on the use of 
frameworks and yields 
most value when it is 
used as a supporting 
framework and not as a 
stand-alone framework 
• Might introduce too much 
ambiguity because it 
leaves the users with too 
much room for flexibility 
with regard to 
interpreting how controls 
should be implemented 
• Compliance-focused and 
not effectiveness-
focused; it does not help 
if an organisation is 
considered compliant 
because controls exist 
but those controls are 
not working effectively to 
address day-to-day 
operational challenges 
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5.3. ATTRIBUTES OF A GOOD IT SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH 
The five attributes which have been observed as making up a comprehensive and 
more effective IT security risk management approach are discussed in this section. 
These attributes have been derived through the detailed analysis of the risk 
management and IT security frameworks and standards discussed in Chapter 3. A 
comparative analysis of the investigated IT security frameworks and standards 
presented in Section 5.2 indicates that there are different approaches to managing IT 
security risk. Other frameworks and standards are applied at a strategic level, 
whereas others are focused at a tactical level. Additionally, some of those 
frameworks and standards focus on the ‘what’ while others focus on the ‘how’. In 
finding a good approach to IT security risk management, strong characteristics from 
the investigated frameworks and standards are extracted to define the proposed 
ITSRB approach.  
 
5.3.1. ATTRIBUTE 1: Hybrid approach  
The first attribute essential for ensuring coverage of an organisation’s IT security risk 
profile is a hybrid approach, depicted in Figure 5.2. To ensure that the entire IT 
security risk profile is covered, a combination of a top-down approach and a bottom-
up approach, namely, a hybrid approach should be applied to identify and manage IT 
security risk (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2010). NIST 
(2010) states that managing IT security risk requires the involvement of the entire 
organisation, from senior management to the most junior employee.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – The Hybrid Approach  
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The comparative analysis presented in Section 5.2 indicates that applying an IT 
security risk management framework only at a strategic level of an organisation may 
leave out other significant IT security risks found at tactical and operational levels of 
an organisation (NIST, 2010). Thus, it is advisable to take a more holistic approach. 
 
Senior management is responsible for providing the strategic vision, goals and 
objectives of the organisation, while mid-level management is responsible for 
planning and managing projects as well as processes. On the other hand, junior staff 
are responsible for carrying out operational activities (NIST, 2010). Figure 5.3 
depicts the tiered risk management approach recommended by NIST (2010). 
 
Figure 5.3 – Tiered Risk Management Approach  
Source: NIST (2010) 
 
In a tiered risk management approach, risks at tier 1 are strategic risks; at tier 2, they 
are tactical risks; and at tier 3, risks are operational risks (NIST, 2010). OCTAVE and 
COBIT 5 are applied at a strategic level by recommending the governance aspects 
of IT security. ISO 27001, ITIL and ISF are applied at tactical level by recommending 
the operational controls for IT security. The proposed ITSRB approach uses the 
hybrid approach. This is also indicated by the comparative analysis in Table 5.1.  
 
 
TIER 1  
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(Governance) 
 
TIER 2  
MISSION / BUSINESS PROCESS  
(Information & Information Flows) 
TIER 3  
INFORMATION SYSTEM  
(Environment of Operation) 
Strategic IT security risks 
Tactical IT security risks 
Operational IT security risks 
IT Security R
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5.3.2. ATTRIBUTE 2: Iteration 
The Institute of Risk Management (IRM, 2010) emphasises that treatment of any 
kind of risk should be an iterative process, which is the second attribute essential for 
the proposed ITSRB approach. Therefore, an IT security risk management process 
should be an iterative process that is defined in a way that will lead to continuous 
improvement of an organisation’s risk posture (Ketel, 2008). Application of this 
attribute is demonstrated in all of the frameworks and standards reviewed by the 
comparative analysis in Table 5.1. ISO 2700:2005, which is a standard 
recommending best practice operational controls for security, further puts a structure 
to the iteration attribute by introducing the Deming cycle. The Deming cycle is also 
known as the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model and is depicted in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 – PDCA Model  
Source: (Averson, 2015)  
 
The PDCA model recommends that IT security initiatives be planned, executed, 
monitored and maintained (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). The model allows organisations 
to continuously self-assess themselves by engaging in improvement activities 
throughout the management of IT security risk (ISO/IEC 27001, 2013). For these 
reasons, the iteration attribute is applied in the proposed ITSRB approach. 
 
Plan 
Do 
Check 
Act 
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5.3.3. ATTRIBUTE 3: Responsibility assignment 
In identifying the responsibility of tasks for any process, the RACI (Responsible, 
Accountable, Consulted, and Informed) is an appropriate tool to be used (Smith & 
Erwin, 2005). The RACI model basically helps to simplify the responsibilities in a 
process by creating a two-dimensional matrix which shows the ‘level of involvement’ 
for functional roles in a set of activities, as demonstrated in Table 5.2 (Smith & Erwin, 
2005; Banacorsi, 2011).  
 
Table 5.2 – Example of a RACI model 
Process Name Role 1 Role 2 Role 3 Role 4 
Process 1 R A C I 
Process 2 A I R C 
Process n I R A C 
 
RACI is defined as follows: 
 
R: Responsible refers to the individual(s) who own the problem, activity or process 
(Smith & Erwin, 2005). The responsible individual(s) execute that specific process 
(Banacorsi, 2011). Responsibility can be shared or delegated (Banacorsi, 2011). 
 
A: Accountable refers to the individual who is liable (Smith & Erwin, 2005). The 
accountable individual(s) are responsible for approving the task before it can be 
used (Banacorsi, 2011). Accountability cannot be delegated or shared (Smith & 
Erwin, 2005). 
 
C: Consulted refers to the individual(s) who have the information and/or ability 
necessary to complete the specific process (Banacorsi, 2011). This individual(s) 
should be consulted before a key decision is taken regarding the process or activity 
(Smith & Erwin, 2005). 
 
I: Informed refers to the individual(s) that must be notified about the results once an 
action has been taken (Banacorsi, 2011). Informed individual(s) are notified because 
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the action(s) taken have some level of impact on their function (Smith & Erwin, 
2005). 
 
The RACI model helps sort out the fundamental issues within a process where there 
is ambiguity in ownership of tasks (Banacorsi, 2011). Effective usage of the RACI 
model in a process will explicitly identify ownership, reduce duplication of effort and 
reduce misunderstanding (Smith & Erwin, 2005; Banacorsi, 2011). 
 
COBIT is the only framework out of the investigated frameworks and standards that 
recommends the use of a RACI model throughout its domains, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3. IT Governance Institute (ITGI) (2007) emphasises that understanding 
roles and responsibilities for each process is important and forms the basis for 
effective governance. For these reasons, the RACI model has been applied for the 
proposed ITSRB approach, as it is regarded as an important attribute for assigning 
ownership in the IT security risk management process. 
 
5.3.4. ATTRIBUTE 4: Input and output 
Both the ITIL and COBIT frameworks emphasise that a process is a set of 
executable step(s) which has the primary objective of transforming input to output in 
order to achieve a known goal (ITGI, 2007; IT Service Management Forum [ITSMF], 
2007). Calder (2013) recommends that a key and basic principle that is applicable to 
any process is that it should have an input and output. It is important to note that any 
process is defined to achieve the one goal of transforming input to output (Calder, 
2013). Figure 5.5 presents a simple process model. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 – A Simple Process Model 
 
Calder (2013) emphasises that every input element put through a process should 
have some form of output as a product. A process is meant to transform input to 
output (Calder, 2013). The COBIT framework explicitly demonstrates the use of 
 
Input 
 
Process 
 
Output 
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inputs and outputs in all its processes, whereas OCTAVE, ITIL, ISO 27001 and ISF 
only emphasise the output components. For this reason, the proposed ITSRB 
approach uses this principle. 
 
5.3.5. ATTRIBUTE 5: Dynamicity 
Before defining the security controls of an IT system, it is essential to enumerate the 
threats to the system in question in order to help system architects or designers to 
develop realistic and meaningful security requirements (Myagmar, et al., 2005). 
Gandotra, et al. (2012) have demonstrated that it is important to implement a risk 
approach that is vigorous so that risk can be treated in a proactive manner. The 
integrated framework defined by Gandotra, et al. (2012) is defined in a way that 
ensures that both known and unknown threats can be identified and mitigated as 
they emanate or change.  
 
Winter and Schelp (2008) have indicated that IT is dynamic, and for this reason, IT 
security threats also change quite often. Accordingly, in order to achieve this 
principle, it is important to define an approach that will periodically cater for the 
changing threats of the IT environment through a continuous monitoring exercise 
recommended by Hardy (2012). 
 
The five attributes discussed above are elementary and sourced from various pieces 
of literature, but they are not all-inclusive enough to fully define the ITSRB approach 
proposed in this study. The next section presents the proposed ITSRB approach, 
which is based on the characteristics of the selected IT security frameworks and 
standards discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
5.4. THE IT SECURITY RISK BASED (ITSRB) APPROACH 
 
5.4.1. Structure of the ITSRB approach 
It is common practice for frameworks to follow a structured life cycle, as highlighted 
by the comparative analysis in Section 5.2. Additionally, the “iteration” attribute as 
defined in Section 5.3 highlights the importance of using a systematic process that is 
continuous for IT security risk management. Furthermore, as previously stated in 
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Chapter 1, one of the objectives is to reuse the best characteristics of the best 
practice frameworks and standards in order to avoid reinventing the wheel. 
Accordingly, the ITSRB approach does not deviate from this practice and adopts the 
PDCA model as well as the iteration attribute to ensure its continuous improvement. 
Figure 5.6 presents the four phases of the proposed ITSRB approach based on the 
PDCA model which was adopted from the ISO 27001 framework. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 – Structure of the ITSRB Approach 
 
Plan refers to establishing the proposed IT security risk management approach.  
 
Do refers to the activities involved in implementing and operating the proposed IT 
security risk management approach.  
 
Check refers to the process of monitoring and reviewing the IT security risk 
management approach.  
 
1.  Plan 
IT security risk 
management 
approach 
2.  Do  
Implement the IT 
security risk 
management 
approach 
3.  Check 
 Monitor the IT 
security risk 
management 
approach 
4.  Act 
Maintain & improve 
the IT security risk 
management 
approach 
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Act refers to the process of maintaining and improving the IT security risk 
management approach which involves maintaining the IT security controls.  
 
5.4.2. Features of the ITSRB approach 
To clearly articulate the ITSRB approach, a number of features were defined to 
ensure that there is consistency in explaining each phase of this approach. The 
features selected align with the attributes discussed in Section 5.3. These features 
basically assist in grouping the characteristics that guide the ITSRB approach to 
make sure that a comprehensive view of this approach is explained in detail. 
Additionally, the features of the ITSRB approach are used to ensure that the target 
audience making use of this approach have an idea of exactly what will be required 
from them to manage IT security risk within their organisations.  
 
The features of the ITSRB approach are defined as follows: 
 
Phase: As per Figure 5.6, the ITSRB approach has four phases based on the PDCA 
model. This implies that it goes through different phases in order to achieve its goal. 
A phase basically refers to one of the sub-processes or stages of the ITSRB 
approach. This feature aligns with attribute 2 (i.e. iteration) described in Section 
5.3.2. 
 
Objective: Objective refers to the aim of each ITSRB approach’s phases. The 
objective describes what each phase intends to do. Explaining the objective of each 
phase ensures that the users of the ITSRB approach comprehend the intention 
thereof. 
 
Target audience: Target audience refers to the person(s) which each phase of the 
ITSRB approach is beset at. The different target audiences will be categorised 
according to their work responsibilities as per Figure 5.3, where tier 1 refers to 
people responsible for strategic management of an organisation; tier 2 refers to 
people performing tactical management duties within an organisation; and tier 3 
refers to people performing operational management duties within an organisation. 
This feature aligns with attribute 1 (i.e. hybrid approach) described in Section 5.3.1. 
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Frequency: Frequency is the rate of occurrence that a specific phase should be 
conducted. The frequency that is specified in the ITSRB approach is the minimum 
frequency; therefore, any additional executions of phases will not cause any 
concerns. This feature aligns with attribute 5 (i.e. dynamicity) described in Section 
5.3.5. This feature intends to promote consideration of various threats on a 
continuous basis. 
 
Process model (i.e. input, process and output): The process model provides the 
input elements, the process that will be used to transform the input elements and the 
output elements. The basics of the process model align with attribute 4 (i.e. input and 
output) described in Section 5.3.4.  
 
Tools: Tools refer to the existing frameworks, processes, applications or 
technologies that can be used in order to execute a process within a specific phase. 
Because organisations operate differently and use different applications, the ITSRB 
does not prescribe any specific application. Instead, the ITSRB approach 
emphasises the need to capture specific information as it best suits the users. 
 
RACI: RACI is for responsibility assignment. RACI shows who will be responsible for 
what within each phase. The objective of this feature is to ensure that the users of 
the ITSRB approach understand their responsibilities within each phase. This feature 
aligns with attribute 3 (i.e. responsibility assignment) described in Section 5.3.3.  
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5.4.3. Phases of the ITSRB approach 
The following tables present the phases of the ITSRB approach. 
Table 5.3 – ITSRB Approach Phase 1 
PHASE 1 PLAN: THE ITSRB APPROACH 
 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this phase is to define and develop an IT security risk management plan that is fit for purpose for a specific 
organisation. The plan basically provides a view of what IT security controls are in the IT environment versus what IT security 
controls need to be in the IT environment (i.e. for software, hardware, procedures, networks, people and procedures). 
 
FREQUENCY Annually 
 
TARGET AUDIENCE 
 
• Strategic Management 
• Tactical Management 
PROCESS MODEL 
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT 
 
• Organisational strategy 
(Objectives) 
• IT strategy 
• Previous IT security risk 
register (if it exists) 
• Previous IT audit report 
(i.e. IT security audits) 
• Previous IT security 
incidents 
 
• Map each organisational strategy and IT strategy objective to an 
IT security principle (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availability). 
• Define IT security requirements for each strategic objective and 
assess which IT security controls exist and which do not exist. 
• Use the COBIT control objectives to conduct a gap analysis to 
assess which controls exist within the IT environment and which 
ones do not exist.  
• Define the IT security risk appetite (i.e. this information should be 
sourced from the senior executive who is in charge of the IT 
environment, such as a chief information officer (CIO)). 
 
• IT security strategy 
• IT security risk appetite 
• IT security risk profile 
• IT security risk register 
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PHASE 1 PLAN: THE ITSRB APPROACH 
• The gaps identified from the strategic objectives as well as the 
gaps identified from the COBIT framework should be added as 
inherent IT security risks within the IT security risk register. 
• Define Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) including the associated 
thresholds. KRI data are normally sourced from people in the 
tactical management tier (e.g. CIO’s direct reports). 
• Define the controls for each identified risk; assess each of the 
controls’ adequacy and effectiveness. 
• Assess the risk once the controls have been taken into 
consideration, and record the residual risk as the risk that is 
tracked on a regular basis in the IT security risk register. 
 
 
 
 
 
TOOLS 
 
• Workshops (Senior & 
tactical management) 
• Spreadsheets 
• Word documents 
 
 
• COBIT  
• OCTAVE 
• RCSA (Risk & Control Self-Assessment) and KRIs 
 
• Centralised document 
management application 
(e.g. Microsoft SharePoint) 
 
RACI 
IT Security Professional CIO & Direct Reports Risk Management Internal Audit 
Responsible Accountable Consulted Informed 
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Table 5.4 – ITSRB Approach Phase 2 
PHASE 2 DO: IMPLEMENT THE ITSRB APPROACH 
OBJECTIVE The objective of this phase is to put the ITSRB approach into effect within a specific organisation. Implementing the ITSRB 
approach will enable IT security professionals to prioritise implementation of the necessary IT security controls as per the 
organisation’s risk profile. 
 
FREQUENCY Quarterly 
 
TARGET AUDIENCE 
• Tactical Management 
• Operational Management 
PROCESS MODEL 
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT 
 
• IT security risk register 
• IT components (i.e. 
information, hardware, 
software, procedures, 
networks, people) 
• Previous IT security 
incident report 
 
 
For each risk within the IT security risk register: 
• Identify and define each IT component(s) affected by each risk. 
• Decompose each identified IT component. 
• Categorise the identified sub-components (i.e. High\Med\Low 
based on business criticality). 
• Identify current threats for each IT sub-component. 
• Document the threats for each IT sub-component. 
• Select IT security controls for each IT sub-component 
commensurate with the threat. 
• Plan the implementation of the IT security control(s) as per the IT 
budget. 
• Prioritise implementation basing the decision on the risk impact to 
the business and IT operations. 
 
• IT security risk register 
(updated) 
• IT security threat 
landscape 
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PHASE 2 DO: IMPLEMENT THE ITSRB APPROACH 
• Implement IT security control(s) for each IT sub-component as 
the per the implementation plan. 
• Assess the IT security control(s) for each identified asset and 
update the IT security risk register on a regular basis. 
• Monitor the IT security control(s) for each identified asset. 
 
 
 
TOOLS 
 
• Focused 
workshops/meetings with 
IT management (i.e. CIO’s 
direct reports, their 
subordinates) and other 
relevant operational staff 
• Spreadsheets 
• Word documents 
 
 
• ITIL and ISO 27001 
• OCTAVE 
• RCSA, Management Actions, KRIs and Operational losses 
 
• Centralised document 
management 
application (e.g. 
Microsoft SharePoint) 
 
RACI 
IT Security Professional CIO & Direct Reports Risk Management Internal Audit 
Responsible Accountable Consulted Informed 
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Table 5.5 – ITSRB Approach Phase 3 
PHASE 3 CHECK: MONITOR THE ITSRB APPROACH 
OBJECTIVE The objective of this phase is to monitor the adequacy and the performance of the ITSRB approach. Performing this phase will 
assist the organisation to reflect on how the ITSRB is doing, thereby highlighting the good and the bad IT security risk areas for 
the IT environment. 
 
FREQUENCY Monthly 
TARGET AUDIENCE • Tactical Management 
• Operational Management 
PROCESS MODEL 
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT 
 
• IT security risk register 
 
 
For each risk within the IT security risk register: 
• Assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the IT security 
control(s) taking into consideration the IT security incidents 
associated with each risk as well as the key risk indicators. 
• Record the performance of the KRIs.  
• Record any operational losses for each risk which materialised 
during that specific month. 
• Update the Management Actions. 
• Update the residual risk. 
• Develop an IT security risk report which provides both a 
summarised view and a detailed view of the IT security risk 
profile. Update the IT security report on a monthly basis. 
• Record any generic areas of improvement of the ITSRB 
 
• IT security risk register 
(updated) 
• IT security monthly 
report 
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PHASE 3 CHECK: MONITOR THE ITSRB APPROACH 
approach and also include them in the IT security monthly 
report. 
 
 
 
 
TOOLS 
 
• Focused workshops/ 
meetings with IT 
management (i.e. CIO’s 
direct reports, their 
subordinates) and other 
relevant operational 
staff 
• Spreadsheets 
• Word documents 
 
 
• RCSA, Management Actions, KRIs and Operational losses 
 
• Centralised document 
management 
application (e.g. 
Microsoft SharePoint) 
 
RACI 
IT Security Professional CIO & Direct Reports Risk Management Internal Audit 
Responsible Accountable Consulted Informed 
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Table 5.6 – ITSRB Approach Phase 4 
PHASE 4 ACT: MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE ITSRB APPROACH 
OBJECTIVE The objective of this phase is to assess the performance of the ITSRB approach by identifying areas of improvement and 
then implementing corrective actions. 
 
FREQUENCY Bi-annually 
 
TARGET AUDIENCE 
• Strategic Management 
• Tactical Management 
PROCESS MODEL 
INPUT PROCESS OUTPUT 
 
• IT security monthly report 
• IT security strategy 
• IT security risk appetite 
• IT security risk profile 
 
 
 
• Assess the trend of the IT security risks for six 
months and update the IT security risk profile. 
• Review the IT security risk appetite and update it 
(i.e. take guidance from the CIO and direct 
reports). 
• Review if the goals within the IT security strategy 
are being met.  
• Create a progressive report providing a view of the 
progress on the activities involved with regard to 
delivering against the IT security strategy. Define a 
generic plan of the activities which still need to be 
performed and record them in the organisation’s 
action plan for IT security. 
• Present the report to strategic and tactical 
management. 
 
• IT security progress report 
(bi-annual) 
• Action plan for IT security 
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PHASE 4 ACT: MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THE ITSRB APPROACH 
TOOLS  
• Centralised document 
management application (i.e. 
spreadsheets, word 
documents) 
 
 
• Spreadsheets 
• Word documents 
• Powerpoint presentations  
 
• Meetings with strategic and 
tactical management 
 
RACI 
IT Security Professional CIO & Direct Reports Risk Management Internal Audit 
Responsible Accountable Consulted Informed 
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5.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the ITSRB approach. The comparative analysis of the 
different IT security frameworks and standards that are commonly used within 
various South African financial institutions was presented. The objective of 
presenting the comparative analysis was to summarise the key characteristics of 
each framework and to highlight the common factors amongst the discussed 
frameworks and standards. Subsequently, the attributes that make up the ITSRB 
approach were discussed to highlight their importance in managing IT security risk. 
Lastly, the different phases of the ITSRB approach were presented. 
 
The following chapter discusses the data analysis process of this study  which 
presents the findings of the survey carried out as part of the research strategy. 
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6. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 – Dissertation Layout: Chapter 6  
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6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The foregoing chapter outlined the data collection process used in this study. The 
objective of this chapter is to present the findings of the survey as well as analyse 
the results of the findings in order to determine the respondents’ level of agreement 
with the proposed ITSRB approach. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the 
questionnaire was directly linked to the research objectives and research questions. 
Linking the questionnaire to the research objective and research questions ensured 
that relevant questions were posed to assist in making conclusions about the 
relevance of the ITSRB approach in the field of IT security.  
 
Similarly, to ensure that the proposed ITSRB approach aligns with the research 
objectives and the questionnaire, phases of the ITSRB approach were mapped 
accordingly. Figure 6.2 depicts the research objectives, questionnaire and the ITSRB 
approach mapping. It becomes apparent in Figure 6.2 that the four phases of the 
ITSRB approach, namely, plan the ITSRB approach; implement the ITSRB 
approach; monitor the ITSRB approach; and maintain the ITSRB approach are 
aligned to the questionnaire as well as the research objectives of this study. Section 
6.2 presents the findings as collected from SurveyMonkey including the analysis of 
those findings. The chapter is concluded in section 6.3. 
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Main Research 
Objective 
Investigate whether strong 
characteristics of the existing 
IT security frameworks, the 
basic risk management 
principles, and the IT security 
threat modelling processes 
within the best practice body 
of knowledge can be 
extended to develop a formal 
and proactive approach for 
managing IT security risk. 
Sub-objective 1 
Investigate the best practice 
IT security frameworks which 
are most commonly used 
within the financial 
institutions in South Africa by 
identifying their common 
characteristics and 
limitations. 
 
Sub-objective 2 
Investigate basic risk 
management principles and 
IT security threat modelling 
processes to assess their 
benefits for IT security risk 
management. 
 
Sub-objective 3 
Consolidate the strong 
characteristics of the 
investigated IT security 
frameworks, basic risk 
management principles, and 
the IT security threat 
modelling processes to 
develop characteristics and 
attributes of a dynamic IT 
security risk management 
approach. 
 
Question 6(a): Use of a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up approaches to identify IT security risk (i.e. Hybrid 
Approach) 
 
Question 6(b): Use of an iterative process for an IT security 
risk management approach (i.e. Iteration) 
 
Question 6(c): Responsibility assignment for an IT security 
risk management approach (i.e. RACI model) 
Question 6(d): Definition of input and output elements for an 
IT security risk management approach (i.e. Input & Output) 
Question 6(e): Inclusion of threat modelling to increase 
dynamicity of the IT security risk management approach (i.e. 
Dynamicity) 
Question 5(a): OCTAVE 
Question 5(b): ISO 27001 
Question 5(c): COBIT 
Question 5(d): ITIL 
Question 5(e): ISF Standard of Good Practice 
Question 7(a): Organisational strategy and IT strategy as 
input elements for an IT security risk strategy 
 
Question 7(b): Consideration of previous IT security risks 
and incidents for IT security risk identification 
Question 7(c): Consideration of previous IT security audit 
findings for IT security risk identification 
Question 7(d): Formal, periodic (e.g. quarterly) workshops 
for IT security risk assessments 
Question 7(e): Threat modelling (IT security) at a business 
unit level at least once a year 
Question 7(f): Development of an IT security risk register 
that is reviewed at least once a month 
Question 7(g): Formal communication (i.e. reporting) of IT 
security risk to senior management on a quarterly basis 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & QUESTIONS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE PHASES OF THE ITSRB APPROACH 
 
 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 1 
PLAN: Plan the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 2 
DO: Implement the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 3 
CHECK: Monitor the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 1 
PLAN: Plan the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 2 
DO: Implement the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 4 
ACT: Maintain the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 3 
CHECK: Monitor the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 1 
PLAN: Plan the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 2 
DO: Implement the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 4 
ACT: Maintain the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 3 
CHECK: Monitor the ITSRB Approach 
ITSRB Approach: Phase 4 
ACT: Maintain the ITSRB Approach 
Figure 6.2 – Mapping of Research Objectives to the ITSRB Approach 
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6.2. FINDINGS 
To achieve a 90% confidence level and a 10% margin of error, the final sample size 
had to be at least 60 responses. As indicated in Chapter 6, the questionnaire was 
sent to 150 IT security professionals. The intention of sending the questionnaire to 
150 respondents was to ensure that the final sample of at least 60 respondents to 
attain an adequate confidence level and low margin of error is achieved. An overview 
of the response summary sourced from SurveyMonkey is presented in Figure 6.3.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 – Questionnaire Response Summary 
 
Penwarden (2014) indicated that an average response rate for a survey such as this 
one is 24.8%. A total number of 65 responses were received through SurveyMonkey, 
which provided a response rate of 43%. Out of the 65 respondents, one respondent 
did not complete all of the questions required to be answered, and the other 
respondent either exited the survey half way or did not attempt to answer some of 
the questions. This implies that the total number of responses considered for 
analysing the findings is 63. As per the selected confidence level of 90% and a 
margin of error of 10%, it is safe to conclude that the responses received for this 
survey were sufficient to satisfy the research objective and research questions. 
 
 
91 | P a g e  
 
6.2.1. Findings for section 1 of the questionnaire: General information 
Section 1 assessed the demographics of the sample group in order to determine if 
they actually met the predefined characteristics of the target population. As indicated 
in Chapter 2, the target population included IT security professionals within South 
African financial institutions. 
 
6.2.1.1. Question 1: Section 1 of the questionnaire 
Question 1 of the questionnaire determined the size of the organisation that the 
respondents worked for. This information indicates the percentage of respondents 
who come from large and complex environments. An assumption made is that, if the 
ITSRB approach is able to add value to large organisations which are more complex, 
it will also add value to medium and small organisations which are less complex. 
Ideally, more respondents who work for large organisations would be able to add 
more value to the survey. Figure 6.4 depicts the response summary for question 1 of 
the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 – Question 1 Response Summary 
 
Figure 6.4 indicates that 81% of the respondents come from large organisations, with 
9% from medium organisations and the remaining 10% from small organisations. 
The results show that the majority of the respondents work in large organisations 
10% 
9% 
81% 
Q1: What is the size of the organisation that you work for? 
Small (< 200 employees)
Medium (200 - 1000 employees)
Large (> 1000 employees)
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that have complex environments. The view of the respondents about the attributes 
and characteristics of the ITSRB approach carries more weight to the conclusions 
made, as they are viewing the ITSRB approach from a complex environment 
perspective. 
 
6.2.1.2. Question 2: Section 1 of the questionnaire 
Question 2 of the questionnaire determined if the respondents were responsible for 
managing IT security risk, directly or indirectly. Respondents whose responsibility 
include management of IT security risk would add value to the survey because they 
would understand IT security concepts used for this study. Figure 6.5 presents the 
response summary for question 2 of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.5 – Question 2 Response Summary 
 
Figure 6.5 reveals that 98% of the respondents indeed work in an area which directly 
or indirectly manages IT security risk.  Two percent of the respondents do not work 
in an environment where they manage IT security risk directly; however, the 
comment provided states that the environment that the respondents work in is an IT 
Audit function which also incorporates IT security audits. It is therefore safe to 
conclude that all the respondents are involved directly or indirectly with management 
of IT security risk, implying that these individuals will comprehend the IT security 
concepts used in the questionnaire. 
98% 
2% 
Q2: Does your day-to-day responsibilities include 
management of IT security risk? 
Yes
No
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6.2.1.3. Question 3: Section 1 of the questionnaire 
Under normal circumstances, IT security functions within large organisations have 
different focus areas such as operations, governance, risk management, and 
monitoring. The objective of this question was to get an indication of the 
demographics of the respondents in order to get a high-level view of their IT security 
focus areas. Figure 6.6 highlights the response summary for question 3 of the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Question 3 Response Summary 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates that 37% of the respondents work in IT security governance, 
36% works in IT security risk, 14% in IT security operations, and 14% in other areas 
(i.e. indicated as security architecture, security consulting and security sales). This 
demonstrates that there is an adequate mix of respondents who participated in the 
survey. Having a mix of respondents adds value to the survey, as the respondents 
assess the ITSRB approach from different perspectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
37% 
36% 
14% 
13% 
Q3: Which area of IT security are you involved in? 
Governance
Risk
Operations
Other
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6.2.1.4. Question 4: Section 1 of the questionnaire 
A general assumption is that people with more work experience have more 
knowledge about a specific subject. Question 4 of the questionnaire assessed the 
level of IT security experience of the respondents. Figure 6.7 depicts the response 
summary for question 4 of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.7 – Question 4 Response Summary 
 
Figure 6.7 shows that the majority of the respondents have over five years’ 
experience in the field of IT security. It is safe to assume that the sample group 
consisted of enough respondents that have extensive knowledge in the field of IT 
security to assess the characteristics of the ITSRB approach adequately. 
 
6.2.1.5. Summary for section 1 responses 
Analysis of section 1 indicates that the respondents are in the correct target 
population. They work for large organisations and in one of the disciplines of IT 
security. Based on the findings presented in this section, it is safe to conclude that 
the respondents from the sample group are adequate in assessing the ITSRB 
approach and its applicability within the organisations they work for. 
 
10% 
29% 
61% 
Q4: Experience in IT security? 
0 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
10 years +
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6.2.2. Findings for section 2 of the questionnaire: Best practice IT security 
frameworks and standards 
Section 2 of the questionnaire evaluated the respondents’ views on the different IT 
security frameworks and standards that are commonly used within South African 
financial institutions. The goal of this section was to determine the respondents’ 
views on the selected frameworks and standards’ ability to manage IT security risk. 
Furthermore, the questions in this section link directly to research sub-objective 1 
and research question 1 (i.e. Do the selected best practice IT security frameworks 
and standards most commonly used within the financial institutions in South Africa 
assist in managing IT security risk?) presented in Figure 6.2. The following request 
was presented in the questionnaire for this section: “indicate your opinion on the 
IT security risk management frameworks and standards used in defining the 
proposed approach”. Figure 6.8 presents the response summary for section 2 of 
the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 – Section 2 Response Summary 
 
Section 2 comprises question 5(a), question 5(b), question 5(c), question 5(d) and 
question 5(e), also indicated in Figure 2.4. Figure 6.8 indicates that the majority of 
the respondents agreed with the statements. The individual questions of this section 
are discussed in Section 6.2.2.1 to Section 6.2.2.5.  
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6.2.2.1. Question 5(a): Section 2 of the questionnaire 
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) is a 
process-driven framework that enables organisations to understand, assess and 
address their IT security risks from an organisation’s perspective (Panda, 2009). 
OCTAVE was selected as one of the frameworks investigated for this study because 
of its ability to engage the entire organisation for IT security risk assessments. The 
level of agreement from the respondents with the fact that OCTAVE can be used by 
organisations to manage their IT security was determined in this question. Figure 6.9 
depicts the response summary for question 5(a) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 – Question 5(a): OCTAVE 
 
Figure 6.9 reveals that 62% (i.e. 22% strongly agree and 40% agree) of the 
respondents agree that OCTAVE is a good framework to manage IT security risk. As 
much as OCTAVE is a fairly known IT security risk management framework, there 
are many people from the sample group who do not know about it. Thirty-four per 
cent of the respondents neither agree nor disagree, which potentially implies that 
they have never used OCTAVE before. Four per cent of the respondents disagree 
(i.e. 2% disagree and 2% strongly disagree) with the fact that OCTAVE can assist in 
managing IT security risk.  
 
2% 2% 
34% 
40% 
22% 
5(a) IT Security Frameworks (OCTAVE) 
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Based on the results of this question, it is assumed that OCTAVE is  not commonly 
used by the respondents. The fact that only 62% of the respondents agree with the 
fact that OCTAVE can assist in managing IT security risk alludes to this conclusion. 
However, this does not mean that OCTAVE does not employ good principles which 
are good for managing IT security risk within organisations. 
 
6.2.2.2. Question 5(b): Section 2 of the questionnaire 
Question 5(b) assessed the respondents’ views on ISO 27001. ISO 27001 provides 
guidance to organisations on how to implement security controls in order to 
accomplish security objectives of safeguarding confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information and systems (ISO 27001, 2007). ISO 27001/2 does not 
explicitly apply risk management principles; however, the literature review revealed 
that application of the recommended controls can assist in mitigating IT security 
risks. ISO 27001/2 was selected because it provides a detailed list of security 
controls that align with business requirements and the fact that it is one of the well-
known frameworks used across the globe for IT security benchmarking purposes. 
Figure 6.10 depicts the response summary for question 5(b) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.10 – Question 5(b): ISO 27001 
 
Figure 6.10 illustrates that the majority of the respondents agree with the fact that 
ISO 27001 can be used to manage IT security risk. The majority of the respondents  
0% 
3% 
2% 
51% 
44% 
5(b) IT Security Frameworks (ISO 27001) 
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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agreed with this statement (i.e. 51% agree and 44% strongly agree) implying that the 
majority of the respondents have potentially used it before.  
 
Even though the majority of the respondents agree that ISO 27001 can manage IT 
security risk, there is still a minority (i.e. 5%) that disagrees. Based on these results, 
it is safe to conclude that the security controls recommended by ISO 27001 can 
assist in managing IT security risk if applied correctly. 
 
6.2.2.3. Question 5(c): Section 2 of the questionnaire 
As discussed in Chapter 3, COBIT 5 provides guidance on what processes and 
controls should exist within an IT division of an organisation, with only a subset of 
COBIT 5 focusing on IT security. Implementing an IT governance framework 
correctly within an organisation provides many benefits, one of which is effective 
management of IT security risk (IT Governance Institute [ITGI], 2012). COBIT 5 was 
investigated because it provides a view of the processes and controls that are 
essential for an IT environment, thereby making a link to the business requirements 
and encouraging responsibility assignment. Figure 6.11 depicts the response 
summary for question 5(c) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – Question 5(c): COBIT 
 
2% 
8% 
5% 
50% 
35% 
5(c) IT Security Frameworks (COBIT) 
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Agree
Strongly Agree
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Figure 76.11 indicates that even though there is a significant number of respondents 
who agree with the use of COBIT for IT security risk management, there is still a 
substantial number of respondents who disagree with the use of COBIT for IT 
security risk management. The questionnaire did not provide a field that allowed the 
respondents who are not in agreement with the opportunity to provide the reasons 
thereof. 
 
COBIT is predominantly an IT governance framework; hence, it is good when an 
organisation wants to define the controls and processes that should make up their IT 
environment. Based on the results depicted in Figure 6.11, it is safe to conclude that 
COBIT has some good characteristics which may be applied in managing IT security 
risk. 
 
6.2.2.4. Question 5(d): Section 2 of the questionnaire 
The literature review in Chapter 3 discussed ITIL in detail. The literature indicated 
that ITIL is also an IT governance framework that is used mostly within the IT 
operations area. ITIL’s primary focus is the IT service life cycle, which implies that it 
does not solely focus on IT security. For this reason, ITIL might not be strong in most 
aspects of managing IT security risk. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
governance principles recommended by ITIL indirectly assist in mitigating IT security 
risk; as such, it was selected for this study. Figure 6.12 illustrates the response 
summary for question 5(d) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.12 – Question 5(d): ITIL 
 
Once again, as demonstrated in Figure 6.12, the majority of the respondents agree 
that ITIL can be used to manage IT security risk (i.e. 22% strongly agree and another 
51% agree). Twelve per cent of the respondents neither agree nor disagree. In 
contrast, 15% of the respondents disagree with the fact that ITIL can assist in 
managing IT security risk. 
 
Because the majority of IT activities within an organisation take place in the IT 
operations area, most IT security incidents are also found there (IT Service 
Management Forum [ITSMF], 2007). To ensure that proper governance controls are 
in place, a framework such as ITIL can provide significant value in guiding the IT 
operational activities better (ITSMF, 2007). For this reason, IT security risk gets to be 
better managed when a good IT governance framework is effective. An assumption 
is made that even though ITIL’s primary focus is not IT security, it can still assist in 
managing IT security risk to a certain degree. 
 
6.2.2.5. Question 5(e): Section 2 of the questionnaire 
As its title suggests, the ISF Standard of Good Practice (SoGP) provides a detailed 
best practice set of controls which covers the IT environment holistically, minimising 
the need to purchase an additional repository of potential controls (Chaplin & 
Creasy, 2011). The ISF SoGP is one of the well-known standards across the globe 
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within the field of IT security, and it is also commonly used for benchmarking 
purposes, as discussed in Chapter 3. The ISF SoGP provides IT security controls 
and does not explicitly present a specific risk management process. It was selected 
for this study because of its rigour and ease of integration with other frameworks. 
Figure 6.13 shows the response summary for question 5(e) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.13 – Question 5(e): ISF SoGP 
 
Figure 6.13 reveals that 82% of the respondents agree with the fact that ISF SoGP 
can be used to manage IT security risk (i.e. with 46% agreeing and 36% strongly 
agreeing). ISF SoGP is solely focused on IT security, hence its high popularity within 
the IT security community. Figure 6.13 also demonstrates that 5% of the 
respondents disagree that ISF SoGP is good in managing IT security risk. On the 
other hand, 13% of the respondents neither agree nor disagree, which may imply 
that they have never used it before or that they do not know it. Once again, it is 
concluded that ISF SoGP can be used to manage IT security risk. 
 
6.2.2.6. Summary for section 2 responses 
The five frameworks and standards assessed in this section are some of the most 
common frameworks and standards used within the field of IT security. The results 
have indicated that even though a minority of the respondents disagree with some of 
the frameworks and standards, there is still a majority of the respondents who agree 
3% 
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5(e) IT Security Frameworks (ISF SoGP) 
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that the discussed frameworks and standards can be used to manage IT security 
risk. This proves that there are some good elements about the frameworks and 
standards discussed and there are some elements which other users do not prefer, 
hence the purpose of this study.  
 
Because section 2 of the questionnaire aimed to determine if frameworks and 
standards investigated possess good characteristics for managing IT security risk, it 
is therefore safe to conclude that this goal was achieved. Research sub-objective 1 
has been achieved because the majority of the respondents showed a fairly 
consistent level of agreement for the statements presented by the questionnaire. 
 
6.2.3. Findings for section 3 of the questionnaire: Approach to IT security 
It is indicated in Chapter 3 that there are various approaches which can be applied in 
managing IT security risk. The objective of this section was to assess the 
respondents’ views with respect to the approach they use in managing IT security 
risk in comparison to the attributes used to define the ITSRB approach. Moreover, 
the questions in this section linked directly to research sub-objective 2 and research 
question 2 (i.e. Can best practice risk management principles and IT security threat 
modelling processes be adopted for IT security risk management?) presented in  
Figure 2.4. The following request was presented in the questionnaire: “indicate 
your opinion on the primary attributes of the proposed approach”. Figure 6.14 
presents the response summary for this section. 
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Figure 6.14 – Section 3 Response Summary 
 
Figure 6.14 illustrates that section 3 of the questionnaire comprised five sub-
questions, namely, question 6(a), question 6(b), question 6(c), question 6(d) and 
question 6(e), also indicated in Figure 6.2. The individual questions for this section 
are discussed in Section 6.2.3.1 to 6.2.3.5.  
 
6.2.3.1. Question 6(a): Section 3 of the questionnaire 
To ensure the correct coverage of IT security risk, assessment of risk should be 
conducted at a strategic, tactical and operational levels of management (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2010). Question 6(a) assessed the 
level of agreement from the respondents regarding the use of a combination of a top-
down approach (i.e. from strategic level down to operational level) as well as the 
bottom-up approach (i.e. from operational level up to strategic level) in managing IT 
security risk. This attribute is also termed the hybrid approach in Chapter 5 and was 
derived from the OCTAVE framework, as it allows for the entire organisation to be 
involved in management of IT security risk. Figure 6.15 depicts the response 
summary for question 6(a) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
a) Use of a mix of
top-down and
bottom-up
approaches to
identify IT security
risk
b) Use of an iterative
process for an IT
security risk
management
approach
c) Responsibility
assignment (e.g.
RACI model) for an IT
security risk
management
approach
d) Definition of input
and output elements
for an IT security risk
management
approach
e) Inclusion of threat
modeling to increase
dynamicity of the IT
security risk
management
approach
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Agree
104 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 6.15 – Question 6(a): Top-down and Bottom-up Approach 
 
Figure 6.15 highlights that the majority of the respondents agreed with the statement 
(i.e. 34% agree and 53% strongly agree with this statement). Only 8% of the 
respondents were neutral (i.e. neither agree nor disagree). The detailed analysis 
conducted in Chapter 3 pointed out that failure to manage risk from the top as well 
as risk from the operations of the IT environment could result in a one-sided view of 
the IT security risk profile. In the cases where risk is not identified and managed 
properly, there might be dire consequences. It is therefore safe to conclude that this 
attribute is good for effective IT security risk management. 
 
6.2.3.2. Question 6(b): Section 3 of the questionnaire 
ISO 31000 and all the selected IT security frameworks and standards emphasise the 
importance of iteration to ensure continuous improvement. Question 6(b) assessed 
the respondents’ level of agreement respecting employing an iterative process to 
manage IT security risk. This attribute was also discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
Figure 6.16 depicts the response summary for question 6(b) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.16 – Question 6(b): Iterative Process 
 
The results as revealed in Figure 6.16 show that 95% of the respondents agree (i.e. 
47% agree and 48% strongly agree) that an IT security risk management process 
should be iterative. Five per cent of the respondents did not agree nor disagree with 
this principle. Because the questionnaire was not designed in a way that provided 
the respondents with the opportunity to present their views on not agreeing with 
some of the statements, it was not possible to know the reasons from those 
respondents.  
 
The reviewed literatureindicated the importance of iteration for IT security risk 
management. It is therefore safe to come to the conclusion that the principle of 
iteration is required for IT security risk management. Lack of an iterative process 
might result in unanticipated risk materialising, resulting in unforeseen 
consequences. 
 
6.2.3.3. Question 6(c): Section 3 of the questionnaire 
Banacorsi (2011) has demonstrated the importance of responsibility assignment for 
any task. Failure to explicitly assign a specific task to an individual may lead to 
ambiguity, thus resulting in a task not being executed or the task not receiving the 
correct level of attention (Smith & Erwin, 2005). Responsibility assignment is also 
deemed as one of the important principles of the COBIT framework, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. This matter was presented to the respondents in order to assess their 
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level of agreement with reference to the importance of responsibility assignment as 
part of an IT security risk management process. Figure 6.17 illustrates the response 
summary for question 6(c) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.17 – Question 6(c): Responsibility Assignment 
 
Figure 6.17 shows that the majority of the respondents agreed with this statement 
(i.e. 35% agree and 56% strongly agree). Seven per cent of the respondents neither 
agree nor disagree, whereas 2% of them disagree with the statement. Based on the 
high level of agreement from the respondents as well as the analysis conducted in 
Chapter 3, it is safe to conclude that responsibility assignment is a good attribute for 
IT security risk management.  
 
6.2.3.4. Question 6(d): Section 3 of the questionnaire 
It is imperative for any process to have input and output elements defined to manage 
expectation regarding what artefacts are required to execute and complete the 
respective processes (ITSMF, 2007). The objective of this question was to assess 
the respondents’ level of agreement in comparison to the proposed approach about 
the importance of defining input and output elements as part of an IT security risk 
management process. This attribute was derived from the ITIL framework discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3. Figure 8.18 depicts the response summary for question 6(d) of 
the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.18 – Question 6(d): Input and Output Elements  
 
Figure 6.18 presents the results from the respondents. It came to light that 36% of 
the respondents agree and 47% of the respondents strongly agree with this 
statement. However, 15% of the respondents neither agree nor disagree, while 2% 
of them disagree.  
 
A number of tasks within organisations are not completed or are found to be poorly 
designed because the users do not know what they are meant to produce (Calder, 
2013). The reviewed literature and the fact that over 80% of the respondents agree 
with this attribute implies that this principle is important. It is concluded that the task 
of defining input and output elements have a level of impact on the efficiency of an IT 
security risk management process. 
 
6.2.3.5. Question 6(e): Section 3 of the questionnaire 
IT is dynamic in nature; because of that, the threats associated with IT also change 
quite often (Winter & Schelp, 2008). The objective of this question was to assess the 
respondents’ level of agreement regarding the inclusion of threat modelling during an 
IT security risk management process. The idea behind threat modelling is to ensure 
that the right risk that is facing an organisation is managed in a way that will provide 
the highest benefits possible (i.e. risk versus value). Figure 6.19 highlights the 
response summary for question 6(e) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.19 – Question 6(e): Threat Modelling  
 
The majority of the respondents of this survey agree with the statement as indicated 
in Figure 7.19 (i.e. 60% strongly agree and 37% agree). As demonstrated in Chapter 
4, the benefits of conducting threat modelling are enormous. Threat modelling 
provides its users with the ability to be more proactive and dynamic when managing 
IT security risk. It is therefore safe to conclude that it is important to cater for the 
nature of change associated with IT during an IT security risk management process. 
 
6.2.3.6. Summary of section 3 responses 
The five primary attributes of how to best approach IT security risk management 
were presented to the respondents. The responses indicate a positive trend by the 
majority of the respondents (i.e. strongly agree and agree). As previously 
highlighted, these attributes were sourced from the different best practice 
frameworks and consolidated to make up the primary attributes of the proposed 
ITSRB approach. Based on the foregoing, it is safe to deduce that the approach that 
is employed by the ITSRB approach to manage IT security risk possesses sound 
attributes which may assist organisations in managing this risk more effectively.  
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6.2.4. Findings for section 4: Key principles of the proposed IT security risk 
management approach 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the ITSRB approach was defined in a way that ensured 
that essential principles derived from the best practice frameworks and standards 
are incorporated as the basic principles. The objective of this section is to determine 
the respondents’ views about the derived principles of the ITSRB approach. 
Furthermore, the questions in this section linked directly to research sub-objective 3 
and research question 3 (i.e. Do the characteristics and attributes deduced from the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards, risk management principles, and 
IT security threat modelling process provide a good base for a proactive and 
dynamic IT security risk management approach?) presented in Figure 2.4. The 
request presented in the questionnaire was: “indicate your opinion on the key 
principles of the proposed approach”. Figure 6.20 presents the response 
summary for this section. 
 
 
Figure 6.20 – Section 3 Response Summary 
 
In Figure 6.20, it is indicated that section 4 of the questionnaire consisted of seven 
sub-questions, namely, question 7(a), question 7(b), question 7(c), question 7(d), 
question 7(e), question 7(f) and question 7(g), also presented in Figure 2.4. The 
individual questions for this section are discussed in Section 6.2.4.1 to 6.2.4.7.  
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6.2.4.1. Question 7(a): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
The direction that any organisation follows is directed by the organisational strategy 
(Hill & Turbitt, 2006). Because IT is considered a custodian of business information, 
the strategy for IT should be fully aligned with the organisational strategy (Hill & 
Turbitt, 2006). Question 7(a) assessed the respondents’ views about using the 
organisational strategy as well as the IT strategy in defining the IT security strategy. 
Figure 6.21 depicts the response summary for question 7(a) of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.21 – Question 7(a): IT Security Strategy 
 
The results shown in Figure 6.21 indicate that the majority of the respondents agree 
with this statement (i.e. 56% strongly agree and 42% agree). Furthermore, Hill and 
Turbitt (2006) emphasised the importance of using both the organisational strategy 
as well as the IT strategy as input to define the IT security strategy. It is therefore 
safe to conclude that an IT security strategy should use the organisational strategy 
and the IT strategy as input elements. 
 
6.2.4.2. Question 7(b): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
 
The ITIL framework demonstrates the importance of considering previous incidents 
during the root cause analysis process in order to reduce recurring incidents (ITSMF, 
2007). Adopting this principle in managing IT security risk will assist in ensuring that 
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during risk identification, previous risk and incidents are considered during the risk 
identification process.  
 
The objective of incorporating this principle is to ensure that a comprehensive view 
of the IT security risk profile is accounted for and that the chances of previous risk 
materialising are minimised. Question 7(b) assessed the respondents’ view’ in 
considering previous risk and incidents during the IT security risk identification 
process. Figure 6.22 illustrates the response summary for question 7(b) of the 
questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.22 – Question 7(b): Consideration of previous IT Security Risks and Incidents 
 
Figure 6.22 indicate that the majority of the respondents agree with the statement 
presented in question 7(b) (i.e. 46% of the respondents agree and 50% strongly 
agree). Only 2% of the respondents neither agree nor disagree with this statement, 
whereas the remaining 2% of them disagree. Based on the ITIL framework’s 
recommendation and the high level of agreement by the respondents, this principle 
is considered a good principle for the ITSRB approach. 
 
6.2.4.3. Question 7(c): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
An audit finding is another source of risk (ITGI, 2007). Audit findings indicate the 
areas of IT security which have weaknesses in controls that may have been 
associated with a process, people or technology (ITGI, 2007). To ensure that all risk 
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is accounted for, it is important to consider audit findings for IT security during IT 
security risk identification. The objective of question 7(c) was to assess the 
respondents’ views in considering IT security audit findings during the risk 
identification process. Figure 6.23 presents the response summary for question 7(c) 
of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 6.23 – Question 7(c): Consideration of IT security Audit Findings 
 
From Figure 6.23, it is apparent that the minority of the respondents (i.e. 7%) neither 
agree nor disagree with this principle. However, the majority of the respondents 
agree with this principle (i.e. 40% agree and 53% strongly agree). Based on the fact 
that audit findings are another source of risk and the agreement level of the 
respondents, it is safe to make the deduction that considering IT security audit 
findings during the IT security risk identification process is essential. 
 
6.2.4.4. Question 7(d): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
 
One of the issues which remain unsolved in managing IT security risk includes the 
need of a formal risk management process for IT security (Krichene, 2008). The 
objective of question 7(d) was to assess the respondents’ views about the formal 
assessment of IT security risk on a periodic basis to ensure that this risk is 
adequately managed. Figure 6.24 depicts the response summary for question 7(d) of 
the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.24 – Question 7(d): Periodic IT Security Risk Assessment  
 
It is evident from Figure 6.24 that the majority of the respondents agree with this 
principle (i.e. 50% agree and 41% strongly agree). Seven per cent of the 
respondents neither agree nor disagree, while 2% of them disagree. As previously 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, many organisations have failed in managing the risk 
associated with IT security because IT security risk management is not formalised. It 
is therefore safe to make the conclusion that this principle is a good principle for the 
ITSRB approach. 
 
6.2.4.5. Question 7(e): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
The direction that any organisation follows is directed by its business operations (Hill 
& Turbitt, 2006). The type of business that is conducted by any organisation 
introduces specific IT security risk. It is therefore important to consider IT security 
threats that are facing a specific organisation in managing IT security risk to ensure 
that the correct risks are managed (Gandotra, et al., 2012). Question 7(e) assessed 
the respondents’ views with regard to including threat modelling as part of the IT 
security risk management process. Figure 6.25 highlights the response summary for 
question 7(e) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.25 – Question 7(e): Threat Modelling 
 
Figure 6.25 indicates that all respondents agree with this principle (i.e. 53% of the 
respondents agree and 44% strongly agree). It is therefore safe to conclude that 
including threat modelling as an integral part of an IT security risk management 
process is vital. 
 
6.2.4.6. Question 7(f): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
 
It is essential to ensure that all risk is documented to allow for knowledge sharing 
(Institute of Risk Management [IRM], 2010). Documenting and agreeing all risk 
elements assists in ensuring that important risk information is available and 
communicated as and when required to the relevant stakeholders (IRM, 2010). The 
first step in documenting risk is achieved through the use of a risk register that is 
reviewed regularly. Question 7(f) assessed the respondents’ views on creating and 
maintaining an IT security register which is reviewed regularly. Figure 6.26 illustrates 
the response summary for question 7(f) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.26 – Question 7(f): IT Security Risk Register 
 
Figure 6.26 demonstrates that only 3% of the respondents disagree with this 
principle. The majority of the respondents agree (i.e. 42% agree and 52% strongly 
agree). Based on recommendations from IRM (2010) and the level of agreement of 
the respondents, it is safe to make the conclusion that this principle also provides a 
good base for the ITSRB approach.  
 
6.2.4.7. Question 7(g): Section 4 of the questionnaire 
 
Managing IT security risk is a process that involves an entire organisation, from 
senior management to most junior staff (NIST, 2010). Because senior management 
is ultimately accountable for risk management, progress of risk should be 
communicated to them on a periodic basis, including IT security risk (NIST, 2010). 
Communicating IT security risk formally will ensure that the IT risk profile and areas 
of improvement are known by the leadership of the organisation. The objective of 
this question was to assess the respondents’ views about the importance of formally 
communicating the IT security risk profile on a periodic basis. Figure 6.27 depicts the 
response summary for question 7(g) of the questionnaire. 
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Figure 6.27 – Question 7(g): IT Security Risk Reporting 
 
As indicated in Figure 6.27, all the respondents to this question agree with this 
principle (i.e. 50% agree and 46% strongly agree). It is therefore safe to assume that 
this principle is important to include as an integral part of the ITSRB approach. 
 
6.2.4.8.  Summary of section 4 responses 
For all the principles presented in section 4 of the questionnaire, the results indicate 
agreement from the responses. The principles presented in this section have been 
used as integral components of the ITSRB approach. The agreement from the 
respondents therefore confirms that the principles applied to the ITSRB approach 
are crucial for effective management of IT security risk. 
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6.3. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the results of the survey as well as the analysis of the 
findings for each section of the questionnaire. It is important to note that all the 
questions presented in the questionnaire were linked to the research objective and 
sub-objectives of this study, presented in Figure 2.4. The reason for linking the 
research objective to the questionnaire was to ensure that the questions asked to the 
respondents followed a sound approach. The questions used in the questionnaire 
assessed the elements, attributes and principles of the ITSRB approach, which were 
based on the IT security frameworks and standards, risk management principles and 
IT security threat modelling found in Chapter 4.  
 
Throughout the questionnaire responses, the majority of the respondents agreed 
with the statements presented. Sporadically, there were negative responses from 
some of the respondents which highlighted disagreement with some of the presented 
statements. However, Chapters 3 and 4 provided a good source for some of the IT 
security frameworks and standards’ principles. The conclusions made for each 
question from the questionnaire were not only made from a theoretical point of view 
but also considered the respondents’ answers.  
 
It is therefore safe to conclude that the ITSRB employs sound attributes and 
principles which can assist organisations in managing IT security risk better. The 
research objective and sub-objectives proposed in Chapter 1 were indeed satisfied 
with the results of this survey.  
 
The final chapter concludes this study by summarising the discoveries made from 
conducting this study as well as proposing recommendations for future research. 
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7.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this study is to investigate whether strong characteristics of the 
existing IT security frameworks and standards, the basic risk management 
principles, and the IT security threat modelling processes within the best practice 
body of knowledge can be extended to develop a formal and proactive approach to 
managing IT security risk. The main objective of this study is achieved through the 
development of the ITSRB approach, which is a new contribution made to the field of 
IT security.  
 
The motivation for developing the ITSRB approach was pointed out during the 
literature review within the current body of knowledge, in chapter 1 of this study. 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that there are a number of IT security frameworks and 
standards that are available for use. However, there are still a number of challenges 
in the formalisation of IT security risk management, which this study proposed to 
address. The intention was to reuse the existing IT security frameworks and 
standards by extracting their strong characteristics, risk management principles and 
threat modelling to develop a unified approach that addresses the identified gaps.  
 
The penultimate chapter analysed the data for this study. The purpose of this 
concluding chapter is to discuss the process that was followed in drawing the 
conclusions that were made. The research objective and the sub-objectives are 
reassessed to establish how they are achieved through the development of the 
ITSRB approach, in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 revisits the research questions that 
underpin the research objective and research sub-objectives, as presented in 
Chapter 1. The research questions are evaluated in order to ascertain how they 
meet the research objective of this study. Sections 7.4 and 7.5 present the strengths 
and the weaknesses of the ITSRB approach respectively. Section 7.6 deals with the 
weaknesses from the investigated IT security frameworks and standards addressed 
by the ITSRB approach. Section 7.7 provides recommendations for future work, 
followed by Section 7.8, which concludes the chapter and this study. 
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7.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
Chapter 1 presented the research objective as follows: 
 
To investigate whether strong characteristics of the existing IT security frameworks 
and standards, the basic risk management principles, and the IT security threat 
modelling processes within the best practice body of knowledge can be extended to 
develop a formal and proactive approach for managing IT security risk. 
 
The main research question of this study was presented in Chapter 1 as follows: 
  
Can a formal, dynamic and proactive approach for managing IT security risk be 
developed through the use of existing IT security frameworks and standards, basic 
risk management principles, and IT security threat modelling processes? 
 
The above-mentioned research objective was achieved through answering the main 
research question and ultimately developing the ITSRB approach. The ITSRB 
approach embodied strong characteristics of the evaluated IT security frameworks 
and standards as a base. Thereafter, threat modelling was incorporated in order to 
increase the level of dynamicity of this approach. Lastly, basic risk management 
principles were incorporated to ensure that the ITSRB approach follows a robust 
process of managing IT security risk.  
 
Additionally, the research methodology in this study was carried out in the form of a 
survey to evaluate the ITSRB approach. This was achieved by assessing the level of 
agreement from IT security experts within the scope of this study on the ITSRB 
approach. The survey yielded positive results as presented in Chapter 6. 
 
7.3. RESEARCH SUB-OBJECTIVES 
The study was based on three research sub-objectives and their supporting 
questions. The research sub-objectives coupled with their research questions – 
which were presented in Chapter 1 – are follows: 
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Research sub-objective 1: Investigate the best practice IT security frameworks and 
standards which are most commonly used within the financial institutions in South 
Africa by identifying their common characteristics and limitations.  
Research question 1: Do the selected best practice IT security frameworks and 
standards most commonly used within the financial institutions in South Africa assist 
in managing IT security risk? 
 
Research sub-objective 2: Investigate basic risk management principles and IT 
security threat modelling processes to assess their benefits for IT security risk 
management. 
Research question 2: Can best practice risk management principles and IT security 
threat modelling processes be adopted for IT security risk management? 
 
Research sub-objective 3: Consolidate the strong characteristics of the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards, basic risk management 
principles, and IT security threat modelling processes to develop characteristics and 
attributes of a dynamic IT security risk management approach. 
Research question 3: Do the characteristics and attributes deduced from the 
investigated IT security frameworks and standards, risk management principles, and 
IT security threat modelling processes provide a good base for a proactive and 
dynamic IT security risk management approach? 
 
The three sections that follow discuss the manner in which the research questions 
are answered in this study. 
 
7.3.1. Research sub-objective 1 
As discussed in Chapter 3, there are many IT security frameworks and standards 
which exist in the current body of knowledge addressing various areas of IT security 
from encryption to application security, to data leakage, to compliance. Furthermore, 
because the scope of this study is limited to financial institutions within South Africa, 
the frameworks and standards chosen are amongst the well known and mostly used. 
 
For the above reasons, the literature review section evaluated five IT security 
frameworks and standards, namely, OCTAVE, ISO 27001, COBIT, ITIL, and ISF 
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Standard of Good Practice. The frameworks and standards reviewed either solely 
focused on IT security (i.e. OCTAVE, ISO 27001/2 and ITIL) or have components 
that focus on IT security (i.e. COBIT and ITIL).  
 
The detailed analyses of the frameworks and standards evaluated have similar 
objectives in respect of IT security, which is to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity 
and availability of information and/or systems. Moreover, these frameworks and 
standards provide a generic blueprint for managing IT security, resulting in better-
managed risk as well as reduced vulnerabilities.  
 
Research sub-objective 1 and the associated research question were answered 
through a detailed analysis of the evaluated frameworks and standards conducted in 
Chapter 3. In addition to that, section 2 of the questionnaire yielded positive results 
from the IT security professionals who participated in the survey. It is therefore safe 
to deduce that this research objective and the associated research question were 
achieved. 
 
7.3.2. Research sub-objective 2 
To achieve research sub-objective 2 as well as answer the associated research 
question, basic risk management principles and threat modelling processes were 
evaluated in Chapters 3 and 4 of this study respectively. In addition, to ensure that a 
risk based approach is incorporated, the ISO 31000 framework which provides the 
basic risk management principles was reviewed in Chapter 3. Incorporating the risk 
management principles in the management of IT security risk would ensure that the 
process is more formal and that risk is prioritised based on its criticality.   
 
In addition to the foregoing, the threat modelling process was presented in Chapter 4 
to demonstrate the importance of modelling IT security threats during IT security risk 
management. Threat modelling assists in ensuring that the correct focus is placed on 
the threats that face an organisation, thereby providing a dynamic process for IT 
security risk management.  
 
In view of the aforementioned points, incorporating basic risk management principles 
and threat modelling process into an IT security risk management process was 
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deemed necessary. This research objective, as well as the associated research 
question, was further evaluated in section 3 of the questionnaire, which yielded 
positive results. For this reason, it is safe to conclude that this research objective 
was achieved. 
 
7.3.3. Research sub-objective 3 
Concerning research sub-objective 3 and its accompanying research question, the 
comparative analysis conducted and presented in Chapter 5 indicated that 
frameworks and standards generally tend to focus on a specific level of 
management, thus creating gaps. Because of this, some IT security risks may be 
missed because of the applicability level of the frameworks and standards.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis conducted revealed that the majority of the investigated IT 
security frameworks and standards (i.e. COBIT 4.1, ISO 27001, ITIL, and ISF SoGP) 
focus on recommending security controls and not providing recommendations for 
prioritising these controls. Organisations may easily find themselves chasing the 
implementing of security controls, not taking into account the risk that faces them.  
 
Consolidating the IT security frameworks and standards’ strong characteristics, 
threat modelling and risk management principles was found to be necessary for 
providing an approach that is comprehensive, dynamic and proactive in managing IT 
security risk. Furthermore, the principles of the ITSRB approach were evaluated 
through section 4 of the questionnaire by IT security professionals who participated 
in the survey. The survey yielded positive results from the majority of the 
respondents. Additional validation was received on the ITSRB approach (i.e. in 
Chapter 5), as it was accepted at the International Conference Information Security 
for South Africa 2015, where valuable feedback and comments were attained and 
incorporated. The next section discusses the strengths of the ITSRB approach. 
 
7.4. STRENGTHS OF THE ITSRB APPROACH 
The motivation for this study (presented in Chapter 1) highlights the gaps that are 
encountered in managing IT security risk. The ITSRB approach bridges the identified 
gaps by incorporating the elements that follow as a base. 
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7.4.4. Basic risk management principles 
The ITSRB approach incorporates the ISO 31000 risk management principles in 
identifying, assessing, treating and communicating IT security risk. This ensures that 
a robust and iterative process is followed in managing IT security risk management, 
thereby ensuring that IT security risk is managed alongside with other organisational 
risks.  
 
Furthermore, the ITSRB approach provides a mechanism that ensures that IT 
security risk is managed holistically throughout all levels of management (i.e. 
strategic, tactical and operational level). In this way, IT security risk receives the 
correct level of attention within any organisation. 
 
7.4.5. Proactive and dynamic approach 
The ITSRB approach incorporates threat modelling to manage IT security risk. As 
previously discussed in the literature review section, IT is dynamic in nature, making 
the threats that arise from this environment dynamic as well. Proactively identifying 
threats and taking them into account during risk management provides a solution 
that actively addresses the risks that matter.  
 
7.4.6. Consolidated characteristics of best practice frameworks and 
standards 
The ITSRB uses consolidated characteristics of the best practice frameworks and 
standards as a base. As demonstrated in the literature review, some frameworks and 
standards lack in certain aspects and are strong in other regards. Consolidating the 
strong characteristics provides an approach that is comprehensive and more 
effective. 
 
7.4.7. Involvement of the entire organisation 
The ITSRB approach follows a consultative process which involves all levels of 
management within the organisation. In this way, a comprehensive view of the IT 
security risk profile is gathered about an organisation, reducing the risk of failing to 
identify other IT security risks that may be left out because of misplaced focus. 
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Complete elimination and mitigation of any risk is impossible; consequently, the 
ITSRB approach may have some weaknesses which are unknown. Section 7.7 
discusses the weaknesses identified for the ITSRB approach. 
 
7.5. WEAKNESSES OF THE ITSRB APPROACH 
It is important to acknowledge that no framework is perfect, as there is an 
overwhelming amount of information available that cannot be addressed. The 
weaknesses that follow were identified for the ITSRB approach. 
 
7.5.1. Scope of the study 
The scope of this study was limited to a specific industry (i.e. financial institutions 
within South Africa). For this reason, the ITSRB approach may have shortfalls when 
applied to other industries (such as telecommunications and health). There are other 
IT security frameworks and standards which are equally good or better within the 
field of IT security. The information used to define the ITSRB approach was only 
limited to frameworks and standards which were studied in detail.  
 
7.5.2. Theoretical base 
The ITSRB approach has not been tested in a real-world situation but is based on 
existing literature and studies. For this reason, the assumptions made about its 
effectiveness are interpretative. Subsequently, the results achieved from the 
research methodology carried out are based on the interpretation of the existing 
literature and may often be subjective in the natural sense. 
 
7.5.3. Limitation of the survey 
As previously discussed, a survey was carried out as the research methodology for 
this study. The survey was quantitative in nature and therefore did not provide a 
flexible mechanism that allowed the respondents to provide reasons for selecting the 
answers they chose. As a consequence, in instances where respondents did not 
agree with the presented statements, it is not possible to know why. Knowing this 
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information would have provided the data analysis section with more value, thereby 
identifying more areas of weaknesses for the ITSRB approach. 
 
Furthermore, with the chosen research methodology, it is always best to have as 
many respondents as possible. It is acknowledged that even though the sample size 
was small and provided an acceptable confidence level, a higher response level 
would have provided a better confidence level (i.e. 95% or higher). 
 
7.6. DEFICIENCIES FROM THE INVESTIGATED FRAMEWORKS AND 
STANDARDS ADDRESSED BY THE ITSRB APPROACH 
It was demonstrated in Table 5.1 that the selected frameworks and standards have 
different shortcomings, some of which are addressed by the ITSRB approach. At a 
high level, the ITSRB approach addresses the following aspects: 
 
• Organisational-wide view (Webb, Ahmad, Maynard & Shanks, 2014): Attribute 
1, discussed in Chapter 5, ensures that a comprehensive view of the IT security 
risk profile is captured within an organisation from the operational level up to the 
strategic level. 
• Slow response and reactiveness (Utin, Utin & Utin, 2008): Attribute 2 and 
attribute 5, discussed in Chapter 5, emphasises the importance of threat 
modelling which ensures that new threats are iteratively considered to ensure 
that a risk based approach is followed. This enables organisations to be more 
proactive. 
• Accountability (Nastase, et al., 2009): Attribute 3, discussed in Chapter 5, 
emphasises the need for explicitly documenting responsibilities when processes 
are executed. 
• Knowledge management (Shedden, Scheepers, Smith & Ahmad, 2011): The 
ITSRB approach emphasises the importance of capturing tacit knowledge in the 
risk management process to ensure continuity in the process. This is 
demonstrated in all the phases of the ITSRB approach presented in Chapter 5. 
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7.7. FUTURE WORK 
In recommending future work for this study, the weaknesses of the ITSRB approach 
discussed in section 7.5 of this chapter were considered. The following areas would 
add more value in the IT security field if further research is conducted: 
 
• The study can be expanded beyond the financial institutions of South Africa. 
Financial institutions in other countries may be doing things differently compared 
to those in South Africa (e.g. better operational processes inherently reducing IT 
security risk, and better technologies introducing more IT security risk). 
• The study can be expanded beyond the financial institution industry. There are 
other industries such as telecommunications, health, manufacturing, and aviation 
that can benefit from the use of a similar approach. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to determine if the ITSRB approach is over- or under-engineered for 
other industries.  
• Because the ITSRB approach was defined using only five best practice 
frameworks and standards, it might be limited in other aspects. Investigation of 
other best practice IT security frameworks and standards can also provide more 
value in enhancing the ITSRB approach. The tools that were recommended for 
the ITSRB approach may also have shortfalls which may be addressed by other 
tools if further investigation is pursued. 
• Implementing the ITSRB approach using empirical research methods (e.g. action 
research) would add more value by demonstrating the actual value or 
shortcomings when this approach is put into practice within a real organisation. 
This study was conducted based on theoretical assumptions and observations. 
 
7.8. CONCLUSION 
This section reflects on the process that was followed to develop the ITSRB 
approach.  The motivation for this study, discussed in chapter 1 of this study, proved 
to be viable as it provided current concerns which exist within different organisations 
in managing IT security risk. To determine a robust methodology for conducting this 
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study, chapter 2 investigated the most suitable research methodology which would 
provide the optimal results used to conclude this study. 
 
Based on the fact that there are frameworks and standards for IT security in the 
existing literature, it was deemed necessary to adopt and reuse some of the key 
principles from those frameworks and standards to develop the ITSRB approach.  
The selected frameworks and standards for IT security were investigated and 
discussed in detail within chapter 3 of this study. 
 
IT security is a dynamic discipline, what is valid today may not be valid tomorrow. 
For this fact, a formal process for threat modelling was investigated and discussed in 
chapter 4 to ensure that the constant changes that face the discipline of IT security 
are taken into consideration while developing the ITSRB approach.  
 
The ITSRB approach was developed and presented in chapter 5 of this study, using 
the theoretical foundation discovered in the previous chapter (i.e. chapters 1 - 4). At 
this point, a questionnaire was sent out to IT security professionals whereby the 
principles and attributes of the ITSRB approach were independently evaluated. 
Chapter 6 analysed the results from the respondents, which indicated that majority of 
the respondents were in agreement with how the ITSRB approach was constructed.  
 
Furthermore, the ITSRB approach was presented in a peer reviewed academic 
conference (Information Security South Africa - 2015) to validate its effectiveness 
and robustness. The feedback received from the IT security professionals who 
attended the conference was positive and viable. Constructive feedback received 
from the conference was used to enhance the final ITSRB approach presented in 
this study. 
 
Having reflected on the process followed to develop the ITSRB approach, it is safe to 
conclude that the ITSRB approach enhances the way IT security risk is managed 
within organisations thereby providing a blueprint for IT security risk management. 
This does not take away the fact that it is subject to being improved by peers to 
enhance the challenges that generally face IT security professionals within various 
industries. Combining efforts and ideas will help the ITSRB approach to becoming an 
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optimal solution that assists individuals and organisations in managing this type of 
risk. 
 
In concluding this study, this quote below is highlighted: “What you do today, may 
improve all your tomorrows” ~ Ralph Marston.  In the same vein, the ITSRB 
approach is a blueprint that can be used in improving the manner in which IT security 
is managed, thereby enhancing the future of IT security risk management. 
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8. APPENDIX A: SURVEY INVITATION 
LETTER 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
You are humbly invited to participate in an academic research study which is 
conducted under the School of Computing, of the University of South Africa.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate if the existing best practice IT security 
frameworks and standards can be unified to provide a more effective approach to 
management of both known and unknown IT security risks within a dynamic 
environment. 
 
Responding to the questionnaire requires only your personal, professional 
experience and not that of the organisation that you work for. I confirm that all 
responses will be treated as strictly confidential and that anonymity will be ensured. 
 
I value your participation and would appreciate it if you can complete this 
questionnaire. The questionnaire should not take more than 15 minutes of your time. 
Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from this research at any time 
without any negative consequences. 
 
Research Title:  A risk based approach for managing Information Technology 
security risk within a dynamic environment 
Researcher:  Bessy Mahopo (née Gomba), MSc student, UNISA 
   Email: 49020056@mylife.unisa.ac.za 
Supervisor:  H. Abdullah 
   GJ Gerwel Building, C4-62, Florida Campus, UNISA 
   Email: abdulh@unisa.ac.za    
 
Best Regards, 
Bessy Mahopo 
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9. APPENDIX B: ETHICAL CLEARANCE 
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10. APPENDIX C: SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Questionnaire 
 
Introduction: 
 
The rapid growth of society’s dependence on Information Technology (IT) has 
precipitated a growing apprehension about the security and reliability of this fragile 
infrastructure. Organisations and individuals always find themselves under pressure 
to stay abreast with the current technology in order to run their organisations or their 
lives, whereby their IT systems are open to the Internet. There is a tremendous 
amount of innovation involved with technology, which introduces a great deal of 
complexity within the IT environment, resulting in a significant number of IT security 
risks. Unfortunately, several issues remain unsolved including the need for 
sophisticated formalisation in the risk management reasoning, which is the basis of 
this research study.  
 
The intention of this questionnaire is to assess if the proposed risk based approach 
would assist in managing IT security risk more proactively and more effectively in a 
dynamic environment. 
 
This questionnaire is divided into the following sections: 
 
Section 1: General Information about the respondent and their professional 
experience 
Section 2: Best practice risk management frameworks and standards for IT security  
Section 3: Approach to IT security 
Section 4: Primary principles of the proposed IT security risk management approach 
 
Notes and Instructions: 
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The questionnaire will take approximately 12 minutes to complete. 
All questions relate to assessing if the proposed approach would be effective and 
efficient in addressing both known and unknown IT security risks within a dynamic 
environment. 
Responding to the questionnaire requires only your personal, professional 
experience and not that of the organisation that you work for.  
All responses will be treated as strictly confidential and anonymity will be ensured. 
All questions are closed-ended. 
Participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw from this research at any time 
without any negative consequences. 
 
SECTION 1: General information 
Question 1 
What is the size of the organisation that you work for? 
Small (< 200 Employees) Medium (200-1 000 Employees) Large (> 1 000 Employees) 
 
Question 2 
Does your day-to-day responsibility include management of IT security risk? 
Yes No 
 
Question 3 
Which area of IT security are you involved in? 
Governance  Risk Operations Other _________________ 
 
Question 4 
Experience in IT Security? 
0-5 Years 6-10 Years 10 Years+ 
 
SECTION 2: Best practice risk management frameworks and standards for IT 
security 
Question 5 
 
The following scale will be used to indicate your opinion on the IT security risk 
management frameworks and standards used in defining the proposed approach: 
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Scale Value Scale Description 
1 
Strongly Disagree: Indicates that the framework presented certainly does not 
assist in managing IT security risk. 
2 
Disagree: Indicates that the framework presented probably does not assist in 
managing IT security risk. 
3 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: Indicates that the respondent does not have a 
viewpoint about the presented framework. 
4 
Agree: Indicates that the framework presented does assist in managing IT 
security risk to some level if applied correctly. 
5 
Strongly Agree: Indicates that the framework presented certainly does assist in 
managing IT security risk if applied correctly. 
 
Question 5(a) 
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 5(b) 
ISO 27001/2 (Information Security Standard) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 5(c) 
COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 5(d) 
ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 5(e) 
ISF (Standard of Good Practice for Information Security) 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
SECTION 3: Approach to IT Security 
Question 6 
 
The following scale will be used to indicate your opinion on the primary attributes of 
the proposed approach: 
Scale Value Scale Description 
1 
Strongly Disagree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement 
certainly does not have an influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of 
an IT security risk management approach. 
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2 
Disagree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement probably does 
not have an influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security 
risk management approach. 
3 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: Indicates that the respondent does not agree nor 
disagree with the principle presented by the statement. 
4 
Agree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement does have some 
level of influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security risk 
management approach. 
5 
Strongly Agree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement certainly 
has an influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security risk 
management approach. 
 
Question 6(a) 
 Use of a mix of top-down and bottom-up approaches to identify IT security risk  
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 6(b) 
 Use of an iterative process for an IT security risk management approach 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 6(c) 
 Responsibility assignment (e.g. RACI model) for an IT security risk management approach 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 6(d) 
Definition of input and output elements for an IT security risk management approach 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 6(e) 
Inclusion of threat modelling to increase dynamicity of the IT security risk management 
approach 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
SECTION 4: Key principles of the proposed IT security risk management approach 
Question 7 
 
The following scale will be used to indicate your opinion on the key elements of the 
proposed approach: 
Scale Value Scale Description 
1 
Strongly Disagree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement 
certainly does not have an influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of 
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an IT security risk management approach. 
2 
Disagree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement probably does 
not have an influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security 
risk management approach. 
3 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: Indicates that the respondent does not agree nor 
disagree with the principle presented by the statement. 
4 
Agree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement does have some 
level of influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security risk 
management approach. 
5 
Strongly Agree: Indicates that the principle presented by the statement certainly 
has influence on the proactiveness and effectiveness of an IT security risk 
management approach. 
 
Question 7(a) 
Organisational strategy and IT strategy as input elements for an IT security risk strategy 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(b) 
Consideration of previous IT security risks and incidents for IT security risk identification 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(c) 
Consideration of previous IT security audit findings for IT security risk identification 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(d) 
Formal, periodic (e.g. quarterly) workshops for IT security risk assessments 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(e) 
Threat modelling (IT security) at a business unit level at least once a year 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(f) 
Development of an IT security risk register that is reviewed at least once a month 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
 
Question 7(g) 
Formal communication (i.e. reporting) of IT security risk to senior management on a 
quarterly basis 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
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11. APPENDIX D: LANGUAGE EDITING 
 
